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ABSTRACT
CLINTON’S FOREIGN POLICY 
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION:
CASES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Daneta G. Billau 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
This dissertation examines the sources of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s foreign 
policy, with special attention to understudied political elements of intervention. The 
basis of this study is the Clinton Doctrine, in which Clinton opposed ethnic cleansing, 
and supported democratic governance worldwide. The primary research question asks to 
what extent and why was there a variation in Clinton’s application o f his own doctrine in 
the specific cases of Rwanda in 1994, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 1999. To address 
this question, the following five hypotheses are posited:
H i: The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer the United States is to the
crisis, the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more 
peripheral interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the 
crisis, the less the president will push for intervention.
H2: The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene.
Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will 
intervene.
H3: The more the United Nations is likely to call for intervention, the more the United
States is likely to support it.
H4 : The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to 
oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.
H5 : The more the media opposes the president’s policy, the more public opinion will
engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding 
intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president’s policy, the 
less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president 
will be regarding intervention.
These hypotheses pertain to the five variables examined, including support for 
intervention from international allies, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, U.S. public 
opinion and the media, and U.S. interests under the Clinton administration.
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This dissertation examines the apparent contradiction between President Clinton’s 
foreign policy discourse (stated as a “doctrine”) and his policies, by focusing on 
international and domestic politics during times of crisis, to examine pressure placed on 
the president to implement particular foreign policy regarding intervention. Intervention 
covers a broad array o f actions, including the use of military force, humanitarian 
assistance, economic or financial sanctions or incentives, diplomatic or political 
negotiations, and inaction. In this dissertation, the focus is placed specifically on military 
intervention. This examination considers events in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor during 
the 1990s.
This dissertation is important for four reasons. First, presidential doctrines lend 
credence to foreign policy because they provide direction and momentum, and they 
explain that direction. It is important for each president to assert distance from his 
predecessors. Doctrines are a tool for doing this, because they tell the world the course 
that will be set by the leaders who articulate them. Second, presidential doctrine clarifies 
where the president places value. Doctrines are important strategically because they help 
communicate intent. During the cold war, for example, doctrines repeated variations of 
the message that the United States would contain communist expansion, even if that 
meant using military power. Third, presidential rhetoric gives clues to upcoming
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f  The Chicago M anual o f  Style: The 
Essential Guide fo r  Writers, Editors, and Publishers, 14th ed. (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1993).
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decisions. 1 Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained, “if 
doctrines capture the essence o f a challenge and formulate a response that is 
geostrategically coherent, they have a lasting effect. ” 2  The containment doctrine endured 
for fifty years during the cold war. Fourth, the Clinton Doctrine is an expression of 
humanitarian ideals not expressed in previous doctrines. Therefore, the Clinton Doctrine 
provides an example of unprecedented intent to end ethnic violence against innocent 
civilians around the world, even though such a doctrine could violate laws o f sovereignty. 
Thus, presidential doctrine is an important indicator o f long-term foreign policy direction 
that merits study. The following historical examples demonstrate the lasting nature of 
presidential doctrines.
After Word War II, the United States provided aid to Greece and Turkey to 
bolster their efforts to contain the aspirations of the Soviet empire. When then-president 
Harry Truman went to Congress to ask for that aid, he established the Truman Doctrine, 
arguing that it “must be the policy o f the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures . ” 3 The 
Truman Doctrine initiated and shaped foreign policy toward the containment of 
Communism that lasted throughout the cold war.
Richard Nixon became president after the strain o f the Vietnam War ended the 
political career of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. Nixon recognized that the United 
States could not sustain extended engagement in too many overseas commitments. As a
1. See Clark D. Edwards, “Predicting Presidential Decision Making from Presidential Language and 
Mass Media Reportage,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1995): 43 -66 .
2. Quoted in Bob Davis, “Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine’ for Foreign Policy Creates Concerns for 
Adversaries and Allies Alike,” The Wall S treet Journal, 6 August 1999, A12 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/ 
asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
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result, the Nixon Doctrine established that the United States would help those countries 
that helped themselves. The Nixon Doctrine branched out from strict containment policy 
to embrace a more flexible stance on resolving conflict abroad. It did this through the 
application of third-party politics, such as “Vietnamization,” in which the United States 
supplemented and replaced U.S. soldiers in the field with those o f a host country, thereby 
limiting costs of foreign conflict.
The Carter Doctrine came in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter Doctrine pronounced that the United States 
would intervene unilaterally and militarily to protect its vital interests in the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf. The Carter Doctrine maintained the momentum o f cold war Communist 
containment, and foreshadowed the eventual Persian Gulf war.
The Reagan Doctrine pronounced a return to Manichean foreign policy for 
containment o f the “evil empire” in the developing world. The Reagan Doctrine stated 
that the United States “must not break faith—on every continent from Afghanistan to 
Nicaragua—to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from 
birth . ” 4 The Reagan Doctrine was more sweeping than earlier containment doctrines, 
because it was not confined to Europe.
As these examples show, presidential doctrines should set the tone of foreign 
policy decisions during a given administration. The Truman, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan 
doctrines demonstrate that for fifty years, cold war doctrines remained deeply rooted in 
anti-communist rhetoric and sentiment that served to divide the East from the West. The
3. Quoted in Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas 
G. Patterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr., A People and a Nation: A H istory o f  the United States, 3rd ed. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 826.
4. Ronald Reagan, Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 21, no. 6, 11 February 1985, 146.
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Clinton Doctrine evolved, as do most presidential doctrines, from those seeking to 
understand the direction of the president’s foreign policy, rather than from an explicit 
announcement by the president himself. Charting a new course was not simple in the 
early years after the end of the cold war, and Clinton had to make many hard choices. 5 In 
the post-cold war era, Clinton had the rare opportunity to define the course of foreign 
policy at a time when the slate had been washed clean. As the first post-cold war 
president, Clinton had within his grasp the power to form foreign policy at a critical 
juncture in American history, when world politics was adjusting to tremendous and 
unsettling shifts in the international geopolitical balance. Therefore, the Clinton 
administration was selected for this study for one overarching but very profound reason: 
Clinton was the first post-cold war president with an opportunity to set the pace, tone, 
and agenda for U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future.
The end o f the cold war ushered in a new era and along with it, new post-cold war 
rhetoric. Jim Kuypers explains that the post-cold war approach needed fresh new rhetoric 
to replace that of the outdated cold war containment-based rhetoric . 6 Rhetoric could no 
longer be founded in communist containment, and under Clinton, there was a return to 
moralistic rhetoric, justifying intervention on humanitarian laws, norms, and principles. 
This new rhetoric eventually led to what would be termed the Clinton Doctrine.
Glimmers o f a future Clinton Doctrine began to take shape as early as his presidential 
campaign. In a campaign speech on 1 October 1992, Clinton noted that since
5. Difficult ethical choices regarding humanitarian actions are discussed in the collection o f  essays, 
see Jonathan Moore, ed., H ard Choices: M oral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
6. Jim A. Kuypers, Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the P ost-C old War World (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1997).
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democracies do not go to war against one another, democracy abroad helps protect 
Americans at home . 7 Clinton termed this speech “one o f the two most important 
speeches o f his presidential campaign.” The other was about the economy . 8
Clinton stood at the threshold of a changed international order. The post-cold war 
world had filled with “teacup wars , ” 9 and theory held that increasing the number of 
democratic states would reduce war, and increase stability. As the leader o f the only 
world superpower, Clinton could grasp the opportunity to define the nature of the 
international environment, and could thereby shape a world in which the United States 
would prosper. 10 In this regard, Clinton went on record on 23 March 1999, saying “I 
want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all of our differences, 
and where we don’t have to worry about seeing scenes every night for the next 40 years 
of ethnic cleansing in some part of the world . ” 11 Clearly, he envisioned a world 
environment where peaceful relations as well as basic human rights could prosper, and at 
least rhetorically, he was willing to use force to make that happen.
Clinton turned to democratic enlargement and the strengthening of international 
institutions as methods for stabilizing security in the international system. Democratic 
enlargement speaks to the very essence o f why we study international relations: how to 
overcome anarchy. Democratic enlargement is rooted in the democratic peace thesis, 
which posits that democracies do not go to war against one another. Clinton’s early
7. See A. M. Rosenthal, “On My Mind: The Clinton Doctrine,” New York Times, 6 October 1992,
23A.
8. Paul Gigot, “Clinton Doctrine? China and Bosnia Will Offer Clues,” The Wall Street Journal, 20 
November 1992, A14 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
9. Leslie Gelb, “Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World’s Constant Challenge,” Foreign Affairs 
73, no. 6 (1994): 2 -6 .
10. Hegemonic theory suggests that the nature o f  the system hegemon determines the nature o f  the 
system. Thus, if  the United States wants a benevolent system, it must use benevolent measures to shape it.
11. Charles Krauthammer, “The Clinton Doctrine,” Time 153, no. 13, 5 April 1999, 88.
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foreign policy emphasized strengthened international systemic constraints to provide 
stability in a U.S.-dominated post-cold war world. Therefore, the Clinton administration 
started out supporting democracy under the umbrella o f a strengthened United Nations, 
because such institutions provide legitimate authority for intervention in the internal 
affairs of sovereign countries. To bolster international stability, the Clinton 
administration supported democratic enlargement, as exemplified in the case study of 
Haiti, where Clinton demonstrated a willingness to use force to restore democracy and 
promote regional stability. Without the legitimacy provided by international institutions 
such as the United Nations, these interventions would be tantamount to invasion and 
declaration o f war.
Clinton’s early support of international organizations was called “assertive 
multilateralism” in his campaign speeches. Clinton’s efforts to strengthen the UN were 
demonstrated as early as April 1992, when the United States advocated a UN Rapid 
Deployment Force . 12 The United States indicated that it was prepared to incorporate the 
UN into its foreign policy in a serious manner, despite the fact that Congress increasingly 
criticized the UN, especially concerning contributions. For example, when Madeleine 
Albright became UN Ambassador, she spoke of the UN being “poised to take a central 
and positive role for peace . ” 13 Shortly thereafter, she embarked upon the policy of
12. See Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say NO: The Development o f  U.S. Policy for 
Peacekeeping,” in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and Uncivil Wars o f  the 1990s, ed. William J. 
Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 41.
13. Quote from Madeleine K. Albright, “Statement at Confirmation Hearing o f  U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations,” 23 January 1993, U.S. Department o f  State D ispatch  4, no. 15 (1993): 229.
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assertive multilateralism, indicating that a renewed American interest in the United 
Nations would be “more than a short-term fad . ” 14
In response to the pivotal events of 3 October 1993 in Somalia that culminated 
with the humiliation o f U.S. troops, Clinton altered his foreign policy strategy from 
multilateralism to “limited engagement. ” 15 The U.S. Marines arrived on the beaches of 
Mogadishu, Somalia in December 1992, in what started out under the Bush 
administration as a U.S.-led humanitarian operation, but became a nation-building 
mission in May 1993 under Clinton. The U.S. commitment in Somalia ended with the 
tragic deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers on 3 and 4 October 1993.16 The highly 
publicized images o f U.S. troops fighting and dying in Somalia shocked America. For 
fear o f a public backlash, Clinton reduced the mission mandate to humanitarian 
assistance only, and ordered U.S. forces to withdraw from Somalia within six months. 
Thus, warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed defeated the United States and 
demonstrated that it could be frightened away by a public display of killing U.S. soldiers.
Until Somalia, the United States had lacked explicit policy guidelines on 
participation in peacekeeping missions, but this changed quickly. Three pivotal speeches 
took place after the Somalia debacle. First, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright raised 
several tough questions at the National Defense University to qualify the types of 
conditions that should be present before the United States should consider intervention. 
Second, Clinton criticized the UN’s over-commitment, saying that “if  the American
14. Madeleine K. Albright, “Myths o f  Peacekeeping,” Statement before the Subcommittee on 
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights o f  the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 24 June 1993, U.S. Department o f  State D ispatch  4, no. 26 (1993): 464-7 .
15. Heinz A.J. Kern, “The Clinton Doctrine: A  N ew  Foreign Policy,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
18 June 1993 ,19  (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
16. For a policy discussion o f  the lessons from Somalia, see Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, 
“Somalia and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Ajfairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 70-85.
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people are to say ‘yes’ to UN peacekeeping, then the United Nations must know when to 
say ‘no . ’ ” 17 Third, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake addressed Johns Hopkins 
University and reminded the world that “multilateralism is a means, not an end,” and that 
it is “one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal. ” 18 These speeches were 
widely understood as a foreign policy reassessment.
As a direct response to events in Somalia, Clinton not only withdrew troops, but 
also completely reformulated peacekeeping guidelines initiated in April 1993. These 
guidelines would soon become known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). 
PDD 25 was an attempt to deal quickly with the loss of American troops in Somalia, 
before political rivals could use the opportunity to make it more damaging and politically 
costly for Clinton. The debacle in Mogadishu immediately created a backlash in 
Congress against participation in UN peacekeeping operations altogether. The Somalia 
debacle forced the Clinton administration to take a more restrictive line on UN peace 
operations in general, and an even tougher position on U.S. involvement in these 
missions. Thus, the PDD 25 was the administration’s major policy response to the 
Somalia humiliation, in an effort to prevent a public backlash against the use of American 
forces in UN missions.
The shift in policy was profound. During May 1994, Clinton’s budget requests 
found little support in Congress. Moreover, Congress had become staunchly opposed to 
paying UN peacekeeping dues, and made such payments conditional on UN reform.
From the American perspective, the UN could no longer be considered a tool for serious
17. Quoted in Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine,” The Los Angeles Times, 4 
October 1993, A19 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
18. Quoted in Kirkpatrick, “Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine.”
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foreign policy issues because of leadership and managerial inefficiency, not to mention 
an unruly membership. This stance would come back to haunt the Clinton 
administration, however, because Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN, 
delayed and blocked UN peacekeeping measures in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the UN 
Secretariat and member states, to varying degrees, considered the United States 
irresponsible, because it made payment on already outstanding dues conditional on 
reform.
Officially issued in May 1994, PDD 25 announced new limits on U.S. 
commitment to peacekeeping, as well as the administration’s intention to seek reform of 
UN peace operations . 19 From this point on, if ground troops would be inserted into 
ongoing civil conflict, then the United States would not deploy them for UN 
peacekeeping missions. Most broadly, PDD 25 “signaled a complete reversal of 
Clinton’s earlier declarations and returned foreign policy to the Republican, Weinberger- 
Powell doctrine o f extreme caution and non-support for international peacekeeping 
operations. ” 2 0  Robert Worth writes that the establishment o f a “Clinton Doctrine” of 
limited intervention forced the military to adjust to “a steady diet o f small-scale 
interventions. ” 21 While Clinton’s foreign policy did not require significant reforms at the 
Pentagon, Clinton was content, according to Professor Eliot Cohen, as long as the 
military “did not make headlines or get him into trouble . ” 2 2
19. For the unclassified Executive Summary o f  the directive, see White House, “The Clinton 
Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD25),” Annex One, USUNPress 
Release, 5 May 1994, 74.
20. Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  US Peacekeeping P olicy under Clinton: A Fairweather 
Friend  (London: Frank Cass, 2000), vii.
21. Robert Worth, “Clinton’s Warriors: The Interventionists,” W orld Policy Journal 15, no. 1 (1998)*
43.
22. Eliot Cohen quoted in ibid., 48.
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Upon deeper examination, policy variation under Clinton shows that he was in 
fact cautious in forging policy. Clinton said, in a 14 September 1994 speech, that he 
wanted to promote democracy abroad and that this was in the U.S. interest. His objective 
over three years was to “make sure that the military dictators leave power and that the
93democratically elected government is returned.”
Despite clear signs that the Clinton administration was pulling back from its 
initial statements supporting assertive multilateralism, confusion remained on what 
exactly the Clinton Doctrine was. For example, in December 1997, the doctrine was said 
to involve “avoiding war but using American troops in modest numbers in many places to 
create space for democracy (as in Haiti) or to keep warring factions from fighting again 
(in Bosnia) . ” 2 4  A few days later, another article pointed to “geoeconomics” and domestic 
special-interest groups as the roots o f the Clinton Doctrine 2 5
In June 1999, President Clinton helped clarify the Clinton Doctrine when he said, 
“If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of 
their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it,
• 9 6  99
we will stop it.” For some, this overarching goal looked like a recipe for inaction. 
Moreover, the goal itself was established with such clauses as “if it is in our power,” 
thereby making the policy a rhetorical device, rather than a tool for action. As a result, 
Clinton has been accused of operating in an “ad hoc” fashion that led to the “reality of
23. William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential 
Documents 30, no. 38, 18 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin...D=56249622997+
1 l+0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
24. E.J. Dionne, Jr., “The Clinton Doctrine,” The Washington Post, 26 December 1997, A29 
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).
25. Robert A. Manning and Patrick Clawson, “The Clinton Doctrine,” The Wall Street Journal, 29  
December 1997, A10 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).
26. Davis, “Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine.’”
27. For a critique o f  the breadth o f  the Clinton Doctrine, see Krauthammer, “The Clinton Doctrine.”
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inconsistency . ” 2 8  By relying on a number of case studies, this dissertation seeks to clarify 
this seeming inconsistency.
Placing each case study in the context o f the Clinton Doctrine is meaningful 
because it highlights differences between policy launched and policy implemented during 
the Clinton administration. As shown at the outset o f this chapter, rhetoric emanating 
from the White House during times o f international crisis should echo the doctrine 
announced by the president. Any policy departure away from doctrinal logic should be 
an indicator that there were other, more compelling factors. In this study, the Clinton 
Doctrine is the yardstick against which foreign policy decisions and implementation are 
measured. This study seeks to establish why extreme variations in the Clinton foreign 
policy occurred.
The three case studies introduced in this dissertation examine the uneven 
application of the Clinton Doctrine in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor. This examination 
clarifies the doctrine by exploring the administration’s actions as well as the explanations 
it offered for its policy. Although the end of ethnic cleansing was the fundamental goal 
of the Clinton Doctrine, that goal was not consistently pursued. This is seen particularly 
in the case of genocide in Rwanda, where the United States was unwilling to risk 
deploying ground troops to protect peripheral interests such as ending ethnic violence.
Chapter II lays out the literature regarding foreign policy and intervention.
Chapter III puts forward the dissertation research design, and provides the methodology 
for examining the hypotheses against three specific case studies, which are instrumental
28. Arnold Kanter, “Memorandum to the President,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a 
Workable Doctrine, ed. Alton Frye (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 1.
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in discovering how, and more importantly, why Clinton’s foreign policy appeared 
inconsistent with his rhetoric.
Chapters IV, V, and VI consist o f case studies o f crises in Rwanda, Haiti, and 
East Timor. The three case studies represent international crises, in which the U.S. policy 
on intervention addressed issues such as humanitarian aid, ethnic cleansing, or 
democratic governance. Chapter IV examines the case o f ethnic cleansing in Rwanda in 
1994, when the United States selected a humanitarian aid-only policy. Chapter V 
analyzes the U.S. diplomatic and military intervention in Haiti in 1994, focusing on 
democratic governance. Chapter VI considers U.S. non-intervention in 1999 in East 
Timor, where the United States remained on the sidelines despite the failure of 
democratic reforms. These three case studies demonstrate conflicting policy choices, and 
bring to bear the research question: to what extent and why was there a variation in 
Clinton’s foreign policy relative to the Clinton Doctrine. All case studies are similarly 
arranged around five specific variables: the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S.
Congress, U.S. public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests.
The final chapter in this dissertation brings together findings from the three case 
studies. It draws on similarities and differences in the findings to formulate a framework 
for understanding why and how Clinton apparently failed to consistently implement the 
Clinton Doctrine.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE ON FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION
The literature on foreign policy and intervention contains several fields o f study 
that portray different approaches to the debate over when, whether, how, where, and why 
to intervene. These include philosophy, law, theory, military operations, and foreign 
policy. The following section frames this debate from each perspective, and concludes 
by explaining how this dissertation fits into such a diverse body of literature.
PHILOSOPHY AND INTERVENTION
The philosophical discourse on intervention examines the fundamental moral and 
ethical essence o f what it means for an actor to take steps to alter a situation in another 
country, in which that actor was not originally involved. There are proponents and 
opponents of intervention who base their arguments along the lines o f just war or 
pacifism . 1 Richard Haass presents these schools o f thought along Christian and legal 
norms . 2 In general, both the just war and pacifism are defensive measures.
Just war assumes that individuals are left to negotiate the struggle to survive 
under conditions where there is no grand arbitrator and where attempts to mitigate 
anarchy have failed. Anarchy is conducive to a general state o f war, because there is no 
government, law, police, or sense o f community. A just war is waged as a last resort by a
1. See Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady, Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism  
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
2. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use o f  American M ilitary Force in the Post-C old  War World, 
rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
3. Michael Walzer gives extensive theory o f  just intervention in Just and Unjust Wars: A M oral 
Argument with H istorical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
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legitimate authority for a worthy cause, is expected to achieve success with the use of 
appropriate force, and respects the welfare of non-combatants.
This approach to intervention assumes that in the fight for survival, groups 
develop that share a common bond of similar values, norms, and principles. One value, 
for example, is that everyone has the basic and undeniable right to self-defense. By 
banding together in large groups with similar belief structures, people can live together 
without constant existential threat. An outgrowth of the concept that man has the 
undeniable right to self-defense extends to and justifies the idea o f national sovereignty, 
because even larger groups band together within a specified territory that is defensible 
and demarcated. Therefore, common morality within groups is a precursor for cultural 
differences between groups, which justify the establishment and defense of sovereign 
nations that are founded in the principle of non-interference. This calls to mind Samuel 
Huntington’s classic work regarding the eventual conflict between seven major 
civilizations that disagree on what is just and unjust. 4 Conflict operates similar to 
tectonic plates that move against one another, generating friction in the process.
When combined, morality and sovereignty lead to the idea o f just intervention as 
a means to protect given groups or nations. Intervention, in this view, is necessary when 
a system is corrupted to the point that survival is so threatened as to make it morally 
retrograde not to intervene to safeguard life and rights. James Mayall builds on this 
point, arguing that international institutions reflect progress in cultural and human 
understanding. This is because it is now possible for the UN Security Council, which 
derives legitimacy and authority from the international community, to intervene in civil
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  the W orld Order (New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
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conflicts “to protect the victims of sustained human rights abuse, even when the 
perpetrators were their own governments. ” 5 At this point, military intervention to stop 
ethnic cleansing is not only appropriate, but also justified, necessary, and responsible 
based on international values. In this line of thinking, it was the responsibility o f the 
international community to intervene in Rwanda to stop genocide.
The opposing view to the just war is the pacifist perspective on intervention. 
Pacifism stems from the concept that countries wish to influence the development or 
internal fabric o f other countries and can do so without the use o f military force. Along 
the lines of pacifism, there are those who support non-violent intervention—which is to 
say that they oppose the use o f force in general. 6 There are various approaches to the 
concept o f non-violent intervention, including various forms of aid and assistance 
programs, as well as diplomatic intervention to protect human rights. In a nutshell, non­
violent intervention consists of methods o f persuasion other than the use of military force 
(such as visiting mediators, transnational broadcasting), and economic activity (such as 
investment or sanctions). David Baldwin’s work on economic statecraft explains many 
forms o f economic political and diplomatic persuasion . 7 An example is positive and 
negative sanctions that are low-risk and low-cost to implement. While the jury is still out 
regarding levels o f success enjoyed by sanctions, they are nonetheless important forms of 
peaceful intervention and should not be ignored.
Economic expansion based on trade is another example o f non-violent
5. James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity, 2000). Mayall builds 
on Josef Joffe’s four criteria for intervention, including moral imperative, national interest, chances o f  
success, and domestic support. See Josef Joffe, “The N ew  Europe, Yesterday’s Ghosts,” Foreign Affairs 
72, no. 1 (1992/93): 33.
6. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber, eds., Nonviolent Intervention across Borders: A 
Recurrent Vision (Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii, 2000).
7. See David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
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intervention. It is intervention because it crosses national boundaries and brings change 
to the receiving country. For example, expanding a domestic economy into a porous 
target economy gains access and influence for the country o f origin, making slow, less 
noticed change in the target country. 8 Economic expansion by liberal democracies brings 
cultural and social changes in the target country, and generates a process o f liberal 
democratic socialization o f sorts . 9  Here, economic expansion would bring stability by 
improving the standard o f living in less wealthy places, thereby allowing the growth of 
liberal capitalism and an acceptable system for political unity. Stability is derived from 
the fact that once a standard of living has been improved, no one wants it to drop.
This raises a problem with pacifism though, because as economic expansion 
proceeds, receiving countries often become increasingly dependent on continued 
economic interaction for a sustained and improved standard o f living. The more recipient 
countries become dependent on economic aid, foreign investment, or trade, the more 
vulnerable they are to shocks in the system. For example, when the Thai Baht fell in 
1997-98, the banks in Indonesia collapsed and virtually wiped out the assets of the 
middle class. People took to the streets, creating turmoil that forced the government to 
step down. To restore order, Indonesia resorted to force. Thus, pacifists ignore that a 
potential consequence o f economic expansion could be the use o f force, if  the expected 
levels o f wealth are disrupted. As a result o f increased economic dependence, therefore, 
military intervention can be called upon to defend threatened economic enterprise, the 
loss of which could jeopardize an improved standard of living.
8. This phenomenon can be examined as transnational relations. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., 
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Dom estic Structures and International 
Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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The philosophical debate regarding intervention is informative regarding how 
morality leads to sovereignty, and why it could legitimize intervention. As such, it helps 
in this study to explain the basis for Clinton’s call to end ethnic cleansing if and 
whenever possible. Moreover, the philosophical discussion clarifies the importance of 
U.S. public opinion and the media as variables, because the American public is the 
essential group with values such as the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
and the media are a transmission belt without which the public might not be aware of 
activities abroad. In addition, American values have expanded into the international 
community to produce a larger group with international values, norms, principles, and 
laws against crimes against humanity. For example, Charles Shotwell and Kimberley 
Thachuk discuss the UN Charter, revealing intervention as an increasingly accepted 
international norm.10 Therefore, the philosophical debate informs general discussion in 
this dissertation regarding two of the five causal variables; however, it is insufficient to 
fully explain U.S. foreign policy regarding military intervention.
THE LAW AND INTERVENTION
There is a considerable amount of literature on the law and intervention. Laws 
function to limit the ways and reasons for going to war. In general, the right to self- 
defense is paramount. This debate focuses on the international and legal implications of 
intervention.
9. See Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling A m erica's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: 
AEI Press, 1991).
10. Charles B. Shotwell and Kimberley Thachuk, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for 
Legitimacy,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 166 
(1999).
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In the twentieth century, global interconnectedness reached unprecedented levels, 
enabling the establishment o f international organizations such as the United Nations to 
improve international order and stability.11 In particular, the UN, as it grew to embody 
the legitimizing authority regarding international matters, introduced international 
regulation into world politics. Sean Murphy examines the UN’s role in intervention and 
argues that technology has made the world so small that the violation o f humanitarian law 
is almost immediately known internationally.12 Increased international awareness—  
especially in Western developed countries— of when and where human rights violations 
occur, often generates pressure on the UN and its members to remedy horrors of 
violations against human rights. In addition, unilateral or multilateral intervention 
without UN approval and mandate are growing less acceptable.
The enhanced importance of the UN is especially reflected in the growing body of 
international law.13 We are witnessing the institutionalization o f the international 
environment. Institutionalization occurs when democratic values are embedded into 
formal practices within an organization or institution. This is seen in the United States in 
the form of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. Without sufficient 
institutionalization, society and culture would be unable to withstand challenges to 
stability from constituent groups. Lester Brune, for example, argues that economic and 
political interdependence is a method to prompt stability, because unstable conditions
11. For a critique o f  the UN, see the collection o f  essays edited by Ted Carpenter, Delusions o f  
Grandeur: The UN and G lobal Intervention  (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1997).
12. Sean Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, vol. 
21, Procedural Aspects o f  International Law Series (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
13. John Norton Moore and Alex Morrison, eds., Strengthening the United Nations and Enhancing 
War Prevention  (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000).
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stem from insufficient system at the state and local levels.14 The international Tribunal at 
The Hague has existed for many years, and has been instrumental in developing 
international consensus regarding war crimes. The deepening of the international 
institution for law recently reached new heights with the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) on 11 April 2002.15 Despite its drawbacks, the ICC 
created a new and important avenue for international justice and stability.16
The trouble with international law, however, is that it is difficult to enforce, and 
therefore introduces delicate questions regarding the function of intervention. Debate on 
law enforcement and intervention often focuses on crimes against humanity, issues 
surrounding violations of sovereignty, and sanctioned/unsanctioned or multilateral/ 
unilateral intervention. Fernando Teson justifies humanitarian intervention based on 
international law that is founded in the fundamental human right to defend life as argued 
under the just war assertion above.17 Even though international law is difficult to 
enforce, it is useful for resolving conflict by strengthening norms of behavior and 
mechanisms for settling disputes. The effectiveness of international law is based in the 
willingness of states to observe it.
14. Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in 
Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-1998  (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999).
15. For debate in the United States regarding the ICC, see “An Unjust International Court,” The 
Washington Times, 11 April 2002 ,20; “Red Meat for Unilateralists,” The Washington Post, 11 April 2002, 
28; and “No Court Dates for America,” The Washington Times, 11 April 2002 ,21 .
16. Two o f  the dominant arguments against U.S. membership in the ICC are that it is unaccountable 
to any governing body, and that rogue or unfriendly states could become members and utilize the ICC 
bureaucracy to bring harm to the United States or its citizens. The argument favoring the U.S. membership 
in the ICC is that U.S. participation in the development o f  an international court is crucial, even if  it is not 
perfect.
17. Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Irvington-on- 
Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997).
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THEORY AND INTERVENTION
The theoretical literature on intervention deals primarily with causes of civil 
conflict and conflict prevention. Theory about the causes of civil conflict includes
1 ftvarious security dilemmas that are brought on by transition or change. A security 
dilemma occurs when efforts to increase security in one state bring an increase in 
insecurity to another. A classical security dilemma was the East-West competition 
during the cold war that ended in a tremendous arms race.
To find alternatives for resolving security dilemmas at the core o f conflict,
Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder explore why civil conflict breaks out.19 Much of the 
security dilemma is caused by fear of change and unstable conditions. For example, 
changes in the political environment may be found in governmental breakdown, as was 
seen in Somalia. Stephen Van Evera examines how increased nationalism contributed to 
war, for example, in the former Yugoslavia.20 Another example is when changes in the 
political balance of power between groups within a country bring on social turmoil, 
especially if the system is not institutionalized to withstand such changes, as in Iran. 
Furthermore, shifts leaving one ethnic group geographically isolated or vulnerable can 
spell doom to peace, as happened in Rwanda. Shifting distribution o f economic wealth 
can also bring about civil conflict, as the standard o f living could drop precipitously and 
spark public outrage, as was seen in Indonesia. When civil order breaks down, lawless
18. Stephen Van Evera, Causes o f  War: Power and the Roots o f  Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999); Chiam Kaufman, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 
International Security, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-76; and Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, ed., Civil 
Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
19. Ibid.
20. Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18, no. 4 
(1994): 5 -39 .
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warlords take over, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.21 Military disarmament after a peace 
agreement can bring on a “reverse security dilemma” between antagonists, increasing
O ')
insecurities and leading to a breakdown in the peace agreement. Kenneth Schultz 
examines a type o f security dilemma that is brought about by conditions o f open social 
structures under democracy, as opposed to non-democracy.23 He determines that open 
information in democratic states can increase or diminish the credibility o f a state’s 
threat, and can therefore bring about or ameliorate an information-driven security 
dilemma that alters perceptions due to public response to policy during crisis.
Theory on conflict prevention is largely an answer to the causes o f conflict and 
how to stop conflict from breaking out. The most influential theory on conflict 
prevention is the democratic peace thesis, as coined by Michael Doyle in 1983, in which 
democracy is thought to contribute to peaceful relations between states.24 The 
democratic peace thesis, based on Immanuel Kant’s idea of “perpetual peace,” posits that 
democracies do not make war against one another.25 Tony Smith endorses intervention in 
support of democratic governance for three reasons.26 First, it functions as a bulwark 
against nationalistic extremism that could lead to instability. Second, it provides a stable
21. John Mueller, “The Banality o f  ‘Ethnic War,’” International Security  25, no. 1 (2000): 42-67.
22. A reverse security dilemma can occur when distrust between parties leads to cheating on 
disarmament, or when one party reduces real capabilities and the other reduces surplus or outdated 
capabilities.
23. Kenneth A. Schultz, D em ocracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).
24. Michael W. D oyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
12, nos. 3 and 4 (1983).
25. For more on influential works regarding the democratic peace thesis, see the following two 
volumes, which consist o f  previously published articles: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and 
Steven E. Miller, eds., D ebating the D em ocratic Peace: An International Security Reader  (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1997); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed. Paths to Peace: Is D em ocracy the Answer?  (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1997).
26. Tony Smith, “In Defense o f  Intervention,” in Foreign Affairs E ditors ’ Choice Series (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), 26 -27 .
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modem institutionalized government founded on a constitution that reduces the chances 
of civil war, which could spill into the larger region. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts give 
an example o f how the system worked to stop the United States from escalating the war 
in Vietnam.27 Even though there were hawks, there were also doves, and the resultant 
policy was a compromised solution. Thus, institutionalized government adds to stability 
because varying constituencies and actors make it difficult to implement extreme policies 
such as war. Third, democratic enlargement increases peaceable relations between like 
states with similar values that foster economic prosperity. Once attained, no one wants to 
have war disrupt wealth or liberty.
William Dixon advances that democracies are better equipped to diffuse conflict 
among themselves at an early stage prior to military engagement. There is a delicate 
period when a newly democratized country, especially one that has a non-democratic 
tradition, would be more likely to revert to previous types of governance. Christopher 
Layne criticizes the democratic peace thesis because it relies on “persuasiveness” found 
in institutional constraints, such as cultural norms and principles to promote peace, that 
are insufficient to provide long lasting results.29 Mansfield and Snyder conclude that 
states in the process of democratizing are more likely to engage in war than are mature 
democracies or stable autocracies, but they leave hope that international stability can 
prosper in the presence of mature, established democracies.30 Therefore, democratic
27. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony o f  Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1979).
28. William Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes,” American Political 
Science Review  88, 1 (1994): 14-32.
29. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth o f  the Democratic Peace,” International Security 
19, no. 2 (1994): 6.
30. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger o f  War,” International 
Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5-38.
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enlargement must be accompanied by a commitment to see young democracies through a 
less stable transition period in which they develop and institutionalize deeper democratic 
norms, values, and principles.
U.S. support o f democratic enlargement reflects a highly valued component of 
American society. Some argue that democratic enlargement takes on imperialistic 
tones.31 For example, Mark Peceny examines important turning points in America’s 
identity as a great liberal power, and demonstrates that the American presidents’ efforts 
to legitimize intervention, both in the international and domestic spheres, are essential for 
the cause of democracy and liberal peace.32 Whether acknowledged or not, the Clinton 
administration’s effort at democratic enlargement involved the promotion o f democracy 
to legitimate continued American leadership in the post-cold war international system.33 
As a result, promoting democratic enlargement is a method for fostering international 
stability and is in the interest of the United States.34 This is especially so in bordering 
regions and nations, but also as a whole, and invokes the U.S. “grand strategy” of 
democratic enlargement for engendering international stability favorable to overarching 
U.S. goals.35
Gideon Rose explains that debate in the United States has a classic division about
31. See Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., American Democracy 
Promotion Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). This is a 
collection o f  essays written by well-known authors such as Michael Doyle, Randall Schweller, and Ole R. 
Holsti, among others, regarding intervention and democratic governance.
32. Mark Peceny, D em ocracy at the Point o f  Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1999).
33. See Naom Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards 
o f  the West (New York: Verso, 2000).
34. For the Clinton administration’s thoughts on democratic enlargement, see Strobe Talbott, 
“Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (1996): 47-63; and G. John Ikenberry, 
“America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-war Era,” in Cox, 
Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 103-26.
35. See Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold 
War,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49-89.
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the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy goal. This division exists between
those who argue that the United States should be content to provide an example of 
democracy for others and those who feel that the United States should proactively shape 
political developments in other countries according to American ideals. Rose points out 
that “rhetorically the Clinton administration fell into the ‘crusader’ camp,”37 declaring
■JO
that “promoting democracy” was an important element in its national security strategy. 
Huntington explains that there have been three waves of democracy—the first in the 
1950s, the second in the 1960s, and the third in the late 1980s to early 1990s—in which 
dozens of countries became democratic converts. Larry Diamond argues that after the 
third wave of democratization—which is drawing to a close— those remaining 
democracies without institutionalization or legitimization will likely consolidate.40
Thomas Carothers cautions that democratization abroad suffers from limited 
accomplishments because an American model for democratization that does not consider 
local circumstances often generates a negative image of democracy in the minds of 
locals41 As a result, such practice is doomed because of local barriers to progress. 
Chalmers Johnson provides a bitingly critical examination of U.S. intervention in terms
36. Gideon Rose, “Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A  Review Essay,” 
International Security 25, no. 3 (2000-2001): 186-203.
37. Ibid., 188-9.
38. See White House, “Documentation: A National Security Strategy o f  Engagement and 
Enlargement,” February 1996, reprinted in Am erica’s  Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader, 
Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1997), 286.
39. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1991).
40. Larry Diamond, D eveloping Democracy: Toward Consolidation  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 23.
41. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: the Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999). For a similar argument that includes lessons on exporting 
democracy, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin Am erica 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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of commitment to maintaining a global empire after the cold war.42 His book is an 
account o f foreign resentment o f U.S. policies that have built up over time, and of the 
kinds o f economic and political international retribution that may return to the United 
States in the twenty-first century. Johnson views imperial expansion as the root of 
terrorism and other international trouble. To avoid harsh resentment, the United States 
could benefit by enabling democratic and institutional consolidation under stable 
conditions. To do so, the United States could continue implementing democratization 
based on the American model, albeit with more sensitivity to local needs, while 
remaining flexible, so that a mid-stream change of course is possible, rather than 
abandoning the project altogether. Understanding how democratic enlargement is a long­
term goal for U.S. foreign policy, supports discussion in this dissertation of powerful 
belief structures that slumber in the American psyche. Values founded in democracy are 
important especially in considering U.S. actions in Haiti; however, they do not explain 
the full breadth of U.S. foreign policy.
THE MILITARY AND INTERVENTION
The literature on military intervention is considerable and generally addresses the 
question o f how to use military force. The answer to the question o f how to intervene, 
involves military capabilities, as well as the types o f warfare to be used. It is not 
specifically addressed here because that literature does not apply directly to analysis in 
this dissertation. Rather, this section examines literature regarding policy aspects of
42. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences o f  American Empire (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2000). The term “blowback” was invented by the CIA for internal use. It refers to the 
unintended consequences o f  policies that were kept secret from the American people. Johnson concludes 
with the question as to whether the United States has become a “rogue” superpower.
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military intervention that have to do with broader policy, such as military doctrine. 
Clausewitz wrote that war is politics “by other means,” and this is clearly the case with 
military intervention.43 Just as international law functions to limit the ways and reasons 
for use o f military force, so do military doctrines. Military doctrines provide guideposts 
for decisions on military intervention, including peace making, peace enforcing, and 
peacekeeping. This is demonstrated clearly in the following three examples of military 
doctrine.
The attack on the U.S. military barracks in Beirut brought about high-level 
considerations in the Department of Defense in 1984. The resulting Weinberger Doctrine 
presented six guidelines for informing decisions on military intervention: 1) a vital 
interest or ally must be at stake; 2) there must be support from popular opinion and 
Congress; 3) force must be used only as a last resort; 4) only commit with the intent to 
win wholeheartedly; 5) clearly define objectives; and 6) reassess and update the size, 
composition, and disposition of the forces as conditions change. A few years later, in 
1992, the Powell Doctrine changed the military approach to intervention by formulating 
policy around four specific points: 1) force should only be used as a last resort; 2) define 
clear objectives; 3) clarify the basis for withdrawal; and 4) commit with overwhelming 
force.
In April 2002, after the dramatic events o f September 11, a new, broader approach 
to military intervention emerged. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld updated military 
policy to clarify new considerations in light of military success in the war on terrorism in
43. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 87. See also Clausewitz, The Principles o f  War (Harrisburg, PA: Telegraph Press 
1942), 6.
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Afghanistan.44 Rumsfeld included eight points: 1) use all elements of national power 
(economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and overt and covert 
military operations); 2) forces must be able to communicate and operate jointly; 3) accept 
help from other countries; 4) coalition warfare should not be fought by committee; 5) use 
prevention and preemption to take the war to the enemy; 6) rule out nothing, including 
ground troops; 7) place special forces on the ground early; and 8) be honest with the 
American people.
These doctrines show the development o f policy for U.S. military intervention 
over the last twenty years. Each doctrine shows a distinct appreciation that military 
intervention must enjoy at least minimal popular support, especially for prolonged 
intervention. Over time, the necessity of public support became an understanding, 
demonstrated by the fact that Powell did not mention it. Instead, his inclusion of an end 
game directly speaks to the Vietnam hangover, as public support had become an 
underlying factor for policy. Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes explained this 
important limitation to military action, in that the U.S. threat to use force is insufficient to 
bring compliance to its demands abroad, because everyone knows that killing Americans 
will drive them away.45 It could drive them away, because the American public only 
tolerated a zero casualty level. A clear example of this is the media frenzy and public 
outcry over images o f American soldiers dragged through the streets o f Mogadishu in 
October 1993. Clinton immediately reduced the mission and withdrew as early as 
possible. Such hard truths present the president with a dilemma, because to achieve
44. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 31-2 .
45. Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use o f  
Force in American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1999).
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success when using force, the United States must select engagements carefully and then 
display staying power. The recent war on terrorism promises to change the post-Vietnam 
catering to public opinion, because this war is expected to be long and to generate 
unknown numbers of American casualties. Instead of catering to the public, Rumsfeld 
proposes to inform the public, but public support remains an important element in 
military policy.
Rumsfeld’s recent reevaluation and broadening o f military doctrine shows that 
prevailing classic definitions for intervention are too narrow for modem warfare. For 
example, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse assert that peacekeeping is no longer 
a matter of self-help by states; rather it is mainly about collective response organized 
through the United Nations.46 Moreover, they argue that the main role o f military forces 
in intervention is to establish a secure environment for non-military operations such as 
electoral monitoring, refugee repatriation, and the distribution of humanitarian relief by 
civilian agencies. Issues on intervention go beyond this, however. In the wake of 
Somalia, humanitarian relief in situations o f civil conflict has been called into question. 
Richard Haass provides a recent analysis o f military intervention in which he concludes 
that relying solely on air power to wage intervention is insufficient, because ground 
troops are necessary to protect vulnerable populations47 He argues that there are four 
considerations in the decision to intervene, including action to prevent genocide, costs 
and consequences of action, availability o f military partnership with others, and the likely 
results o f alternative action or inaction. The above development o f military doctrines
46. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: 
A Reconceptualization  (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996).
47. Richard N. Haass, “The Use and Abuse o f  Military Force,” Brookings Policy Brief, no. 54 (1999):
1- 8 .
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shows a broadening of elements and considerations that cannot be ignored, because it 
informs decisions regarding intervention. In this dissertation, military considerations are 
informative to the evaluation of U.S. interests, but are insufficient to explain broader 
foreign policy.
FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION
The debate on foreign policy and intervention focuses on what it means to make 
decisions on intervention. Thus, it is concerned with a larger context than any o f the 
above categories, and actually encompasses them and more. The policy debate on 
intervention examines overarching questions such as the who, whether, when, why, and 
how o f intervention. The broader context o f policy therefore must take into consideration 
the philosophical, legal, military, and political issues involved in any given intervention, 
and leads to policy on a case by case basis. For example, it would be unrealistic for the 
president to call for intervention without first considering ethical implications, legal 
limitations, international or domestic support, military capacity to perform necessary 
operations, or the political and historical background o f each specific situation.
In the United States, the decision to intervene ultimately falls to the president.
This does not mean, however, that he can intervene at will. The debate on who makes the 
ultimate decision regarding intervention generally revolves around the question of war 
powers o f the president. This points out the recurring vigorous debate regarding 
congressional oversight and accountability of the president. If the president holds
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A n
supreme control over the nation’s military, as is commonly believed, then the question 
arises as to how that power is kept in check. James Meemik examines 458 crises 
between 1948 and 1988, and surprisingly concludes that there is political value in taking 
advantage of opportunities to use force.49 After examining the role of international and 
domestic factors in American foreign policy, he consoles us that decisions to intervene 
are more often motivated by national interest than personal political gain. This is 
certainly a relief, but it raises the murky debate over what exactly is a national interest.
For the purposes o f this dissertation, the concept of national interest is not used, even 
though considerable emphasis is given to U.S. vital and peripheral interests as defined 
under the variable “United States interests” in Chapter III.
In making decisions about how to intervene, the president must take into 
consideration many different perspectives. The president is pressured from numerous 
directions, including those stemming from the international as well as the domestic 
environments. We have already explained the importance of the United Nations and 
international law as an example of international factors that the president must take into 
consideration when determining how to intervene. Within his own cabinet, though, the 
president is confronted with varying alternative perspectives. The Council on Foreign 
Relations provides an excellent illustration of these perspectives in the form of fictional 
memos to President Clinton from the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As each of these actors justifies
48. See C.V. Crabb and P.M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign 
Policy  (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980); C.F. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); John T. Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Making (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); and H.K. Tillema, A ppeal to Force (New York: Thomas 
Crowell, 1973).
49. James Meemik, “Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use o f  Military Force,” 
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1994): 121-38.
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their position, and recommends a different policy approach, we gain a fuller 
understanding o f the overall issues involved in the decision-making process, because 
each advisor suggests a different policy.50
Since the end of the cold war, increased struggle within and across borders 
threatened to lead to far greater conflicts. Richard Haass eloquently reviews recent cases 
of U.S. military intervention abroad, and argues that the post-cold war era is 
characterized by “international deregulation,” when new actors have new capabilities and 
alignments but lack new rules.51 This situation increases the number of violent conflicts 
within and across borders. Haass concludes that in the modem world, policy on 
intervention reflects ongoing political and technological characteristics. The relatively 
recent technological development of “compellent force”52 by “smart munitions” such as 
precision-guided bombs increases the political uses of force as called for by Clausewitz.53
THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
In looking through the literature on foreign policy and intervention, the author has 
not found any work that specifically addresses intervention in terms o f the five variables 
found in this study, which include the UN, allies, Congress, public opinion and the 
media, and U.S. interests. The approach adopted in this dissertation examines the 
influence of these five variables on the foreign policy decisions under Clinton. This
50. Alton Frye, Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable D octrine (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2000).
51. Haass, Intervention.
52. Compellent force is the ability to strike specific military/political targets in one location to 
influence behavior elsewhere. Ibid., 16.
53. This corresponds with Les Aspin’s view. See “The Use and Usefulness o f  Military Forces in the 
Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World,” Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., reprinted in Haass, Intervention, 207-14.
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section examines Michael MacKinnon’s analysis regarding foreign policy and 
intervention, as his work comes closest to the approach used in this dissertation.54
There are three main differences between our analysis and the MacKinnon 
examination. First, he examines the international environment by looking at the United 
States and the UN, but not U.S. allies. He is particularly interested in extreme policy 
shifts in the United States toward the UN. For example, many expected that the end of 
the cold war would loosen the deadlock in the UN Security Council, providing conditions 
for unprecedented cooperation amongst the more influential member states, but that did 
not exactly happen. Although President Clinton initially promised to strengthen the UN, 
after Somalia, he reconsidered participation in peacekeeping efforts and stepped away 
from assertive multilateralism. In May 1994, PDD 25 raised an obstacle to effective and 
timely international action, as well as to any chance o f improving and strengthening the 
UN’s operational capacity. MacKinnon’s work is centrally focused on U.S.-UN 
relations, while this dissertation is a more broadly focused deductive study to isolate the 
elements o f influence on decisions regarding intervention.
Second, MacKinnon’s analysis is based on Roger Hilsman’s “political process 
model,” which is the basis of the bureaucratic politics model.55 Hilsman’s model offers 
three rings o f power. The inner ring is the president and his staff, political appointees, 
Congress, the bureaucrats. The second ring includes interest groups and the press/ 
television. The outer ring includes public opinion and the electorate. These three rings
54. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  US Peacekeeping.
55. Roger Hilsman, with Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, The Politics o f  P olicy Making in 
Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).
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have two outputs o f power: foreign affairs and defense policy. Hilsman’s model is 
similar to, yet different from, the analysis in this dissertation.
MacKinnon alters Hilsman’s model to suit his cases more closely. MacKinnon 
examines four actors in the domestic environment: the executive, the bureaucracies 
(Department of State and Department of Defense), Congress, and public opinion. 
MacKinnon argues that Congress dominated the flexible Clinton administration in setting 
policy towards international organizations, and uses PDD 25 on U.S participation in UN 
peacekeeping to show the “true nature and the twisted roots of the U.S. attitude to the 
UN.”56 He concludes that PDD 25 was “largely the result o f a self-perpetuating cycle of 
confrontation and conciliation played out between the White House and Congress.”57
This dissertation differs from MacKinnon, because our analysis does not consider 
the bureaucracies per se, but rather considers decisions taken by the Clinton 
administration to encompass the president’s advisors, including various ranking 
department heads, but not singling each out individually. Moreover, it is similar because 
it considers Congress and public opinion; however, it differs because in this dissertation 
Congress is separate from public opinion, while the media is part o f it. MacKinnon does 
not make any specific treatment o f the media. Finally, this dissertation considers U.S. 
interests as a launching pad for examination o f foreign policy in the cases provided.
Third, while MacKinnon is specifically interested in the erratic U.S.-UN 
relationship regarding peacekeeping in the early post-cold war years leading up to the 
PDD 25, this dissertation covers a wider span of time: until the turn o f the century. In 
short, whereas MacKinnon’s work most closely resembles the analysis in this
56. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  US Peacekeeping, vii.
57. Ib id , 105.
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dissertation, it differs significantly because it is based closely on the political process 
model and does not include all five variables. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the 
literature on foreign policy by using a holistic approach that differs from any other 
approach.
Overall, the current project builds upon all o f the above categories in the literature 
on intervention, but strictly falls into none of them. The gap in the literature, filled by 
this dissertation, is that this approach to intervention is holistic in nature. That is, policy 
decisions are seen as outcomes of the interplay o f various international and domestic 
constraints placed on presidents. In this regard, this study differs from previous work on 
intervention, as it is more concerned with policy making within a broader international 
and domestic context. At the international level, the importance of international 
organizations and regional allies is investigated. At the domestic level, presidential 
decision making is constrained by Congress in an institutional manner. This assumes that 
there will be bipartisan consensus against the president; however, as we have seen in 
recent decades, partisan divisions within Congress can weaken its ability to constrain the 
president. In addition, public opinion and the media can influence presidential policy 
decisions. Thus, this dissertation approaches U.S. foreign policy by focusing on 
constraints on presidential decisions to intervene, which are found in international and 
domestic politics.




There is no clear or convincing theory for foreign policy decisions regarding 
military intervention. On the whole, such decisions often seem ad hoc and are commonly 
made on a case-by-case basis. This study seeks to clarify patterns of interaction between 
five variables across three specific case studies to help us understand how decisions 
regarding intervention are formed and the extent to which these five variables influenced 
President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to resolve small-scale international crises, in 
the context o f his stated Doctrine.
This study of the politics of intervention unfolds at the international and domestic 
levels, and looks at the field o f foreign policy by breaking it into its component parts.
This dissertation builds on the existing foreign policy literature by inquiring to what 
extent five specific variables impacted Clinton’s foreign policy. In addition, it builds on 
existing foreign policy literature on intervention to define to what extent these five 
variables influenced the type o f intervention policy that is ultimately implemented, such 
as inaction, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military intervention. Each option 
is the result o f a process o f interaction between the five variables identified for this study. 
This dissertation is specifically concerned with U.S. intervention in small-scale crises, to 
clarify what it takes for the United States to intervene in areas o f peripheral as opposed to 
vital interests, what type of intervention might be expected, and why.
The primary research question asks why there were such variations in the 
implementation o f the Clinton Doctrine in Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor. For example,
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why did the United States intervene militarily in Haiti, but not in either Rwanda or East 
Timor? Furthermore, why did the United States provide substantial humanitarian aid to 
Rwanda’s refugees, but not to Haiti’s or East Timor’s? Most o f all, why did Clinton not 
call for military intervention to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or the civil violence against 
the East Timorese, when his doctrine specifically promises that he would do so whenever 
possible? In response to these questions, this study clarifies what is required for the 
United States to intervene in areas of peripheral interest. To answer the primary research 
question, five foreign policy variables are explored. After a review of these variables, 
this chapter will describe the methodology to be utilized in the dissertation.
THE VARIABLES
Nothing exists in a vacuum, and that is particularly so with American foreign 
policy. Scholars have worked for many years to explain the intricacies of international 
relations. For example, this dissertation draws on Kenneth Waltz’s three main levels of 
analysis—the individual, the state, and the system.1 In examining the individual level, 
this dissertation considers U.S. interests as defined by the Clinton administration. This 
analysis does not examine the individual level in terms o f Clinton’s personality or 
ideological inclination. Therefore, this study examines the way the Clinton 
administration explained U.S. interests, which tend, especially in the case o f vital U.S. 
interests, to have enduring characteristics that transcend presidential administrations. For 
example, any U.S. president would define the Persian Gulf as a vital security interest 
because o f its impact on regional U.S. strategic and economic interests.
1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959).
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This dissertation examines the relationship between the U.S. intervention and five 
specific sources o f foreign policy, or variables. The variables in this study include U.S. 
interests during the Clinton administration, U.S. allies, the United Nations, the U.S. 
Congress, and U.S. public opinion and the media. As explained in the literature review in 
Chapter II, some authors approach either foreign policy or intervention by examining one 
or more o f these variables, but this author has found no literature that examines foreign 
policy and intervention by analyzing the political implications of all five.
This dissertation explores the relationship between foreign policymaking under 
President Clinton and the extent to which foreign and domestic forces shape policy 
regarding U.S. intervention. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the variables. 
The process o f foreign policymaking is very complex and, depending on the context and 
situation, the variables have different levels o f importance.2 For example, given a 
situation in which the variable domestic public opinion is strong enough to engage, 
organize lobbies, and divide elites at the decision-making level, then this variable’s 
importance to and impact on decision making rises to the forefront of all five variables. 
The independent variable is U.S. interests; the intervening variables at the domestic level 
are the U.S. Congress, and public opinion and the media, and the intervening variables at 
the international level include U.S. allies and the United Nations. The dependent variable 
is the type of intervention policy selected.
Intervention decisions are generally made on a case-by-case basis, because the 
importance of each variable relative to the others may differ in each circumstance.
2. This highlights the complexity o f  foreign policy.
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Moreover, each variable does not necessarily apply consistent pressure on decision 
makers either throughout each case or across the case studies, nor do they always interact 
in a consistent manner. Thus, the interaction o f these variables adds complexity to 
decision making for intervention. The following explanation o f the variables clarifies 
specific application of each one in this study. This section establishes the relevance, and 
method of examination, measurement for each variable.
U.S. Interests under Clinton
“U.S. interests” are the independent variable in the following analysis.3 For this 
dissertation, a distinction is made between vital and peripheral U.S. interests. Vital 
interests are the most important interests to a state’s survival, and they cover security and 
economic issues. As explained in the literature review, under conditions of anarchy, the 
state’s survival depends on measures of self-help. Therefore, one method to improve 
security is for the state to maximize stability in the international environment. There are 
two main methods for a state to promote international stability. One method is to enforce 
stability in the system through military or strategic means. A second method is for the 
state to maximize its financial well being as it also improves the financial well being of 
other states, as discussed. Thus, vital interests pertain to military, strategic, and economic 
policies.
Peripheral interests also affect international order, but they do not respond to 
existential threats to the state in the same manner as do vital interests. Peripheral
3. U.S. interests differ from U.S. national interests, which are delineated into three categories: vital 
(survival, safety, and vitality), important (national well-being or regional development), and humanitarian 
(disaster relief, violations o f  human rights, rule o f  law, joint recovery operations, development,
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interests include international values, norms, principles, and laws. Values, norms, and 
principles have an important role in the process o f stabilizing international order, because 
they function to bring differing countries into closer understanding with one another. If it 
is possible to overcome extreme differences through internalization o f overarching 
values, norms, and principles, then it is possible to reduce the effects o f international 
anarchy. Thus, it is in the U.S. interest to promote acceptable international values, 
norms, and principles in the world community, because as these spread, a greater 
consensus can grow. Consensus regarding values, norms, and principles makes 
international law possible. International law codifies values, norms, and principles in an 
enforceable way that improves international stability and reduces the impact of anarchy.
It follows then, that it is in the U.S. interest (albeit peripherally) to establish accepted 
standards o f international law, because they provide a basis for regulating the effects of 
anarchy and thus promote coherence rather than chaos in the international system. 
Therefore, even though international values, norms, principles, and laws do not protect 
the United States in the same concrete and immediate ways as military, strategic, and 
economic interests, they are nonetheless very important to far-reaching efforts for 
promoting long-term international stability. Peripheral interests are akin to the icing on 
the cake, while vital interests are the cake itself.
Table 1 lists reasons for some post-cold war intervention according to vital and 
peripheral interests. This list is instrumental in the case study selection (described below) 
because it provides a broad overview of real-world interventions for the independent 
interests with pertinent examples. Table 1 also lists the justification and examples of
environment, and demining). See The White House, A National Security S trategy fo r  a G lobal A ge  
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.
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Table 1
Reasons for Post-Cold War Intervention
Vital Interests
Military Interests
Territorial Defense (Panama 1989, War on Terrorism 2001)
Classical Deterrence (Taiwan Straits 1996)
Strategic Interests
Terrorism (Sudan 1998, Afghanistan 1998, Afghanistan 2001)
Regional Stability
Collapsed Government (Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Rwanda 1994, 
Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991-1999, Indonesia/East Timor 1999) 
Refugees {Rwanda 1994, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, 
Indonesia/East Timor 1999)
Balance of Power (Middle East-Persian Gulf War 1991, N/S Iraq 1993) 
Democratic Enlargement (Panama 1989, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994)
Economic Interests
Regional Stability
(Europe-Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991-1999, Middle East-N/S Iraq 
1993)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, Haiti 1994)
Economic Turmoil (Somalia 1993, Rwanda 1994, Haiti 1994, East Timor 1998)
Peripheral Interests
Norms, Values, and Principles 
Humanitarian Assistance
(Sudan 1990-1992, Somalia 1992-1993, Bosnia 1993-1995, Rwanda 1994, 
Kosovo 1999, East Timor 1999, Afghanistan 2002)
Nation-Building (Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, East Timor 1999)
International Law
Violation o f Sovereignty (Persian Gulf War 1991, Kosovo 1999)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, Haiti 1994)
UN WMD Inspections (Iraq 1998)
War Crimes {Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999)
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intervention according to vital and peripheral interests. The cases in this study are 
italicized in Table 1, and fall into a variety o f different categories o f interests. For 
example, the case of Haiti is listed under vital interests in both the Strategic Interests 
category and the Economic Interests category, but it is also listed under Peripheral 
Interests both for Humanitarian Assistance and International Law.
To examine vital and peripheral interests, this section considers the implications 
o f the post-cold war environment including collapsing states, civil conflict, and refugee 
flows. Many of the crises noted in Table 1 included some aspect o f collapsed 
government. At the end of the cold war, there were a growing number o f disintegrating, 
or collapsing, states.4 They cease to be states because they degenerate into ungovemed 
territory. Collapsing states commonly experience a variety o f side effects that impact the 
interests o f other states, including democratic breakdown and human rights violations. 
During the process o f collapse, state leadership often turns the governing apparatus 
against the citizenry or a portion of it. Under such circumstances, it is not at all 
uncommon for collapsing states to experience ethnic or religious violence that results in 
the flight o f threatened civilians. Collapsing states often generate considerable 
movement o f refugees and displaced persons, because the governmental control 
mechanisms have broken down, giving lawless marauders the opportunity to rob, 
brutalize, and murder other citizens.5
Refugee flows are demographic shifts of persons who are not allowed to return
4. See I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration o f  Legitimate 
Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
5. John D. Steinbrunner explains this phenomenon in Principles o f  G lobal Security (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 141-2.
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home. Nana Poku and David Graham confirm that since the end o f the cold war, there 
has been a broadening of the term “security” in developed countries to include threats 
from refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrations, and undocumented migrants, with 
special emphasis on those from less developed countries.6 Receiving countries often 
view refugees as problems for multiple reasons: they can challenge existing patterns of 
political representation, drain the economy, damage the environment, threaten law and 
order, introduce health risks, become terrorists, alter the existing cultural composition, 
and dilute national identity.7 As a result, refugees may not be welcome. Alejandro 
Portes and Ruben Rumbaut explain that immigration without assimilation can lead to 
ethnic solidarity.8 This situation can increase domestic political concerns, especially for 
politicians who have large sub-populations as constituencies. Political concerns of this 
type were seen in Florida, for example, with the arrival o f Haitian refugees. More 
importantly, large numbers of refugees sometimes use refugee camps as a base to 
organize and militarize. Such conditions generated a great deal o f regional instability for 
Rwanda’s neighbors, especially Zaire and Burundi. Moreover, once organized and 
militarized, refugees may invade their country of origin to gain power, as was also seen 
in Rwanda.
Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner argue that the end of the cold war gave many 
citizens of less developed countries the opportunity for “reducing unemployment, earning 
remittances, and reducing demographic pressure” by migrating to more developed
6. Nana Poku and David T. Graham, Redefining Security: Population M ovements and National 
Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).
7. For more about types o f  threats presented by refugees, see Mark J. Miller, “International Migration 
and Global Security,” chap. 2 in Redefining Security, Poku and Graham.
8. Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: 
University o f  California Press, 1996), 138.
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countries, especially to Western Europe or the United States.9 Myron Weiner lists three 
reasons why migration has been on the rise since the end of the cold war: there is more 
conflict within states themselves; modem conflicts produce more refugees than 
previously; and clusters o f countries that drive away refugees form “bad 
neighborhoods.”10
There are three typical responses to mass migration observed in the receiving 
countries. First, countries can introduce restrictive border regimes and immigration laws 
to limit undesired mass migration. Second, they might develop preventive or 
interventionist strategies against the countries of origin. This may be either by non­
violent means, such as sanctions, or by the use of force. Third, as a humanitarian gesture, 
they may accept a number of the migrants, but reject others. There is occasionally a 
positive impact o f refugees on the receiving country, in that they sometimes provide 
cheap, skilled labor. In the recent past, however, refugee migration has significantly 
contributed to regional instability, and was the case in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor.
Barry Posen cites other methods to stem migration once it is already under way.11 
Long-term private sector solutions, such as trade and foreign investment, require a great 
deal of patience and have few short-term affects. Such remedies have many problems, 
due to the lack o f financial security found in politically unstable regions. Governments, 
however, can bring about short-term results through aid. The trouble with foreign aid,
9. Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner, eds., Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German 
Policies tow ard Countries o f  Origin (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), vii.
10. Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods,” in Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign 
Policy: U.S. and German Policies tow ard Countries o f  Origin, ed. Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner, 
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 208.
11. Barry Posen, “Can Military Intervention Limit Refugee Flows?” in Migrants, Refugees, and  
Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies tow ard Countries o f  Origin, ed. Rainer Muenz and Myron 
Weiner, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 273-322.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
however, is that it may be rerouted to corrupted bank accounts with few desired results, 
as occurred in Indonesia under Suharto.
In sum, collapsing states commonly threaten vital interests of other states, 
including military, strategic, and economic interests, because internal instability caused 
by a collapsing government threatens to spill civil turmoil into the larger region, and 
threatens regional stability. Refugee movement is an indicator of severe dysfunction in a 
state. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher argue that it is the responsibility o f other states to 
intervene to restore order, lest hordes o f refugees requiring care invade other countries.
As a result, “grievous human rights abuses are not an internal matter when neighboring 
states must bear the cost o f repression by having refugees forced on them.”12 Thus, the 
importance of international stability can override the right o f sovereignty, as other states 
have not only an interest but also a responsibility to intervene to stop civil turmoil and 
violence, since they trigger refugee movements that can result in areas where they gather 
to organize and militarize. The importance of this variable on Clinton’s foreign policy is 
estimated by examination of speeches, interviews, and other statements.
U.S. Allies
Theoretical patterns o f international interaction rooted in balance o f power 
politics explain that alliances are an outgrowth o f self-help interaction between states that 
are seeking to survive in an anarchic international environment in which less powerful 
states join to balance more powerful threatening states.13 As explained earlier, conditions
12. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,” 
International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): 59.
13. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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o f anarchy exist in the absence of government, laws, police, and sense o f community. 
Without these, there is no regulation either at the individual, state, or international level. 
This variable considers patterns o f interaction formed between the United States and 
other friendly countries, or allies.
Alliances are formal or informal arrangements between states that share common 
aims to overcome anarchy, and are aimed principally at security and military concerns. 
Alliances demonstrate the willingness of states to cooperate and make mutual 
commitments to act to protect each other under threatening situations. During the first 
post-cold war decade, there was an increase and then a marked decrease in the U.S. 
willingness to perform unilateral operations abroad, as the absence of the bipolar 
international environment no longer regulated the actions o f states of all sizes. This 
unwillingness partly stems from the importance placed on multilateral coalitions.
The Gulf War launched the post-cold war era with a dramatic example of 
American commitment to working in a coalition of allies. In this respect, the Gulf War 
set the tone o f U.S. operations by providing a stellar example o f successful coalition 
operations, which proved that coalitions increase legitimacy and authority. When 
Iraq violated Kuwait’s sovereignty, the United States led the coalition to send the 
message that international law is indeed enforceable. A country’s intervention 
in the internal affairs of another country can be especially controversial because it 
challenges this most important international principle upholding the post-Westphalian 
international order. It is wise for leaders to seek the support o f allies, because 
there is greater legitimacy in numbers. Riding this wave of multilateral success, the 
Clinton administration for a time brought into the White House an unprecedented air of
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assertive multilateralism that reflected a new American vision of international 
cooperation.
For this study, U.S. allies are U.S.-friendly countries or regional international 
organizations that played an important role in a crisis and thereby exercised some 
influence on the U.S. decision regarding whether, how, or when to intervene. In the case 
of Rwanda, for example, France unilaterally intervened to create a safe haven, thereby 
relieving the United States o f responsibility to act. In Haiti, regional OAS members 
spearheaded economic and political pressure on the insurgents, and worked with the UN 
and the United States to reinstate democracy. Haiti’s neighbors cooperated in shutting 
down trade and crippling the Haitian economy. In East Timor, regional actors such as 
Australia took on a critical function by intervening, again relieving the United States of 
the responsibility. Thus, in all three crises, U.S. allies were instrumental in the 
developments and resolution of the crisis. This dissertation examines how the allies’ 
position and actions during such crises contributed to Clinton’s decisions regarding 
intervention. The influence o f U.S. allies on Clinton’s foreign policy is estimated by 
examining the actions and declarations from U.S. allies or regional international 
organizations that had an integral association with the crisis at hand. Patterns in the 
relationship between U.S. and allied actions are included in this examination, to assess 
the influence o f U.S. allies over Clinton’s decisions.
The United Nations
The examination of the United Nations is based on the same grounds as the above 
examination of alliances, and is treated in a similar fashion. Even though the UN is not a
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world government, it does function to ameliorate anarchy, because it provides a forum for 
dialog aimed at resolving disputes and designing the type o f world that is most acceptable 
to its members. Thus, the UN, through consensus, legitimates international laws and 
authorizes policing o f those laws, even though the United States does not intervene every 
time the United Nations mandates it. In addition, the UN provides a collecting place for 
world leaders to get to know one another and thereby increases a sense of international 
understanding and community. This dissertation examines UN actions to ascertain the 
influence these activities exerted over U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding 
intervention in our three specified cases.
The end of the cold war released the UN Security Council from deadlock between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, making it difficult to form a UN consensus 
regarding the relationship between sovereignty and community.14 The post-cold war era 
was a time of heightened international nervousness, in which disturbances in the 
international system, even in small countries, generated a wave of instability throughout 
the world. Richard Haass aptly calls this post-cold war environment “international 
deregulation.”15 The mission of the United Nations continued to facilitate the peaceful 
resolution o f differences between members and to provide a forum for interaction 
between nations and peoples.
The UN role thus took on added significance in the post-cold war environment, 
and made possible new international norms. Such norms included a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between internal political crisis and international
14. See Michael J. Glennon, “Sovereignty and Community after Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use 
o f  Force,” American Journal o f  International Law  89, no. 1 (1995): 70.
15. Haass, Intervention, 5.
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security. Norms promoted a wider acceptance of UN authority to impose mandatory 
sanctions on countries that threaten international security. Moreover, the UN was the 
only international body equipped with the legitimacy and credibility to mandate 
international military action in crises. The precedent was set during the Persian Gulf War 
for the UN to authorize military intervention in a country that threatens peace. For 
example, despite reservations voiced by important members such as China and India, the 
OAS convinced the UN to impose sanctions on Haiti, even before the United States 
decided on a course of action.
The Clinton administration’s response to each crisis was not independent o f other 
countries around the world; in part, it varied because of the UN influence. This study 
considers the development of UN support for intervention of each crisis. The United 
Nations pressured the United States to increase support for peacekeeping operations and 
succeeded, until October 1993. As already explained, after Somalia, Clinton’s PDD 25 
“all but ruled out U.S. participation in, and perhaps even support for, UN-led peace- 
enforcement operations.”16
The influence o f this variable on Clinton’s foreign policy is estimated by 
reviewing Security Council resolutions during each crisis, as well as events and activities 
surrounding or involving the UN Security Council. Consensus within the UN regarding 
intervention in another country is an important variable for determining U.S. foreign 
policy, because UN backing legitimizes intervention. This is because the UN is 
comprised of members from throughout the world and places onerous pressure to 
conform on members. Thus, the UN legitimizes intervention policies because they are
16. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  U.S. Peacekeeping, 115.
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brought before the General Assembly and the Security Council, debated, and documented 
in a legal and transparent fashion. This is important because the more an issue is debated, 
the more it is legitimated. Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab argue that the more frequently 
recipients are confronted with one side of an adversarial argument, the more likely they 
will adopt that point of view and thus strengthen that position.17 Countries with 
grievances can defend themselves and possibly gain international support. This occurred, 
for example, in the establishment of Israel in 1948, and more recently in the case of East 
Timor. However, the very essence of intervention violates sovereignty: it is an act o f war 
that can cause many complications, as demonstrated in the case o f Indonesia’s occupation 
and annexation of East Timor. Therefore, any state that wishes to intervene in the 
internal affairs o f another state for any reason should first seek a UN blessing. Such UN 
mandates commonly specify conditions o f the intervention, as occurred with France in 
Rwanda, the United States in Haiti, and Australia in East Timor, and they lay the ground 
rules for the operation.
In this dissertation, UN policies, mandates, and actions influence the U.S. policy­
making process regarding intervention, because without its legitimization through 
collective mandates, any intervention would be problematic. This speaks to the concept 
that the United States needed UN support for intervention, and therefore had to generate 
support in the UN. One problem with this variable however, is that the United States sits 
on the UN Security Council, which means that this decision making may be circular 
rather than causal. This having been said, this dissertation examines how the UN 
contributed to Clinton’s decisions regarding intervention during each crisis. Analysis of
17. H.M. Kepplinger, H.B. Brosius, and J.F. Staab, “Opinion Formation in Mediated Conflicts and 
Crises: A Model o f  Cognitive-Affective Media Effects,” International Journal o f  Public Opinion Research,
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the UN examines Security Council resolutions about each crisis. These resolutions are 
credible indications o f the intent and actions of the most influential UN body. As 
applicable, the relations between the United States and the UN are included in this 
examination to establish the influence o f the UN on Clinton’s decisions regarding 
intervention.
The U.S. Congress
The U.S. Congress is one of the three institutions o f democratic power in the 
United States. It shares power with the executive and judiciary. Congress is a powerful 
institutional force that every president must work with to forge successful policies. The 
literature regarding the president and the Congress is divided between two schools of 
thought.18 First, the “two presidencies” theory suggests that “while often frustrated in the 
sphere,. . .  presidents do not fail on any major foreign policy initiatives.”19 Whereas this 
argument has been shown faulty in recent history, it did pave the way for a better 
understanding o f the fact that the president tends to experience more congressional 
support in foreign affairs than in domestic initiatives. Second, there are those who
no. 3 (1991): 132-56.
18. There is considerable literature regarding this topic. See, for example, Lance T. LeLoup and 
Steven A. Shull, The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in N ational Policymaking  
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999); Thomas E. Cronin, “A  Resurgent Congress and the Imperial 
Presidency,” P olitica l Science Quarterly 95, no. 2 (1980): 209-37; Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and 
Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 
141-69; Eugene R. Wittkopf, Congress and the Politics o f  U.S. Foreign P olicy  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994); James McCormick, “Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Relations Committees,” in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol H ill, ed. Randall 
B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University o f  Michigan Press, 1993); James L. Sundquist, 
Beyond Gridlock? Prospects fo r  Governance in the Clinton Years—and After (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1993); and Gerald Feliz Warburg, Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle between Congress and 
the President over Foreign Policym aking  (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
19. See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action, no. 4 (December 
1966): 7 -14; and Jeffrey E. Cohen, “A  Historical Reassessment o f  Wildavsky’s ‘Two Presidencies’
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• * 20believe that partisan voting in Congress impacts foreign as well as domestic policy. 
Brandon Prins and Bryan Marshall, for example, state that “it is evident that post-cold 
war congressional decision making on issues relating to the president’s foreign policy 
agenda have become increasingly characterized by less congressional consensus and 
greater partisanship.”21 In this dissertation, legislative voting is the measure for this 
variable.
Clinton’s early months in office were marred by several political battles. For 
example, his nomination of Zoe Baird to Attorney General failed because she had 
illegally hired a nanny and failed to pay social security. In addition, his early fight over 
gay rights in the military hit Clinton especially hard with opposition from Congress. 
Topping it all off, his defeat on the health bill came on the eve of the 1994 midterm 
election. Not long after Clinton came to office there was a congressional Republican 
resurgence, in the midterm election of 1994. For a period o f time, the administration 
“remained in a state o f shock, having lost its footing and confidence as a result of the 
midterm election.”22 Thus, opposition in the 104th Congress played a large role in 
moderating Clinton’s policies.
The Clinton White House was domestically oriented and was careful about raising 
political costs at home by appearing to refuse to work with Congress on foreign policy 
initiatives abroad. For example, Michael MacKinnon argues that PDD 25 resulted from a
Thesis,” in The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment, ed. Steven A. Shull (Chicago: Nelson- 
Hall, 1991), 3.
20. See, for example, Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Blen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, “The 
Demise o f  the Two Presidencies,” American Politics Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2000): 3 -25 .
21. Brandon C. Prins and Bryan W. Marshall, “Congressional Support o f  the President: A 
Comparison o f  Foreign, Defense, and Domestic Policy Decision Making During and After the Cold War,” 
Presidential Studies Q uarterly 31, no. 4 (2001): 672.
22. William C. Berman, From the Center to the Edge: The P olitics and Policies o f  the Clinton 
Presidency (Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 46.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
perpetual cycle o f confrontation between the Congress and the White House, in which it 
seemed that “the harder Congress pushed, the more pliable the Executive appeared to 
be.”23 PDD 25 is an example of how Clinton’s flexibility in bargaining was a great asset. 
PDD 25 “was designed to avoid any future confrontations with Congress over U.S. 
support of a UN mission, or participation in such a mission,” not to strengthen 
peacekeeping.24 Along these lines, PDD 25 “was directed and formulated based on the 
self-interested, political calculations o f what the Clinton administration believed was 
necessary to appease hostile congressional positions.”25
Congress retains a considerable measure o f de facto  control over the approval or 
denial o f any proposed mission because it controls funding for the annual Department of 
Defense budget. This forces the executive to make funding requests for each individual 
case as it arises. In this way, Congress is able to maintain checks and balances on foreign 
policy, regardless o f whether the UN gives its go-ahead to intervene. MacKinnon 
concludes, “domestic politics have led the United States to become a ‘self-restrained’ 
power.”26
Apparent inaction in Congress results in part from differentiated roles o f the 
executive and legislative branches. Michael Smith argues that the executive and 
legislature reached a stalemate during the twentieth century, contributing to “a situation 
in which each side depends on the other when committing the United States to a major
23. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  US Peacekeeping, 105.
24. Ibid., 106.
25. Ibid., xviii.
26. For more on this argument see Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and the Use o f  Force in the 
Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Restraint? CRS 94-581 S, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, 20 July 1 9 9 4 ,16 -17 . For similar views see Thomas L. Friedman, “Theory vs. Practice: Clinton’s 
Stated Foreign Policy Turns into More Modest ‘Self-Containment,’” New York Times, 1 October 1993, A3.
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military operation.”27 Smith explains that this stalemate between the president and the 
Congress has led to a bifurcation in the roles o f each institution. The president “provides 
energy and expediency in ordering forces overseas, acts as the highest level in the chain 
of command when forces are actually engaged, and serves as the focal point for U.S. 
interests on the world stage.”28 Philip Trimble argues that the president has greater 
legitimacy, based on a greater constituency than is found in Congress. Indeed, says 
Trimble, due to the president’s accountability to this greater constituency base, the 
president has more authority to exercise his right to use force than the Congress has the 
authority to require him to petition it for permission. The Congress serves as a forum for 
intense debate and provides support for U.S. forces sent abroad. As a result of their 
shared power, these two bodies are forced into a bargaining situation that often influences 
presidential decisions during foreign crises.
In this study, Congress has the capacity to impact foreign policy because it has the 
authority to question long-term military intervention. Thus, if  the president anticipates 
that a particular intervention may last longer than the sixty days allowed by the war 
powers resolution, then he must be cognizant of, and consider the views in, Congress. 
Thus, there is less congressional oversight in the short term, but intervention in crisis is 
often a longer-term affair than sixty days. Without congressional approval o f foreign 
policy decisions, the president would still run into roadblocks in implementing policy, 
including crisis situations when the president’s popularity tends to rise.
27. Michael Smith, “Congress, The President, and the Use o f  Military Force: Cooperation or Conflict 
in the Post-Cold War Era?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 1 (1998): 51.
28. Ibid.
29. Phillip R. Trimble, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to use Limited Military Force,” 
American International Journal o f  Law  89, no. 1 (1995): 84-87.
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The president must remain attuned to views in Congress to determine whether or 
not he has support for his policy agenda. If he does not, then he may wish to act to 
persuade Congress to support him. Congress, for example, could deny funding for 
military operations that it finds unnecessary or unappealing, as occurred in the East 
Timor crisis, when it cut off military aid to Indonesia. The president’s awareness at the 
outset of a crisis that Congress does not support intervention will impact his decision. 
Under such circumstances, the president may be required to bargain for support and take
o n
a different approach, such as appealing for public support. Thus, the case study 
analyses here consider the orientation o f the Congress to be a vital element in shaping 
foreign policy.
The evaluation o f congressional debate on intervention is important because the 
more an issue is discussed, the more important it becomes in the minds of the discussants. 
If a crisis is o f high importance, then the consensus regarding intervention policies should 
be clearly delineated. In this study, the level o f support in Congress for U.S. policy on 
intervention is established by determining the extent to which Congress pressured the 
president on foreign policy. A review of congressional debates regarding intervention 
should reveal what type of approach Congress is willing to support. There are two 
measures of support in Congress for intervention. First, this study examines resolutions 
on each crisis to uncover the formal decision on each case. Whenever possible, 
evaluation of votes should clarify partisan politics impacting each resolution. Second, 
consideration o f the debate surrounding intervention for each case should outline the
30. Since Neustadt’s seminal study, others have written on the bargaining president including: Aaron 
Wildavsky, The Politics o f  the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Graham Allison, The 
Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins, 1987); Hugh Heclo,
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specific issues involved in the congressional decision. Thus, an exploration of committee 
and subcommittee hearings should include the number o f committee and subcommittee 
hearings, and highlight efforts made by members of Congress to influence the president’s 
decisions regarding each crisis. This research should reveal the extent o f support in 
Congress for intervention in each case as well as overview the issues.
Public Opinion and the Media
This section examines the role of public opinion and the media in foreign policy 
decision making. There are three specific factors to consider regarding public opinion: 
the relationship between the president and public opinion, the role o f public opinion polls 
in the decision-making process, and the impact o f the media in crisis situations. For its 
part, the media plays three vital roles in the relationship between the president and public 
opinion: to relay the president’s message, to educate or inform both the president and the 
public, and as a lobby to elites for the public. Since the media is so flexible, it is 
important for the president to “manage” the media carefully.
First, we shall examine the relationship between the president and public opinion. 
The president of the United States receives power from popular support. Yet, as Robert 
Dallek points out, the president holds an elected position and public opinion also has
7 1
power to pressure him. In this respect, President Clinton was well known for his 
domestic orientation. Since the president is theoretically accountable to the public for
The Government o f  Strangers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); and N elson W. Polsby, 
Consequences o f  Party Reform  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
31. Robert Dallek, The American Style o f  Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New  
York: Knopf, 1983).
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making policy that will not harm them, there has been extensive analysis of the 
relationship between the president and public opinion.32
Shapiro and Jacobs, for example, examined the pattern o f elite33 responsiveness to 
public opinion, and concluded that interest groups and partisan politics substantially drive 
policy decisions.34 They show that developments in the relationship peaked during the 
Vietnam War and have declined since then.35 Prior to World War I, it was thought that 
elites in Congress or the executive drove policy. After World War II, it was thought that 
public opinion increasingly drove policy. These findings correspond to the debate on the 
Almond-Lippmann consensus.36 Holsti explains that World War I led to the belief that 
public opinion impacts foreign policy, but that World War II led to the Almond- 
Lippmann consensus, wherein the elites drive foreign policy. However, the Vietnam War 
led to refutation of the Almond-Lippmann consensus. Thus, democratic responsiveness 
rose after 1934, peaked in the 1970s, and has declined since.
There is, however, a natural balance in this relationship between the president and
32. For an overview o f  the debate on whether public opinion impacts policy making, see Bruce 
Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance o f  National Security (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990); Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years o f  Trends in 
Americans' P olicy Preferences (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1991); John Aldrich, John Sullivan, 
and Eugene Borgida, “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates Waltz before a Blind 
Audience?” American Political Science Review, no. 83 (1989); and Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs, 
“The Relationship between Public Opinion and Public Policy: A Review,” in Political Behavior Annual, 
vol. 2, ed.. Samuel Long (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).
33. For an excellent examination o f  the elite in America, see Thomas R. Dye, W ho‘s  Running 
America: The Bush Restoration, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002).
34. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “Source Material: Presidents and Polling: Politicians, 
Pandering, and the Study o f  Democratic Responsiveness,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2001): 
150-67.
35. Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 
(1996): 439-66 .
36. For an excellent analysis o f  the Almond -Lippmann consensus, see Maxine Isaacs, “Two 
Different Worlds: The Relationship between Elite and Mass Opinion on American Foreign Policy,” 
Political Communication  15, no. 3 (1998): 323-45; and Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “Lyndon 
Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory o f  Leadership,” Political Science 
Quarterly 29, no. 3 (1999): 592-616.
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public opinion. If this balance goes too far in either direction, the other operates to pull it 
back into balance. For example, lobby and interest groups form in response to 
unresolved issues and thereby function to balance the responsiveness o f elites to public 
opinion. Accordingly, if  public opinion is excessively ignored by decision-making elites, 
then the public will begin to be engaged, and apply pressure on Congress. Once 
Congress responds to public pressure, it will in turn place pressure of its own on the 
president. Therefore, once public opinion is engaged it is transformed into a lobby of 
sorts, threatening the elite decision-making apparatus with internal division that alters the 
balance of power between decision makers and bureaucracies. It is at this critical 
juncture that public opinion begins to impact the decision-making process, because it 
gains access to representatives, infiltrating the ranks of the elite decision makers to 
generate a shift in policy.
If the president wishes to maintain a cohesive administration while having a 
relatively free hand in foreign policy, he must hold a finger on the pulse of American 
public opinion to know if  it remains moderate and steady. There is a distinction to be 
made between public opinion and public mood. Public opinion is dynamic, but public 
mood tends to remain static for a period o f time. James Stimson describes the public 
mood as a cyclical process whereby the public strives for moderate policies.37 Based on a 
normal distribution, public mood might enjoy rhetorical extremes, but the electorate
37. James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1999).
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patterns indicate that the public prefers moderate policies.38 This cycle bears out in the 
ever present shifting between conservatism and liberalism, because the public constantly 
seeks the middle but is only presented with a two-party system and therefore must either 
lean left or right.
Clinton keenly evaluated public mood. He knew that the public wanted to hear 
that America supported humanitarian good deeds (mood), but would only pay for such 
policy to a point (opinion). The public will not support a long drawn out and involved 
war because costs are too high and quickly become extreme. This understanding aided 
Clinton in forming moderate policies that found rhetorical favor with the public. Looking 
at this from another angle, as long as public opinion remains steady and moderate, there 
is little reason for it to organize a lobby to impact the president’s decisions and the 
president will maintain relatively greater freedom—moderately speaking, of course.
Thus, if the president has steady public support, or even disinterest for his policies, he has 
a better position vis-a-vis representatives in Congress.39 This is especially true when the 
president must sell a moderate policy in the face o f extreme voices in Congress.
Second, the president uses polls for two important but very different purposes.
On one hand, the president uses polls to ascertain what types of rhetoric would find favor 
with the public. Polls are thus important for informing how the president should best 
formulate explanations of policy. Knowing how to talk to the public is critical at times of 
crisis, when the president must call for some action that may not find favor among the
38. Philip Converse was the first to argue that the normal distribution for public opinion is 
problematic, because aggregate public opinion does not reflect coherent attitudes, since foreign policy is far 
too complex and remote. See Philip Converse, “The Nature o f  B elief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology 
and Discontent, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964); and John Zaller, The Nature and Origins o f  
Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 5.
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public at large. The president must generate sufficient public support, if not prior to 
intervention, then soon afterward, before there is time for a lobby or interest group to 
form. Otherwise, Congress could invoke the War Powers Resolution; this was one of the 
most powerful lessons o f the Vietnam War. After Vietnam, to avoid domestic or 
international resistance or hindrance to U.S. policy, foreign policy decision favoring 
intervention may need to be “sold” to the public.
Selling foreign policy means that there should be a solid rationale for decisions, 
and this requires careful use of rhetoric to explain goals and expectations.40 If the 
president is to generate public support, it is imperative that his message makes its way 
intact to the public, Congress, and international audiences if  at all possible. Press 
Secretary McCurry and his colleagues were “engaged in a daily struggle to control the 
agenda, to seize the public’s attention, however fleetingly, for Clinton’s wide-ranging 
initiatives. They had to package the presidency in a way that people would buy the 
product.”41 Presidential rhetoric during crisis is “about the creation o f stable contextual 
frames through which to view the event and justify any action taken in response to the 
event.”42
The president’s ability to sell his policy makes the public more likely to accept or 
support a policy that could affect and displease large numbers o f citizens. This was seen
39. See Samuel Kemell, Going Public: New Strategies o f  Presidential Leadership  (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997), 3; and Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power  (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1980).
40. John Maltese examines the White House Office o f  Communications from Nixon to Bush and 
concludes that a modem president must communicate goals, achievements and agendas directly to the 
public or indirectly through the press. See John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office o f  
Communications and the M anagement o f  Presidential New  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1992).
41. Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycle: How the White House and the M edia M anipulate the News (New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), xv.
42. Kuypers, Presidential Crisis Rhetoric, 195.
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in the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Many in the United States saw little reason for an 
intervention in that country. The president’s explanation emphasized the need to reduce 
human suffering and increase democracy abroad. On 26 February 1993, he said, “we 
must challenge the changes now engulfing our world toward America’s enduring 
objectives o f peace and prosperity, o f democracy and human dignity.”43 Such an 
explanation said little about U.S. strategic interests in the region, but it did resonate well 
with American beliefs and values based in liberal democracy. Thus, in Somalia, the 
president was able to promote public support for intervention by using a rhetoric that 
spoke to the American identity.
Public opinion that fails to engage has a lower probability of generating a lobby in 
Congress. As a result, when public opinion shifts, attentive decision makers in Congress 
tend to shift as well. As this occurs, attentive representatives are more likely to lobby the 
president on behalf of the public. As a result, there would be increased debate and 
opposition to policy that counters public opinion. As a result, it is important for the 
president to understand what the public wants to hear, so that he can use rhetoric to 
enunciate policy in ways that will appeal to the public, even when the content of the 
message is not what the public wants to hear. By doing so, the president can reduce the 
chances that public opinion will initiate a shift in Congress to oppose the president’s 
policy. Thus, the president has more latitude to operate. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to examine the polls in terms of informative rhetoric.
The president also uses polls to examine public levels of policy receptivity. As 
explained above, it is important for the president to know the extent to which his policy
43. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, eds., The Clinton Foreign Policy 
Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 9.
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direction differs from the sway of public opinion. This is so that he can take steps to 
moderate public opinion before it begins to engage and assert influence or opposition to 
preferred policy. All modem presidents take polls, but in the Clinton administration 
“they were virtually a religion.”44 Whenever “Clinton went before the press to argue this 
or that position, he was, in most cases, leading where he knew the public would 
follow.”45 This approach is part of managing the media in the modem age.46 By polling 
the public, the president remains alert to the public opinion, and can take action as 
necessary to explain policies to the public. In this way, the president is motivated not 
only to maintain acceptable policies, but also to stay one step ahead of the public in 
forming policy. In this study, poll data are examined to establish levels o f public 
acceptance and support for intervention.
Third, the media plays a vital role in the U.S. democratic system. While the term 
“media” is often used in the literature, it is not a monolithic entity and in fact 
encompasses a variety o f media outlets, including television broadcasting, newsprint, 
magazines, and increasingly today, the internet.47 This study primarily examines the role 
o f the elite print media (i.e., the New York Times and the Washington Post) in shaping 
public opinion and covering the crises we examine. To assess the impact o f the media, 
several methods can be explored. First, we can count the number and length o f articles 
or broadcasts on a particular issue or event to establish the extent o f coverage. Second,
44. Kurtz, Spin Cycle, 203.
45. Ibid., 204.
46. For an examination o f  varying ways that presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to George Herbert 
Walker Bush used to interact with the media, see Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief 
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1991).
47. For more about the mass media in the political process, see Doris A. Graber, M ass M edia and  
American P olitics, 6th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002).
48. See John T. W oolley, “Using Media-Based Data in Studies o f  Politics,” American Journal o f  
Political Science 44, no. 1 (2000): 156-73.
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we can calculate the number o f times a particular word or phrase is used in articles or 
broadcasts, such as “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide.” Third, we can examine the 
ideological slant of particular news firms, to establish the extent a newspaper favors a 
more liberal or conservative position. The extent to which a newspaper might favor a 
more liberal or conservative position inherently shapes what is considered newsworthy 
and how a given event is depicted. This study did not intend to and does not provide a 
highly quantified measure o f this variable, but it does examine the elite newspapers along 
these lines.
In an ideal democracy, the media is the gatekeeper for the public good; 
unfortunately, however, this is not always true in practice. The media can remain neutral, 
work for the president, inform the president and the public, or even represent the public 
as an informal sort o f lobby. This dissertation considers the media as an intervening 
variable that is an essential part o f the political process. Here, the media is an intervening 
variable because the government recognizes that information is power and therefore 
routinely works to manipulate the press as an instrument o f national power.
If the media endorses the message of the president, it can diminish the ability of 
the public to engage elite attention. The media can, however, encourage or enflame 
public opinion to produce a lobby, by pointing out flaws in the administration’s policies 
or actions. If the president manages the media well, he may enjoy their endorsement, 
making it less likely to either enflame public opinion or allow it to publicize anti­
administration items.
The media plays a critical role because the president relies on it to relay his
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message to the American public and to the world at large.49 Since John F. Kennedy, the 
importance of the media has grown in the White House. President Richard Nixon, for 
example, was the first president to have a White House Office o f Communications that 
was dedicated to developing good media relations. President Ronald Reagan was the first 
modem president to fully utilize the power o f the media available to the executive. White 
House insider David Gergen reveals a “chaotic” White House under the Clinton 
administration; however it was one that paid close attention to relations with the media.50
Today, it is expected that the White House generates news of the day stories, 
which keep the executive in a positive light and set the tone for media relations. An 
example is the rally-around-the-president phenomenon that frequently occurs during 
crisis situations.51 This characteristic of the media stems from the idea that in a liberal 
democracy, the U.S. government provides the media with reliable and credible news.
This leaves the government to set the course of media relations, as explained by Timothy 
Cook, via a “fourth institutional branch” of political government.52
The media is important to the president as a conduit o f information both to and 
from the White House. It can tell the president about powerful undercurrents in America 
that could threaten the president’s agenda. Thus, despite official efforts to manipulate the 
news, the media retains the potential to turn against policy makers in Washington in 
situations where public opinion becomes extreme and begins to use the media to lobby
49. For discussion o f  various strategies on how a president might gain and maintain popular support, 
see Samuel Kemell, Going Public, Chapter 7.
50. David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence o f  Leadership, Nixon to Clinton (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2000), 292.
51. For an explanation o f  how the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon works, see Matthew A. Baum, 
“The Constituent Foundations o f  the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,” International Studies Quarterly 
46, no. 2 (2002): 263-98 .
52. Timothy E. Cook, Governing with the News: The News M edia as a Political Institution (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1998).
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elites. News reporting is an essential element for democracy, because the press “plays a 
major role in rendering opposition effective.”53 The media is a tool for educating the 
public on important matters that it would otherwise be unlikely to learn about. It is also a 
mouthpiece for public opposition, and thereby becomes a lobby and can impact elite 
decision makers by generating division among them.
The media works as a constraint on the president because it speeds up time. For 
example, Clinton knew that intervention must have an end strategy that is not too far in 
the future, because the public expects to see results quickly and is reluctant to see 
American boys put into harm’s way for an extended period. For example, when the 
public saw images of American soldiers as victims of brutality, it reduced support and 
increased opposition for the intervention to the point that elites challenged policy. For 
fear of a public backlash, Clinton withdrew U.S. participation from Somalia operations 
within six months. As a result, the media played a large role in the U.S. entry into and 
exit from Somalia. Clinton’s retreat from the press was prompted by the “CNN effect,” 
which “suggests that policy makers only respond when there are scenes of mass 
starvation on the evening news. It also suggests that policy makers obtain most of their 
information about ongoing disaster from media reports.”54 While the direct influence of 
the CNN effect on the president is overstated, it can have a mobilizing effect on the 
public.
Therefore, the media can become an actor in and of itself, as images and stories 
are used to make a profit in a competitive environment. Recent examples include media
53. Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics ofNewsm aking  
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 193.
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photos o f atrocities that generated revulsion in the American public. Images o f suffering 
or atrocities are highly influential on shaping public opinion in favor o f finding a remedy, 
even in cases where they are misleading.55 The public just does not want to see horrible 
images on TV, and policy makers are therefore pressured to do something about the 
problem. In such cases, by showing the atrocities—for whatever reason—the media 
becomes an influencing factor in the policy-making process.
The media often puts its own spin on the news. There has been considerable 
research on what is called “indexing” in media reporting.56 Indexing refers to the extent 
to which the news staff adheres to a particular point o f view in news reports, be that 
official, public, or their own. Indexing could prove important in cases where the 
administration’s activities are explained with an underlying or overt spin. It is unclear 
whether indexing actually impacts public opinion regarding the president and policy; 
however it holds the potential to do so because it represents news with some preexisting 
bias. For example, if  the media and the president sit in adversarial positions, then the 
media might present the president’s message with a critique that could damage the 
tendency of the public to offer the president support for policy. Clinton, for example, 
increasingly operated at arms length with the media after sensational stories were 
published about him. Thus, it remains likely that the media, by interjecting bias, can 
intervene between the president and the public by reshaping the rhetoric used by the
54. Andrew Natsios, “Illusions o f  Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,” in From 
M assacres to  Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and 
Thomas G. W eiss (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 150.
55. See Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, The M edia o f  Conflict: War Reporting and Representations o f  
Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books, 1999), 2.
56. See, for example, Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory o f  Press-State Relations in the United 
States,” Journal o f  Communication  40, no. 2 (1990): 103-25.
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president to explain policy, and this gives the media the power to influence public 
opinion.
As media shapes news about the president, it also shapes public opinion. In doing 
so, the media acts as an intervening variable, sifting the president’s message as it is 
relayed to the public. The media, for example, could reawaken powerful images of 
domestic opposition that occurred during the Vietnam War as a warning of foreign policy 
gone afoul. In informing the public, the media becomes an integral part of the 
information chain. To be sure, Clinton’s performance “had helped create the sense that 
the country was doing just fine on his watch. But it was a carefully honed media 
strategy—alternately seducing, misleading, and sometimes intimidating the press—that 
maintained this aura o f success.”57
In this study, public opinion is measured by analyzing public opinion polls. Polls 
give an indication of how the American public viewed U.S. action during each crisis 
under study.58 It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to examine how the Clinton 
administration analyzed the polls to design rhetoric that would be amenable to public 
receptiveness. The examination of the polls reveals the level of support or opposition to 
policy set by the administration under a given crisis situation and reveals the extent of 
public influence over policy makers.
In this dissertation, the examination of public opinion includes the role of the 
media, and considers the extent to which the news supports the position of the
57. See Joe Conason and Gene Lyons, The Hunting o f  the President: The Ten Year Campaign to 
D estroy Bill and H illary Clinton  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), xiii.
58. For a clarification o f  how polls may portray misleading results, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, 
“Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the U se o f  Military Force Abroad,” 
World Politics 47, no. 4 (1995): 534-54.
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administration, or provides its own index of the crisis, or reflects the position o f public 
opinion. Since the media is considered to hold the potential to impact public opinion, it is 
approached as an intervening variable between the president and his public. Moreover, 
the media is an intervening variable because it can become a catalyst for action, either by 
influencing public opinion, or by turning itself into a lobby to divide elite policy makers.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
Each variable has a corresponding hypothesis. The hypotheses are listed at the 
beginning and in the conclusion of this dissertation. The case study findings and analyses 
are given in the concluding chapter. The following section explains why the cases of 
Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor were selected for analysis in this study.
Case Study Selection
This dissertation uses the Method of Structured, Focused Comparison to examine 
three case studies.59 The case studies are occurrences o f small-scale intervention in 
which the United States faced risks to vital and peripheral interests. The case studies for 
this analysis were selected for six reasons. First, each crisis is similar to the others, in 
that it engaged world attention and had its roots in history that went back decades— if not 
centuries—prior to the crisis. Consequently, they are all crises that resurfaced in the 
deregulated post-cold war environment. These crises could no longer be sublimated 
without U.S.-Soviet cold war competition. In addition, cold war rhetoric favoring
59. See Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theoiy Development: The Method o f  Structured, 
Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon 
Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979): 43-68 .
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containment and U.S.-Soviet animosity cannot be properly compared with the rhetoric of 
the post-cold war era, due to the demise of the foundation for and acceptance of 
containment rhetoric. Therefore, for comparative purposes, the case studies o f Haiti, 
Rwanda, and East Timor fall into the same post-cold war rhetorical category and time 
frame.
Second, all three cases occurred during the same administration—under Clinton. 
For example, Haiti drew direct economic, political, and military intervention, whereas the 
United States balked against involvement in international intervention in Rwanda, and in 
East Timor, the United States had mixed responses. The explanation o f existing 
dissimilarities should therefore be discemable for reasons other than differences between 
administration styles or time periods.
Third, the case studies selected for analysis in this dissertation represent a cross- 
section o f instances in which vital and peripheral interests were at stake. For example, in 
Haiti, refugee issues posed a threat to regional stability and therefore engaged vital U.S. 
interests regarding security and economy. Moreover, it was an example of how 
democratic disruption engaged further vital U.S. strategic interests. Peripheral U.S. 
interests in Haiti included humanitarian issues. In Rwanda, vital interests referred to 
strategic interests and regional stability. Ethnic cleansing and genocide threatened 
peripheral U.S. interests regarding international law and human rights. In East Timor, 
U.S. interests focused more narrowly on military/security and economic stability of the 
larger region, placing high priority on Indonesia-U.S. relations. In this case, only 
peripheral U.S. interests were threatened in East Timor— specifically, the American 
values represented in ideals of self-determination and the right to life, liberty, and the
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pursuit of happiness. Thus, the three cases selected represent situations that engaged vital 
and peripheral U.S. interests. This combination o f cases gives examples o f each type of 
interest plus a combination o f the main categories of U.S. interests. As a result, a 
comparison between these specific case studies should reveal variances in U.S. policy on 
military intervention based on the level of interest involved.
Fourth, each crisis represents a different area of the world. Selection of these 
three case studies places importance on varying geographic proximities to limit 
influences on foreign policy due to potential bias based on region, culture, or other 
affinity. Therefore, varying geographic regions are considered, including Rwanda in 
Africa, Haiti in the Caribbean, and East Timor in Southeast Asia.
Fifth, each crisis represents one of three different causes o f crisis, including ethnic 
genocide, civil violence, or democratic crisis. Accordingly, the case studies for this 
dissertation include ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, civil violence in East Timor, and 
democratic governance in Haiti. The case on ethnic genocide was selected because 
directly invokes the Clinton Doctrine. The cases on civil violence and democratic 
governance both fall into strategic goals of the Clinton administration for democratic 
enlargement, as covered in Chapter II. All three cases involve elements o f human rights, 
self-determination, and regional stability.
Sixth, each case study represents a small-scale crisis with different degrees of 
intervention. High-intensity crises, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, are not considered 
because this study focuses on small-scale, low-intensity crises where the United States 
has only marginal interests and where the risks are limited. This is an important 
distinction, because when U.S. vital interests are at stake, and the costs o f non-
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intervention are substantial, the United States is more likely to intervene. This study, 
therefore, focuses on instances o f low-intensity crises where the likelihood of U.S. 
intervention is not a foregone conclusion. In this study, Rwanda represents a crisis in 
which the United States experienced very low intensity in terms o f urgency. The United 
States chose not to intervene with force to stop the killing in Rwanda. Furthermore, the 
United States experienced low intensity in terms of urgency to provide humanitarian aid 
once the killing eased. Similarly, East Timor is low-intensity non-intervention in military 
terms and low intensity in humanitarian relief. Haiti, however, ranks as medium- 
intensity military intervention, because the United States did use military force, but with 
low risks. The case studies cover only the lower spectrum of intensity of intervention. 
The selection o f case studies reflects a range of foreign policy initiatives from sanctions 
to incentives, and from apathy to military force.
Table 2 illustrates important elements of each case. In the table, “Interest” points 
to the type o f U.S. interest at stake. As discussed, interests are divided into two 
categories: peripheral and vital. Peripheral interests have little or no impact on the 
United States. Peripheral interests rank lower in priority than vital interests. Vital 
interests include those o f high importance to the United States. In this study, peripheral 
and vital interests were at stake for all cases selected.
“Intensity” refers to the level o f engagement to which the United States was 
willing to commit. In other words, it entails those items that matter enough to call for 
intervention. Low-level intensity, for example, refers to a lack of U.S. resolve to address 
the crisis in a significant way, including a lack of long-term commitment. Any
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Table 2
Case Study Typology Overview
Case Interest Intensity Reason Time Location
Rwanda vital and 
peripheral
very low humanitarian 1990-94 
representation
Africa
Haiti vital and 
peripheral
medium democracy/ 1991-94 
humanitarian
Caribbean
East Timor vital and 
peripheral
low humanitarian 1991-99 
self-determination
SE Asia
engagement in this category would only be done at very low risk, very low cost, and very 
short-term. A low-intensity crisis would most likely encounter U.S. policy, which 
without reference to duration resists committing troops, equipment, or economic 
assistance. For this study, East Timor is considered a low-level intensity crisis. Rwanda 
was a very low-intensity crisis for the United States. Medium-level intensity indicates 
willingness to engage, however only with moderate risk, moderate cost, and for a limited 
time. A crisis in this category would likely encounter U.S. policy placing limitations on 
troop levels and movement, equipment, and economic resources, and will generally 
demand a specific objective. For this study, Haiti is a case in which the United States 
displayed moderate intensity. High-level intensity refers to high U.S. willingness to 
provide troops, equipment, and resources, and often demonstrates a willingness to 
commit to a longer-term resolution. Such crises may have an open-ended time frame, 
such as was seen in Kosovo, but are not examined in this study.
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“Reason” in the above table refers to the accepted understanding by policy makers 
about what type o f crisis is involved. For this dissertation, the case study crises are all 
humanitarian in some form, including peacekeeping, human rights, and ethnic cleansing, 
and Haiti experienced democratic breakdown. This column in the table refers to the 
decision taken in Washington on each particular crisis, according to the U.S. perspective. 
It does not refer to the position taken by other international entities or actors.
The “Time” column in the table refers to the years that the crisis occurred. The 
crisis in Rwanda began in October 1990 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in Haiti 
began in September 1991 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in East Timor started in 
November 1991 and ended in late 1999. These crises all began within two years o f the 
beginning o f the post-cold war period, which bespeaks the deregulated international 
environment discussed earlier.
The “Location” o f the crisis refers to the area o f the world in which the crisis took 
place. As explained earlier, the geographic proximity o f the crisis to the United States 
influences the U.S. sense o f urgency. Rwanda is in Africa. Haiti is in the Caribbean.
East Timor is in the Southeast Asia. As a result o f varying geographic distance from the 
United States, each case has a different sense o f urgency, with the closest having the 
highest level and the farthest having the lowest. The study of geographic proximity is 
made by other authors and is therefore accepted in this dissertation as a natural 
phenomenon.
Case Study Structure
Each case study begins with an historical background summary, after which each
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variable is examined at length. All case studies are similarly arranged around the same 
five specific variables. The initial variables under examination in each case are found in 
the international environment. The first variable includes important U.S. allies or 
international organizations other than the UN. The second variable, the United Nations, 
represents the international organization as an approximation of a legitimizing world 
body, as already explained. The remaining variables are found in the domestic 
environment. The third variable is the U.S. Congress, as the body for domestic political 
representation and debate. The fourth variable reveals what U.S. public sentiment means 
in terms of foreign policy, and includes an examination of the media. The last variable 
encompasses U.S. interests under the Clinton administration, including how Clinton or 
his advisors portrayed interests in public statements. Each case study concludes with a 
brief overview o f critical turning points for each variable as it influenced Clinton’s 
foreign policy. Case study findings and analysis are in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY ON ETHNIC CLEANSING IN RWANDA
The 1994 crisis in Rwanda resulted in at least a million lives lost in war between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes, and culminated in the largest known case of ethnic 
cleansing since World War II. This chapter explores U.S. policies during the crisis to 
examine why and how the Clinton administration chose not to intervene militarily to stop 
the violence. We begin with a brief historical section, then examine the five international 
political variables outlined previously, and conclude with a brief summary of our 
findings.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Hutu and Tutsi people of Rwanda had longstanding differences. Historians 
are divided on the Hutu-Tutsi relationship prior to colonization.1 Some argue that it was 
symbiotic and friendly between Hutu cultivators and Tutsi cattle owners. While the Tutsi 
kings ruled most of Rwanda, the country’s administrative leadership was frequently given 
to Hutu. Rwanda was initially a German colony that was placed under the League of 
Nations after World War I. It was then turned over under trusteeship to Belgium, as were 
Burundi and Zaire. The colonizers disrupted the existing relationship, placing Tutsi in
1. For an overview o f  Rwandan history, see United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-  
1996, United Nations Blue Book Series, vol. 10 (New York: The United Nations Department o f  Public 
Information, 1996); Tor Sellstrom, Lennart Wohlgemuth, The Nordic Africa Institute, with contributions 
by Patrick Dupont and Karin Andersson Scheibe, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessons from  the Rwanda Experience, 5 vols. (Copenhagen: Steering Committee o f  the Joint Evaluation o f  
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996); and Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, “Rwanda’s 
Internally Displaced: A Conundrum within a Conundrum,” in The Forsaken People: Case Studies o f  the 
Internally D isplaced, ed. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998).
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power positions over the Hutu majority, and instituting a polarized social structure that 
caused hatred o f Belgians, who issued the controversial identity cards bearing ethnic 
origin that was later key in the genocide. Other historians contend that prior to 
colonization, Tutsi rule had led to a two-tiered societal structure, which was deepened 
and institutionalized by colonization. Both schools o f thought agree, however, that 
during the colonial period the Tutsi minority gained significant power, exploited the Hutu 
majority, and spread myths of Tutsi intellectual and political superiority that inflamed 
social tension.2 Rwanda-Urundi, as it was known, was split into Rwanda and Burundi in 
the 1950s, when decolonization swept across Africa.
Decolonization meant more than throwing off the yoke of foreign colonizers. It 
was Hutu emancipation from Tutsi rule and resulted in the flight o f around 120,000 Tutsi 
refugees to neighboring states.3 Formal independence was granted on 1 July 1962 to 
Hutu president Gregoire Kayibanda, but did not ensure domestic stability. For many 
years, periodic violence between the groups caused large numbers of refugees to collect 
in neighboring states. Relentless attacks from Tutsi refugee rebels were launched from 
refugee bases in Uganda and Burundi, and caused difficulties for Tutsi in Rwanda as well 
as increasing the number o f refugees. Violent exchanges occurred with the Hutu/Peasant 
Revolution in 1959-61, and crises in 1963-64 and 1973 in which an estimated 600,000 
Tutsi became refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zaire by the early 1990s.4 After 
the Hutu regime up-scaled retaliatory Tutsi killings in 1967, the Tutsi rebel attacks eased.
In a military coup d ’etat in mid-1973, Hutu Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana
2. See Catherine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics o f  History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 
(1998): 7.
3. The United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 9.
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seized power and set up single-party rule. Even though Rwanda remained one of the 
poorest countries in the world, the economy thrived for fifteen years, but a slump in 
world prices for coffee hit Rwanda’s main export and disrupted the agricultural economy. 
In an effort to help, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, and the European Union contributed $216 million in 1990 and 
increased aid to $375 million in 1991 for structural reforms.5 After seventeen years 
without ethnic violence, this severe economic downturn set off a disastrous spiral of 
events, as Habyarimana renewed discriminatory policies that worsened competition for 
scarce resources in one o f the most densely populated countries in the world.
The Crisis
For nearly thirty years Tutsi refugees were a source o f regional instability, 
involving Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. For example, by 1990, there 
were over 470,000 Tutsi refugees in other countries, with 280,000 in Burundi, 80,000 in 
Uganda, 80,000 in Zaire, and 30,000 in Tanzania.6 The economic drain on these host 
countries prompted the OAU and UN to resolve refugee issues, pressuring Habyarimana 
beginning in the late 1980s to implement power sharing reforms. Habyarimana stood to 
lose power by these reforms, and he was slow to implement them, but he did allow the 
organization o f other political parties.7
Tutsi refugee rebels invaded from Uganda on 1 October 1990, marking the
4. See Sellstrom et al., “Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors,” vol. 1, The International 
Response to Conflict and Genocide, 30.
5. United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 11.
6. Ibid., 11
7. These included the Mouvement democratique republicain (MDR), Habyarimara’s main opposition 
party, but also the Parti social democrate (PSD), the Parti liberal (PL), and the Parti democrate chretein 
(PDC).
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beginning o f the crisis in Rwanda.8 They killed hundreds o f Hutu and set off intensified 
anti-Tutsi activity in Rwanda, such as political arrests and intermittent massacres of Tutsi 
in the countryside. The October Tutsi invasion prompted France, Belgium, and Zaire to 
aid the Hutu regime to quell the invasion.
The economic downturn, along with renewed civil war in 1990, left Rwanda’s 
economy in ruins. International development assistance did little to end the violence, and 
may have exacerbated tensions due to exclusionary politics in elite Hutu circles.9 Two 
weeks after the invasion, the leaders o f Rwanda and Uganda agreed to attend a 
conference supervised by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to discuss the refugee issue. They agreed 
to negotiate with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and reached a cease-fire on 26 
October. The cease-fire lasted until the RPF violated the agreement on 8 February 1993 
and accused Habyarimana of human rights violations,10 including a massacre in January 
1993 in northwest Rwanda.11 A  day later, the Dar Salaam Declaration committed the 
Rwandan government to offering Tutsi refugees a threefold choice. They could return 
home to Rwanda, remain in the host country and retain Rwandan citizenship, or become 
nationals o f the host country. A cycle o f cease-fire violations and extensions eventually 
led to the creation o f an OAU-monitored buffer zone.
8. Such Tutsi activity was repeated on five other occasions prior to the 1994 genocide.
9. For further discussion o f  this issue, see Peter Uvin, Development, Aid, and Conflict: Reflections 
from  the Case o f  Rwanda  (Helsinki: UN University/WIDER, 1996).
10. Claims that the government o f  Rwanda violated human rights were subsequently substantiated by 
the International Commission o f  Inquiry, “alleging serious and widespread human rights abuses and 
concluding that the majority o f  offenses had been committed by the Rwandese Government soldiers or 
officials,” United Nations, United Nations and Rwanda, 20.
11. United Nations, “Report o f  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on his 
Mission to Rwanda o f  11-12 May 1994,” E/CN.4S-3/3, 19 May 1994, reprinted in United Nations, The 
United Nations and Rwanda, 285-89 .
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Progress in international negotiations was slow. In August 1992, the OAU and 
the government of Tanzania sponsored peace negotiations in Arusha.12 Under domestic 
and international pressure, Habyarimana finally signed the Arusha Peace Accord on 4 
August 1993,13 ending the civil war that had raged since October 1990.
The Accord arranged power sharing between the Hutu government and the Tutsi- 
led RPF, and arranged for the repatriation of refugees and resettlement o f displaced 
persons. It favored the RPF and the opposition, which received the majority interim 
cabinet and legislature seats before elections, as well as half of the officer and 40 percent 
of the enlisted positions. This arrangement amounted to an implicit negotiated surrender 
of the Hutu army to the Tutsi rebels.14 In the accords, the RPF and domestic opposition 
would receive 50 percent o f the officer and 40 percent o f the enlisted positions. Thus, 
Habyarimana grasped at the remaining chances to retain leadership and reintroduced age- 
old anti-Tutsi rhetoric as a method for splitting opposition.
Relations between the Hutu government and the Tutsi RPF were further 
complicated by unexpected political trouble in neighboring Burundi. In June 1993, 
democratic reforms in Burundi ushered in the first Hutu president. Shortly thereafter, on 
21 October, Tutsi rebels assassinated Burundi’s new president and killed thousands of 
Hutu. As a result, approximately 375,000 Hutu refugees fled into Rwanda, heightening 
Hutu fears there and prompting further anti-Tutsi propaganda.
12. Belgium, Burundi, Germany, France, Senegal, and Zaire also participated.
13. For a general overview o f the fourteen months o f  negotiations leading to the Arusha Accord with 
analysis based on interviews by a former UN diplomat, see Bruce D. Jones, Peacem aking in Rwanda: The 
Dynamics o f  Failure (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), esp. chaps. 3 and 4; and Amare Tekle, “The 
OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” in The Path o f  A Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis 
from  Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999), chap. 6.
14. See Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 11.
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Rwanda was in a state of near collapse, and Habyarimana began the groundwork 
for genocide to eliminate his political opposition and maintain power.15 Habyarimana 
and his supporters, threatened by their loss o f power, quickly sought to undermine the 
accord by splitting domestic Tutsi-Hutu party alliances. For example, he offered political 
moderate leaders, such as Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana from the Mouvement 
democratique republicain (MDR) opposition party, positions within his administration. 
Such appointments made it possible to monitor and control their activities more closely, 
while at the same time breaking them away from previous political cooperation with 
opposition RPF elements.16
These events unfortunately fed Habyarimana’s plan to undermine the Arusha 
Accord and hold on to power by planning genocide.17 The genocide was highly 
organized and planned, with initial perpetrators recruited and trained to kill. Hutu 
governmental extremist preparations for the coming genocide included amassing 
weapons and machetes, recruiting and training extremist anti-Tutsi militants, expanding 
anti-Tutsi networks, and starting up a private radio station, used to incite ethnic violence 
against Tutsi. Catherine Newbury proposes that the Hutu placed generalized blame for 
social problems on the Tutsi, thereby making all Tutsi in the country “enemies of the
15. See Timothy Longman, “Rwanda: Chaos from Above,” in The African State at A Critical 
Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration, ed. Leonardo A. Villalon and Philip A. Huxtable 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 75-89.
16. She surprised Habyarimana with her unwillingness to conform to his ideals and may have 
contributed to her assassination. See Linda Melvem, A People Betrayed: The Role o f  the West in R w anda’s 
Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), 104-5.
17. Proof o f  a plot for committing genocide includes the 11 January fax from the UN Force 
Commander General Dallaire, reporting that the Hutu militia called the interhamwe was preparing to kill 
large numbers o f  Tutsi in the Kigali area. See United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 31.
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state.”18 The genocide was set into motion as a program to eliminate enemies of the 
state, and when Tutsi rebels learned about these activities, they earnestly trained for war.
On 6 April 1994, the president’s plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile 
during its landing approach to Kigali, killing both President Habyarimana and President 
Ntaryamira o f Burundi. The double assassination is attributed to extremist forces within 
Habyarimana’s Rwandan Army, and Hutu extremists immediately took hold of the 
government. The killing was goal-oriented but departed from common bureaucratic 
channels o f  authority that would later complicate calls for justice.19 Rwanda, one of the 
most densely populated countries in Africa with approximately one-half of its population 
under age 15, was also very poor. Dire economic conditions made recruitment less 
difficult. John Mueller examines Rwanda and shows that ethnic violence used “common, 
opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological marauders,” who were 
“recruited and permitted free reign by political authorities.”20 This explains why the RPF 
relatively quickly took control of the country: because the killers were cowardly 
opportunists, who fled in the face o f military opposition.
Ethnic violence began with the downing of Habyarmana’s plane. According to 
some observers, “within 30 minutes of the plane crash, barricades were thrown up around 
Kigali and the killing began.”21 Elimination o f political opposition and moderates was 
the first step in launching the genocide. The initial killings targeted not only Tutsi, but 
also moderate Hutu politicians, including the much-publicized case o f the first woman
18. Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics o f  History in Rwanda,” 7.
19. For more, see Alison Des Forges, Leave None to  Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1999), 9.
20. John Mueller, “The Banality o f ‘Ethnic War,’” 43.
21. Holly Burkhalter, “The Question o f  Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda,” World 
Policy Journal 11, no. 4 (1994): 47.
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Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She had taken office as Prime Minister in July 
1993 in accordance with the Arusha Accord. A moderate, who worked toward 
diminishing discrimination, she had visited a Tutsi refugee camp in November 1991, 
where Tutsi army training was underway. After the visit, she insisted that such training 
end, but was ignored by camp directors and local authorities.22 She was assassinated in 
her home on 7 April 1994, because she “called for reforms, which would avert further 
internal conflicts,” and because she openly opposed existing class structure in Rwandan 
society.23
A central element in the extremist strategy was to sow confusion with 
disinformation and communications blackouts, so that neither foreigners nor nationals 
knew what was happening. In addition, the Hutu government contributed to international 
misunderstanding of the genocide by explaining the massacres as a “spontaneous civilian 
outbreak as a result o f incitement from the RPF.”24 It also charged the RPF with 
responsibility for the massacres, despite U.S. reports to the contrary. Further 
complication stemmed from the difficulty for outsiders to recognize that this new 
outbreak of violence was not a continuation of previous conflict, because it appeared to 
be chaotic and anarchic, rather than highly organized.
By 21 April, an estimated 250,000 Tutsi were already dead. This occurred 
surprisingly fast, as many seeking refuge were killed by grenade or machete in churches, 
schools, stadiums, athletic fields, and hospitals. Sometimes massacres occurred within
22. For more see Des Forges, Leave None, 136.
23. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, “Governance, Security and Conflict Resolution in Africa,” Diogenes 
46/4, no. 184(1998): 136.
24. United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H earing before the Subcommittee on Africa 
o f  the Committee on Foreign Affairs House o f  Representatives, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994, 6.
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sight o f clergy or UN observers, who lacked the mandate to intervene. Communication 
from Kigali to the countryside by phone was interrupted, so news spread slowly.
Different regions had different rates of violence throughout the country. By the end of
< \c
April, the largest massacres were already completed.
Unlike most researchers, Robert Kuperman finds that the genocide in Rwanda 
happened faster than the West learned of it. He argues that even if action had been taken 
immediately, the genocide would have been achieved anyway, because it was swifter 
than a reasonable required response time necessary. The killings were largely over by 
April 21, and President Clinton later said that the killers “did their work five times as fast 
as the mechanized gas chambers used by the Nazis.”26 Extremists strategically 
announced on 11 May that the genocide was already finished, possibly to avoid UN 
military intervention. Kuperman argues that “three-quarters of the Tutsi victims would 
have died even if the West had launched a maximum intervention immediately upon 
learning that a nationwide genocide was being attempted.”27
Reports have since come to light detailing the UN communications breakdown,28 
and declassified U.S. documents point to the likelihood that some U.S. officials “knew 
the potential for mass slaughter” at the outset, and held an even higher level 
understanding of the situation three weeks in.29 The international community
25. For a chilling account o f  personal stories o f  genocide, see Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform 
You that Tomorrow We w ill be K illed  with Our Families: Stories from  Rwanda (New York: Farrar Straus 
and Giroux, 1998).
26. President Clinton’s speech, “Clinton’s Painful Words o f  Sorrow and Chagrin,” New York Times, 
26 March 1998, A 12.
27. Kuperman, Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention, viii.
28 See Barbara Crossette, “Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in ’94 Worsened Genocide in Rwanda,” New  
York Times, 17 December 1999: A l,  A14.
29. Neil A. Lewis, “Papers Show United States Knew o f  Genocide in Rwanda,” New York Times, 22 
August 2001, A5.
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misunderstood the conflict, however, seeing it as renewed civil war. Former UN 
diplomat Bruce Jones explains that the posture taken by any given state was most likely 
dominated by the state o f their previous relationship with Rwanda. For the United States, 
the crisis was “driven by bureaucratic, not political actors, never reaching the level even 
of secretary of state, let alone the White House.”30 Consequently, the international 
community, and especially the United States, sought to bring the two sides to a cease-fire. 
The difficulty with negotiating a cease-fire was that condemning the Hutu regime for 
committing genocide would make it impossible to support their continued rule. Such 
condemnation would ultimately bring the RPF to the political fore, and France and 
Belgium in particular did not want this to happen. Thus, the international effort had to 
remain neutral.
From late April until the end of June, the war moved across Rwanda from east to 
west.31 Seeing that the Hutu were unable to stop RPF progress, France intervened on 23 
June to provide a safe haven in the southwest for their former Hutu allies. The RPF 
continued to gain the upper hand until a cease-fire was declared on 18 July 1994.
Rwanda returned to Tutsi rule, but there were massive numbers o f displaced persons and 
the economy was a shambles. In addition, Hutu refugees in the French safe haven 
presented new opportunities for inverted refugee-inspired instability. Jan Vansina 
suggests that a result o f the biased and incorrect information is that there are two general 
views on the RPF military move through Rwanda32 First, renewed myths o f Tutsi
30. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, 61.
31. For a clear explanation o f  the international military component o f  the Rwanda crisis, see Larry 
Minear and Philippe Guillot, Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from  Rwanda  (Paris, France: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996).
32. Jan Vansina, “The Politics o f  History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 
(1998).
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superiority credit Tutsi with vanquishing the morally deficient Hutu and saving Rwanda 
from extremists, even though the Tutsi fought for survival. Second, the RPF conquered 
the weakened Habyarimana regime in a move of geopolitical opportunism.
The crisis in Rwanda occurred in three distinct periods: October 1990 to 6 April 
1994 (sporadic civil war), between April 6 and June 23 (the genocide), and after June 23 
(severe refugee movement). During the first period, the international effort led to the 
Arusha Accord and was followed by attempts to keep the peace agreement in force. The 
second period began with the assassination of the presidents o f Rwanda and Burundi by 
extremists, who seized the opportunity to commit genocide. The third period began with 
unilateral military intervention by France in Operation Turquoise, and includes U.S. 
humanitarian relief effort Operation Support Hope, which ended 27 August 1994.
U.S. ALLIES
France and Belgium were the primary U.S. allies that concerned themselves with 
the crisis in Rwanda. Other countries that showed interest included regional actors 
concerned with instability and massive refugee movements. Indeed, the genocide set off 
a chain reaction that led several African nations into war in the Congo (former Zaire).
The secondary regional actors included Britain, Zaire, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Senegal, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. These secondary actors are addressed in the analysis of 
primary actors, such as France, Belgium, and the Organization of African Unity, or in 
later sections.
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France
French involvement in this crisis complicated the strained relationship between 
the Hutu and Tutsi peoples, because France remained supportive o f Hutu leadership in 
Rwanda, and partly because of the belief that political legitimacy is derived from 
majority representation. This ideology left little room for Tutsi minority in a Hutu- 
dominated Rwanda. Thus, the political implications o f the Rwanda genocide suggest that 
even though Habyarimana made promises of integrating Tutsi into political 
representation, they remained marginalized because they represented only 7-10 percent 
of the Rwandese population. Therefore, a democratic system was insufficient to quell the 
fears o f opposing Tutsi and Hutu parties, and the Tutsi were compelled to fight for a 
voice in leadership.
In repeated exchanges between the Hutu and Tutsi, Hutu extremists massacred an 
estimated 300 Tutsi in 1993, raising the number of victims to around 2,000 since 1990, 
and confounding ongoing peace negotiations. The Tutsi rebels in the RPF retaliated by 
launching a well-organized offensive toward Kigali, the capital o f Rwanda. In response, 
France nearly doubled the 250 troops already in country. The RPF agreed to a cease-fire, 
lest they appear overly militant and thereby risk losing international diplomatic support. 
France wanted to reduce its troop levels, but this step might have threatened Hutu rule 
since French military support was essential for Habyarimana to maintain power. 
Consequently, France maintained a military contingent in Rwanda, even though Tutsi 
rebels retreated to the mountains along the Ugandan border.
Around that time, Belgium withdrew its forces, and France absorbed the Belgian 
sphere o f influence. According to some analysts, France experienced competitive
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concerns about the waxing influence of the United States. For example, Peter Schraeder 
recently described the U.S.-French relationship as one o f competition—for a sphere o f 
influence in francophone Africa—that functioned as a zero-sum game. He argues that 
due to “ongoing changes in the foreign policy regime of the cold war era that we are 
witnessing the rise o f U.S.-French competition and conflict in francophone Africa.”33 He 
based his analysis on growing economic blocks that are a result o f competition between 
France, the United States, Germany, and Japan. He explained that democratization was 
made a precondition for improvement of economic and political relations between the 
two countries. Moreover, he stated that bold “rhetoric was obviated by the reality of 
ongoing foreign aid programs designed to keep pro-French elites in power.”34 Thus, the 
French involvement in the Rwanda humanitarian crisis had everything to do with 
perceptions o f democratization that were the trappings of a zero-sum game between Paris 
and Washington.
To take this argument one step further, the civil war in Rwanda was carried out 
between French-speaking Hutu and English-speaking Tutsi. France therefore supported 
the Hutu, a longtime ally, and the United States would have had more interest in seeing 
the RPF gain dominance in Rwanda, since it used English and was trained in the 
Ugandan army by the British.35 In addition, France has been charged with finding it 
difficult to adapt to its changed role in francophone Africa—including Rwanda—despite 
the fact that Rwanda had not been French but rather a German colony and a Belgian trust.
33. Peter J. Schraeder, “Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining United States— French Competition in 
Francophone Africa,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000): 405.
34. Ibid., 407.
35. See Marlise Simons, “France’s Rwanda Connection: Military Intervention by Paris Reveals Some 
African Links,” New York Times, 3 July 1994, 6L.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
To illustrate, American officials indicated that Secretary o f State Warren Christopher’s 
bitter position against a U.S. visit to Africa was due to “French anxiety over losing its 
grip on a region it has long controlled.”36 Although denied by U.S. officials, the United 
States stood to gain an English-speaking ally in Rwanda with RPF leadership, an ally 
with pre-existing and attractive ties to the U.K.37 Mahmood Mamdani argues that France 
has not been held accountable for its imperialist intervention, which was explained away 
as a humanitarian intervention, regardless o f the fact that it stepped in to save the very 
government which had only a short time earlier committed genocide.38
To its credit, France’s threat o f withdrawal placed increasing political, military, 
and financial pressure on Habyarimana to implement democratic reforms. The Rwandan 
army remained heavily dependent on French military support, since the Tutsi rebels 
claimed a small territory in the north, and by 1990 it had advanced to within forty miles 
of the capital city o f Kigali. Tutsi rebel alliances with political parties in Rwanda 
generated internal political threats to Habyarimana. Hutu elite fears were exacerbated 
with the departure o f French troops and the arrival o f a UN peacekeeping force in late 
1993, because they saw their influence slip away.
Beyond language ties between France and Rwanda, the Hutu government had 
enjoyed strong relations with France for many years, which were particularly close 
between Fran?ois Mitterrand and Habyarimana. For example, Habyarimana’s private 
Mystere Falcon airplane had been a personal gift from Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe,
36. Howard W. French, “United States and French Sniping Heats up over Paris’s Links to Africa,” 
New York Times, 17 October 1996, A13.
37. Simons, “France’s Rwanda Connection,” 6L.
38. Mahmood Mamdani, “Humanitarian Intervention: A  Forum,” The Nation  270, no. 18, 8 May 
2000 : 22 .
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who served as special advisor at the Elysee Palace. Despite such close relations with 
Rwanda, France adamantly opposed Belgium’s April 1994 UN request to authorize a 
multinational militarily force to intervene, France worried that the RPF would stand by its 
earlier pledge to fight the French. More disconcerting was the fear that past French 
involvement in Rwandan politics could make any military intervention, even a UN 
authorized mission, to “be mistaken for an attempt at supporting the provisional 
government and lead to military clashes with the RPF.” These worries compelled 
France to initiate Operation Amaryllis, on the same day, to evacuate foreign nationals 
from Rwanda, and from the French embassy in Kigali, which was closed on 12 April.
Despite its earlier hesitation, France “offered” to conduct a UN humanitarian 
intervention under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter,40 an offer that was eventually accepted 
with UN Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994. “Operation Turquoise,” 
launched the very next day,41 revealed the poor condition of the Hutu army. The Hutu 
were disappointed that France refused to lend military assistance to their cause, but 
France wanted to avoid confrontation with the RPF whenever possible. Its troops secured 
a Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) to protect Hutu from Tutsi reprisals. In spite o f such 
caution, an exchange of fire with the RPF in mid-July convinced the French that the RPF 
was not afraid to confront their troops, even though it did not want a full-blown military 
confrontation. Consequently, the RPF accepted French presence even though they
39. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History o f  a Genocide (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 234-35 .
40. J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Politics o f  Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster R elief in Rwanda,” in 
UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars o f  the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch (New  York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 385.
41. For background on the development in Paris o f  Operation Turquoise, see Prunier, The Rwanda  
Crisis, 281-311 . For more about Operation Turquoise, see Kuperman, Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention, 
44-51.
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divided Rwanda and protected Hutu. For the most part, the RPF had control o f Rwanda 
and was in the process of institutionalizing its legitimacy.
By mid-July, France was the only country that still acknowledged the former 
Hutu regime as the legitimate government of Rwanda. By this time, it had become clear 
that this regime had planned, initiated, and committed genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda. 
Moreover, the French presence in southwest Rwanda was increasingly criticized for 
protecting and assisting a genocidal regime. France stayed in Rwanda for two more 
months, but withdrew on 21 August as agreed. As the time for French departure came, 
an estimated two million refugees streamed out of the SHZ in July and August.42 Despite 
the now well-known fact that Operation Turquoise assisted and protected the Hutu 
government in Rwanda, “France has never sought to apologize, admitted any fault or 
even publicly questioned its backing of the Hutu-dominated regime before, during and 
after the massacre.”43 A 1998 parliamentary inquiry initiated an investigation into the 
question of French complicity in the genocide, including providing arms to the Rwandan 
government during the time after Habyarimana’s assassination.
Not only did the French intervention in Rwanda protect the French sphere of 
influence in Africa, but also, more importantly, when France unilaterally intervened in 
Rwanda, no one else needed to. Thus, the French intervention took the pressure off the 
United States to end the genocide. As will be shown, the United States only reconsidered 
inaction after France departed Rwanda, leaving the Hutu to flee in fear of reprisal killings 
at the hands of angry Tutsi. Thus, the United States would not need to take action until a 
new refugee problem appeared.
42. See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 312.
43. “Humanitarian? France and Rwanda,” Economist 347, no. 8065 (1998): 48.
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Belgium
As a post-colonial power, Belgium had troubled relations with the Hutu regime in 
Rwanda partly because it had historically supported Tutsi rule, and relations in Rwanda 
deteriorated severely for the Belgians during the time leading up to April 1994. 
Habyarimana already felt betrayed when the sale o f Belgian weapons to Rwanda was 
stalled after the October 1990 RPF invasion. When Belgium supported the 1993 Arusha 
Accord, which favored the RPF, relations with Rwanda worsened further.
Habyarimana started a pro-government radio station, Radio et Television Libre 
Mille (RTLM), that accused Belgium of supporting the RPF. Reasons for this mistrust 
were varied. First, the RPF located its European office in Brussels—lending credence to 
the idea that Belgium was the enemy alongside the RPF. Second, Belgium sought to 
enlarge the UN mandate several times in early 1994, but remained unable to conduct 
security operations without prior notification of the Rwandese government. Fearing an 
explosive violent outburst, Belgium again asked the UN for a less restrictive mandate.
The United States and the U.K. opposed such requests however, because they would have 
changed the peacekeeping mission into a more confrontational peace-making mission. 
Third, Belgium aimed at stopping the violence, but only as part of a multilateral UN 
operation. When asked later, Dallaire said that his forces were neither sufficient nor 
trained to perform such rescue operations, even if  he had known what was happening at 
the time where Belgian soldiers were killed. He later said that if  he had been given 5,000 
well-trained troops in April, he could have stopped much of the killing.44 But having
44. See Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use o f  Force might have Suceeded in 
Rwanda (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 33.
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already been humiliated in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali objected to converting peacekeeping
into peacemaking in Rwanda.
The UN response was to provide Belgium with 200 Ghanaian peacekeepers in
Kigali, who redeployed from the northern demilitarized zone of Rwanda. In essence, this
adjustment was o f little help to Belgium because it needed well-equipped and
experienced peacekeepers. In mid-March, the Belgium government again asked the UN
to reconsider its mandate. These efforts convinced Habyarimana that Belgium could not
be trusted, and he authorized propaganda that resulted in Belgians being the only foreign
nationals targeted by RTLM after the killings began.45
In a horrible incident on the morning after Habyarimana was killed, ten Belgian
Blue Helmets were killed while protecting the moderate Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, who was assassinated. UN Commander Dallaire had not rescued the
Belgian peacekeepers held hostage at the army base, because he was en route to a crisis
meeting called by Hutu extremist Colonel Bagosora. Here is a description o f his ride:
In the car with him were a Rwandan and a Belgian officer. All were unarmed.
As Dallaire later recalls events, when passing Camp Kigali he saw bodies on the 
ground inside the compound; they appeared to be Europeans. Making inquiries, 
he was told that they were not Belgians, and that he could not enter to investigate 
due to chaotic conditions in the compound where the soldiers were rebelling.
Just as Somalia shocked the U.S. public, this event shocked Belgium, and it recoiled.
Within three days, Belgium sent 250 soldiers to rescue nationals from Kigali. Belgian
foreign minister, Willy Claes, asked the UN to modify the UN Assistance Mission in
45. African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance, rev. ed. (London: African Rights, 1995), 
1114.
46. Astri Suhrke, “Dilemmas o f  Protection: The Log o f  the Kigali Battalion,” in The Path o f  a 
Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from  Uganda to Zaire, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New  
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 261.
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Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandate, allowing military intervention to stop the killing in 
Rwanda, because he believed that removing foreign nationals from Rwanda would give a 
free reign to the violence. France and the United States again opposed military 
intervention. As a result, Belgium formally withdrew its troops from UNAMIR on 14 
April, partly because of increased domestic ethical and financial objections, not to 
mention growing military discomfort since the violent end of its colonial power in 
Congo.47 The last Belgian peacekeeper departed Kigali five days later.
The departure o f the Belgian forces from UNAMIR severely hampered the UN 
capabilities to operate in Rwanda. Belgian withdrawal meant the loss of the most 
specialized and highly trained UN troops in Rwanda at the time. As a result, Commander 
Dallaire ordered UN troops to follow strict rules of conduct, including a curfew and 
restricting movements.
The Belgian withdrawal from UNAMIR reverberated through the international 
community. For this study, it is relevant to note that the UN peacekeeping force in 
Rwanda depended greatly on the experienced and well-equipped Belgians. Moreover, 
Belgium had long-term interests in Rwanda, and to pull out overnight surprised the UN 
and the United States. Their withdrawal disheartened and weakened remaining 
peacekeeping forces, and increased the belief in the UN and the United States that 
nothing could be done to help Rwanda.
The Organization of African Unity
The OAU is charged with promoting regional stability, but its efforts to resolve
47. See Alain Rouvez with the assistance o f  Michael Coco and Jean Paul Paddack, Disconsolate 
Empires: French, British, and Belgian M ilitary Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
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the conflict were hampered by structural weaknesses common to post-colonial African 
states, and suffered from limited economic means. The OAU’s mission was based on 
principles o f nonintervention, noninterference, and the sanctity of colonial boundaries, 
with a jurisdiction limited to interstate conflict. The OAU’s deep concern with the crisis 
in Rwanda was limited because its mission is conflict resolution, not prevention. It 
established a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), as spelled out in the N ’sele 
cease-fire agreement o f 29 March 1991, to monitor the cease-fire between the RPF and 
the Rwandan Army. Even though the NMOG reported to the OAU Secretary of the 
Security Council, it was plagued with severe logistical and financial limitations that left 
the it dependent on contributions from wealthier and more capable non-member states 
such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United States.48
Despite its shortcomings, the OAU succeeded in negotiating an agreement that 
was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993. Because the OAU recognized early the 
potential for regional instability and violence from civil war in Rwanda, it attempted to 
enforce the Arusha Accord negotiations, and even delayed fifty monitors in Rwanda to 
keep a watch on its border with Uganda. Yet, due to limitations in mission and 
capabilities, the OAU could not stop the civil war in Rwanda prior to, during, or after the 
April genocide, and the OAS sought international assistance from the UN, thus reducing 
its role. Furthermore, member states resisted sponsoring OAU missions in Rwanda for 
three reasons. First, the Rwandan government viewed the OAU as “predisposed to the 
RPF position and not reliable.”49 Second, the unsatisfactory performance of the OAU- 
sponsored troops during the NMOG mission, meant that the troops it could muster were
(Lanham, MD: University Press o f  America, 1994), 378.
48. Tekle, “The O A U 119.
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mostly poorly trained, and did not have the necessary equipment or resources for 
peacekeeping. As a result, the UN requested other members to provide equipment and 
training. Third, the UN opposed the proposal, because the inability o f the OAU to 
effectively promote peace in Rwanda was often due to a breakdown in negotiations 
caused by disputes over the performance of NMOG. Such division led to increased 
involvement o f the UN in peacekeeping operations, and the NMOG was absorbed into 
the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission (UNUROM) operations in June 1993.
Despite the OAU’s interest in resolving the crisis, it was no more ready than the 
UN “to call genocide by its rightful name,” 50 but instead called the massacres “carnage 
and bloodletting” and “massacres and wanton killings.”51 Like the rest of the 
international community, the OAU publicly recognized the genocide in early June, as 
France was preparing for intervention.
THE UNITED NATIONS
The Arusha Accord notified the UN that the government o f Rwanda would work 
honorably with the RPF to build a new nation based on shared power. This misjudgment 
contributed to the international misunderstanding that it was, in fact, the Rwanda 
government that was committing genocide against the Tutsi minority, and that the Tutsi- 
led RPF was invading Rwanda to protect Tutsi civilians. This error allowed the Rwandan 
representative to remain in the UN Security Council, where he misconstrued facts. The 
resulting inaction on the part of the international community to stop the genocide in
49. Jones, Peacekeeping in Rwanda, 104.
50. Des Forges, Leave None, 643.
51. United Nations Security Council, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, S/PV/3377, quoted in 
Des Forges, Leave None, 643.
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Rwanda, therefore, generated an ethical morass for all involved— or not involved, as the 
case may be.
The UN approached the crisis in Rwanda by demanding that a cease-fire be 
maintained prior to UN assistance, and underscored the lack of understanding of the 
situation at hand. Despite warnings from the field, UN headquarters did not recognize 
the genocide in a timely manner. As Turid Laegreid explains, UN operations in Rwanda 
were implemented according to political and financial considerations to avoid another 
Somalia, leaving those in the field ineffective due to logistical incapacity,52 and helpless 
to convince headquarters of what was happening around them.
To bring the warring sides together, UN Resolution 846 on 23 June 1993 created 
the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observer Mission (UNUROM) to facilitate ongoing 
negotiations o f the Arusha Accord and to monitor troop movements at the Uganda-
C O
Rwanda border. Commander Romeo Dallaire was appointed commander of 
UNUROM, but securing troops for UNUROM was very slow, and it was deployed after 
the Arusha Accord was signed on 4 August 1993. To support the cease-fire agreement, 
the UN Secretary-General recommended in September that the Security Council send a 
peacekeeping force, and on 5 October UN Resolution 872 created UNAMIR to arrange 
and deploy a 2,500 neutral military monitoring force to ensure implementation of the 
Arusha Accord. At this time UNUROM was integrated into UNAMIR.
After the unfortunate peacekeeping humiliation in Mogadishu in early October 
1993, UN members pressured for reduced peacekeeping operations. The Somalia
52. Turid Laegreid, “U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” in The Path o f  a Genocide, ed. Adelman and 
Suhrke, chap. 11.
53. UN, “SC/RES 846,” 23 June 1993Reprinted in United Nations, “The United Nations and 
Rwanda, 1993-1996,” 167-8.
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debacle happened just two days before the date that the UN was to vote on sending troops 
to Rwanda and generated pressure against peacekeeping altogether, particularly from the 
United States and U.K. The world thought that it was seeing a renewed civil war in 
Rwanda, and therefore placed a mandate into effect, which required the warring parties to 
come to a cease-fire prior to making peacekeeping arrangements. This belief was, as we 
now know, incorrect.
Rwanda received its seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 
January 1994. Given that Rwanda held a revolving seat on the Security Council at the 
time, it is highly plausible that extreme versions o f the situation were either not presented 
or were misconstrued to the Council by the Rwandan representative. Linda Melvem 
evaluated the ability o f the UN to handle complicated peacekeeping missions and argued 
that secrecy in Security Council decision-making had made the Security Council 
“unaccountable.”54 In addition, Jan Vansina argued that “the small volume of more 
valuable evidence remains unavailable” to researchers.55 Many accounts testify to the 
fact that the Hutu Rwanda representative in the Security Council at the time presented the 
situation to the Council as a civil war in which both sides were equally involved, and it 
could therefore not be considered genocide. Thus, if  the Security Council had been 
presented the intelligence indicating preparations for genocide, it is likely that it would 
have been rebuffed or misconstrued by the Rwanda representative. Under such 
conditions, it is likely that the Security Council could have remained unconvinced for a
54. Linda M elvem, “The Security Council: Behind the Scenes,” International Affairs 77, no. 1 
(January 2001): 102.
55. Vansina, “The Politics o f  History,” 38. Vansina argues that this scarcity o f  valuable information 
makes historiography o f  the Rwanda crisis problematic.
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longer period of time than would have been the case had Rwanda not held a seat on the 
Security Council.
Adding to the response time, it is not uncommon to seek confirmation of initial 
reports in the field, especially if they are extreme. In this case, President Habyarimana 
was linked to the genocide, so confirmation requests may have prolonged Hutu extremist 
leadership, rather than stopped it. This issue is complex, however, because the UN 
peacekeepers were only in Kigali with the permission of the Rwanda government and 
therefore could just as easily be asked to leave.
On 11 January 1994, UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire faxed the UN about 
a report from an informant that extremists were planning to provoke new civil war. They 
were also planning to kill Belgian peacekeepers in hopes o f prompting their withdrawal, 
and use a 1,700-member interahamwe militia to kill Tutsi. Dallaire was denied an 
expanded mandate for permission to conduct arms seizures. Linda Melvem argues that 
the Secretariat staff, who received the 11 January fax from Dallaire, failed to convey its 
contents or other dire warnings to the Security Council.56 Moreover, what little 
information held by the United States and France was not shared with the Security 
Council. The failure to inform the Security Council o f Dallaire’s fax or requests for 
increased mandate was to avoid clashing with such major powers as the United States.57 
It could have also happened to avoid sticky relations within the Council— on which the 
genocidal Rwandan government held a rotating seat— or because the fax was of such an 
extreme nature that it was dismissed as overreaction on the part o f Dallaire. Such claims 
needed to be substantiated by other sources. Thus, the Secretariat staff failed to fully
56. M elvem, “The Security Council,” 103.
57. Des Forges, Leave None, 19.
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inform the Security Council regarding the severity o f the situation in Rwanda as the 
momentum toward genocide grew. It is possible, however, that France, Belgium, and the 
United States had at least an inkling o f what was happening, because “Dallaire, on 
Annan’s orders, passed along the informant’s allegations to those ambassadors.”58
It was difficult for Dallaire to convince headquarters that preparations for 
genocide were being made, partly because he was forced to work through the Rwandan 
government. On 14 January, the UN denied Dallaire permission to raid arms caches 
without seeking prior confirmation of such information from President Habyarimana.
Such prior confirmation from Habyarimana ultimately compromised the success of any 
future raid, because it was under the Habyarimana regime that preparations for genocide 
were made. In February 1994, Dallaire learned about the deteriorating situation, 
continued weapons distribution, and lists o f targets for death squads, and requested 
reinforcements from UN headquarters in New York to no avail.
In an attempt to reach a cease-fire, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
909 on 5 April 1994, renewing the UNAMIR mandate, but threatening to pull out within 
six weeks unless the Arusha Accord was implemented. At the time of President 
Habyarimana’s assassination, UNAMIR had three infantry battalions in Rwanda 
authorized under Chapter VI, and was therefore not mandated to intervene with force. 
After Habyarimana’s plane crash on 6 April, the UN peacekeeping troops initially tried 
for a few hours to hold the peace according to the terms of the Arusha Accord, but they 
were neither outfitted nor trained for such operations, and were therefore ordered to 
withdraw to their posts. While this left the local population more vulnerable to the
58. Bruce Wallace, “The Rwanda Debacle: United Nations Issues Report on Rwandan Genocide,” 
M aclean’s, 10 Jan 2000, 34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
impending genocide, the UN mission was one o f peacekeeping, not peace making or 
enforcement. Other reasons that the international community did not intervene include 
the lack of accurate intelligence, the speed o f the killings, the difficulties o f airlifting 
sufficient forces to Africa, and the lack o f political will to intervene.
In the initial days after 6 April, it was widely thought that the violence was due to 
the resumption of the civil war, since there were both Hutu and Tutsi casualties. As a 
result, the UN was more concerned with stopping the spiraling costs of peacekeeping, or 
helping to settle a civil war, than in the possibilities that the unthinkable was taking place 
in the middle of Africa.
With the deaths o f the Belgian peacekeepers, Western countries began evacuation 
of all foreign nationals beginning on 9 April. France began Operation Amaryllis, in 
which 190 French paratroopers took control of the Kigali airport for emergency 
evacuations. The next day, Operation Silverback brought in 450 Belgian and 80 Italian 
troops to evacuate nationals. By 13 April, almost all Westerners had been evacuated.
Belgium’s withdrawal from UNAMIR on April 14 generated concern among 
other troop contributors, because of the low number of troops in the country during the 
genocide, who were not trained or equipped to deal with attackers in confrontational 
situations (such as protecting large groups while being pursued by attackers). The 
withdrawal o f the highly trained Belgians diminished international confidence, and 
member states grew less willing to commit troops. The deaths of the Belgian 
peacekeepers demonstrated that violence would extend to anyone attempting to interfere, 
including the UN. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to the Security
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Council President Colin Keating of New Zealand with concerns about the possibility of 
ending the UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, after the pull-out o f the Belgians.59
On 15 April, Dallaire identified local unrest as mutual violence in which both 
sides were pounding “each other.”50 Such early reports portrayed violence as a civil war 
type of conflict, rather than as genocide. Former UN diplomat Bruce Jones explains that 
UN actions were not o f neglect, or aimed to prevent genocide, but “to prevent an 
escalation of the crisis and to lay the groundwork for peace.”61
Three weeks into the crisis, the killings and massacres were clearly suspicious, 
and it became clear that the violence was highly centralized and that chaos and anarchy 
did not rule the day as thought. Carefully planned propaganda campaigns represented 
chaotic internal turmoil to the outside world. Initially, fears of another debacle in a 
decentralized African state, such as occurred in Somalia, increased pressure to hold down 
peacekeeping costs and mandates from the UN. This led to a reduction o f the Rwanda 
mission force to 270, one-third the size of that originally proposed. Moreover, the 
mandate was further reduced from that spelled out in the Arusha Accord. Thus, the crisis 
in Rwanda found the UN ill-prepared and without mandate to counteract the highly 
organized genocide that took place in April 1994. On 1 May 1994, Dallaire again 
requested 5,000 troops.
After Oxfam announced genocide against the Tutsi was underway in Rwanda, the 
Security Council debated the official use of the word at length, because using the word 
“genocide” would invoke the 1948 Geneva Convention and automatically require the UN
59. See Reuters, “U .N. Considers Pulling Troops Out o f  Rwanda,” The Washington Post, 14 April 
1994, A26.
60. Quoted in Kuperman, Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention, 25.
61. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, 2 -3 .
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to intervene. Six weeks into the crisis, the world understood that it was genocide, not 
civil war. Reports o f genocide led to an international public outcry, and the UN passed 
Resolution 918, authorizing military intervention under UNAMIR II on 17 May. The 
resolution declared that the crisis “constituted a threat to peace and security in the 
region,” placed an arms embargo against Rwanda, increased the number o f authorized 
troops to 5,500, and authorized safe zones for “displaced persons, refugees and civilians,” 
and to “provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and 
humanitarian relief operations.”62
Securing troops was very slow; however, the United States did not want to place 
troops into a confrontation between the RPF and the Rwandan army, and required 
additional information on the situation in the field. The delay was also partly due to 
unwillingness o f other members to commit troops and the inability of those willing to 
actually get their troops into the theater. On 25 May, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal 
committed to provide 800 troops each with Zimbabwe and Nigeria making similar 
promises quickly. Actual deployment was slow because until mid-August there was no 
transportation for the 800 troops that were promised by Ethiopia. On 1 June 1994, 
Dallaire publicly appealed to the United States to supply fifty armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) to UNAMIR to use in evacuating trapped civilians.63 In less than a month, the 
United States had Dallaire’s APCs in Uganda ready to use.
UN Security Council Resolution 925, adopted on 8 June employed the term
62. UN, “SC/RES 918,” 17 May 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9421836e, accessed on 21 
September 2001), 4 (hereafter cited as UN “SC/RES”).
63. See “UN Commander in Rwanda Asks United States A id ," New York Times, 2 June 1994, A5.
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“genocide” for the first time in a Security Council document., agreed to dispatch troops.54 
It also banned the use o f the media as a vehicle to incite violence and ethnic hatred. 
UNAMIR II never fully got off the ground, and by the time troops arrived in Rwanda it 
was too late to stop the genocide. On 11 June, the UN sent special rapporteur Degni- 
Segui to Rwanda to investigate human rights violations. His report was published in 
Geneva in late June, and revealed that massacres had occurred across Rwanda as part of a 
planned and systematic genocide campaign. The early genocide in Rwanda had been 
perpetrated by the Hutu extremist government by using special forces called the 
Interhamwe that had been specially recruited and trained. The Rwandan army helped the 
Interhamwe. Once the RPF began to advance through Rwanda and the genocide against 
the Tutsi stopped; however, killings o f soldiers, political, and military leaders with their 
families began to arise in RPF held territories. UN Security Council Resolution 928 
reiterated a general and complete arms embargo against Rwanda.65
With a new understanding of the nature o f the violence, UN Security Council 
Resolution 929 authorized France to intervene in Rwanda on 22 June 1994 after France 
announced that it would unilaterally intervene. The mandate was of “strictly 
humanitarian character” to be “conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion,” rather than 
as “an interposition between opposing forces.”66 The mission was only authorized to
64. UN, “SC/RES 925,” 8 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/944454e, accessed on 21 
September 2001).
65. See UN, “SC/RES 928,” 22 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9425620e, accessed on 21 
September 2001).
66. U N , “SC/RES 929,” 22 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9426027e, accessed on 21 
September 2001).
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operate for two months, and Operation Turquoise began at dawn on 23 June and fell 
under considerable international critique.
As a result o f these killings, the UN began further investigations on 1 July 1994 
with UN Security Council Resolution 935, establishing an “impartial Commission of 
Experts” to investigate allegations o f serious violations o f human rights, including 
“possible acts of genocide.” 67 Moreover, it spelled out that an international tribunal 
would handle prosecutions. Robert Gersony, a consultant to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, determined in August that the “RPF had engaged in widespread and 
systematic slaughter o f unarmed civilians.”68 In September, the UN “suppressed the 
culminating report,” but demanded that the RPF stop the killings, after which they 
subsided.69
The violence in Rwanda generated the fastest mass exodus of refugees that the 
international system had ever faced. On 5 July, French forces established a humanitarian 
sector in southwest Rwanda, again triggering extreme refugee movement into and out of 
the area. When the violence began in April, there were a quarter o f a million refugees 
crossing into Tanzania within the first 24 hours. Many of these were Tutsi fleeing from 
Hutu violence. Within a few days, that number swelled to half a million. By the end of 
July, numbers of refugees in Goma had reached a million. The later refugees not only 
included Tutsi, but also many Hutu, who were fleeing from possible Tutsi reprisal 
violence. Conditions in Goma during this time worsened as the camps there were 
overwhelmed, and a Cholera outbreak took the lives o f around 50,000 in a few weeks.
67. UN, “SC/RES 935,” 1 July 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9427351e.htm, accessed on 29 
January 2002).
68. Des Forges, Leave None, 14.
69. Ibid.
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By August, there were around 1.3 million refugees in Zaire, 530,000 in Tanzania, and 
200,000 in Burundi.70
The UN Security Council decided on 25 August that it would not allow Rwanda 
to take its turn as the revolving president o f the council. Ironically, this decision came 
after the Hutu regime was replaced by the RPF led regime, thereby removing the regime 
that stopped the genocide rather than the one that committed it.
It was approximately six months before the UN could gather the troops and 
equipment to fill the May mandate. By then the fighting had largely ceased the RPF had 
control. The Chapter VI mandate was insufficient for the monumental task at hand: 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruct. Additionally, in the aftermath of the crisis, 
bringing genocide perpetrators to justice was very slow and problematic, despite UN 
Security Council Resolution 955, which established an international criminal court for 
criminals in Rwanda in November 1994.
THE U.S. CONGRESS
In March 1993, even before the Somalia humiliation, Congress debated financial 
issues in conjunction with UN peacekeeping missions. At the time, there were 12 UN 
peacekeeping missions, with the mission in Cambodia thought to be the most costly ever. 
With over 22,000 people involved in the country, that mission had already cost $2 billion, 
and corruption was a problem. As a result, in June 1993, Congress rejected Clinton’s 
request for $293 million for additional 1993 peacekeeping assessments and in July, “both
70. These figures are from United States House, “Testimony o f  Dennis McNamara, Director,
Division o f  International Protection, UN High Commissioner for Refugees,” in H earing before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights o f  the Committee on International Relations 
House o f  Representatives, 105 Cong., 2nd sess., 5 May 1998,21.
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the House and the Senate approved fiscal 1994 spending bills that cut the
71
administration’s peacekeeping request by 32 percent.” This legislation killed the 
possibility o f a UN proposed peacekeeping contingency fund, allowing U.S. funds to be 
used for emergency startup for yet unknown peacekeeping operations.
Indeed, the Congress was so preoccupied with domestic issues, that it removed all 
international organization assessments from the budget for 1993. This alarmed some, for 
example, House Foreign Affairs committee Chair Lee Hamilton (D, Indiana) wrote a 
letter to Clinton to appeal that we “have reached a crisis point in U.S. financial support 
for U.N. peacekeeping” and urged Clinton “to make a personal public appeal for this
77
funding.” After Clinton appeared before the assembly on 27 September 1993, Congress 
began with a $533 million ($233 million to the regular budget and 300 million to 
peacekeeping) payment on October 6 to pay for its UN arrears.73 In October 1993, the 
United States owed $900 million in assessments for peacekeeping and other expenses. 
Congress voiced concerns that the United States would over-commit to peace operations, 
thereby compromising U.S. credibility abroad.
As explained, the October debacle in Somalia occurred only days prior to the UN 
vote on troop deployment in Rwanda, and held significant persuasion on policy-makers 
in Washington. Congress prepared a Peace Powers Act in response to Somalia’s efforts, 
to make it impossible for the president to commit U.S. troops to UN operations. As early 
as 10 April, Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole indicated “that he opposed any
71. Steven A. Dimoff, “Congress’s Budget-Cutting Fervor threatens United States Standing at U.N.,” 
United Nations Association o f  the USA, Interdependent 19 (1993): 6.
72. Quoted in ibid.
73. This payment left $472 million in arrears: $284 million to the regular budget and $188 million to 
peacekeeping.
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American role in Rwanda as no vital national interest was at stake there.”74 Dole insisted 
that the United States stop placing the UN agenda before the interests o f  the US.75 
Congress categorically resisted placing U.S. troops under UN command. Assistant 
Secretary o f State for African Affairs, George Moose, testified to Congress that the U.S. 
response to the crisis in Rwanda was to pursue a strategy with five main goals. These 
goals were to: stop the killings, achieve a durable cease-fire, return the parties to the 
negotiating table, contain the conflict, and address humanitarian relief needs. As such, 
the position in the United States was not conducive for increasing either troop levels or 
mandates in the Rwanda crisis.
The response of Congress to the crisis in Rwanda was plagued by fears brought 
on by the Somalia debacle, especially that humanitarian aid could become more involved. 
Such “mission creep” could lead the United States into a “political quagmire.” Here is an 
example to illustrate the significance of this point. In the After Action Review, the 
comments of the Commanding officer LTG Daniel Schroeder, indicated that mission 
creep was difficult to avoid because “maintaining the focus on what we had been told to 
do—avoiding ‘mission creep’—took constant attention and emphasis at all levels o f
7 7
command.” Moreover, fears o f spiraling dangers were reinforced after ten Belgian 
peacekeepers were killed in Kigali, and Belgium pulled out o f the Rwanda mission. In 
response, the United States supported withdrawing the bulk o f the UN force for its own
74. Referenced in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The International Dimension o f  Genocide in Rwanda 
(Washington Square: N ew  York University Press, 1998), 91.
75. Quoted in M elvem , A People Betrayed, 78.
76. See United States House, prepared statement o f  George E. M oose, “Testimony o f  Assistant 
Secretary o f  State before the House Subcommittee on Africa on the Crisis in Rwanda,” in Hearing before 
the Subcommittee, 4 May 1994 ,45 .
77. United States European Command Headquarters, Operation Support Hope, 1994: After Action  
Review  (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute, 1995), 1.
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safety. The United States demanded that the mission to Rwanda be only peacekeeping, 
not an intervention for peacemaking or enforcing.
Apathy in Congress was demonstrated in a hearing on 4 May 1994, when the 
Chair o f the Subcommittee on Africa, Harry L. Johnston of Florida, said that reductions 
in the UN presence “demonstrates the urgent needs for Africans to find an African 
solution to their problems.”78 In his testimony, Assistant Secretary o f State George 
Moose, backed this up, saying that “in the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to 
their country, and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the 
combatants themselves.”79 He explained that the U.S. position demanded that the RPF 
and the Rwandan Army come to negotiations. Indeed, this demand expressed the U.S. 
misunderstanding of the situation in which the Rwandan government was bent on 
eliminating the Tutsi opposition, and therefore the RPF could not stop fighting as long as 
Hutu extremists ran the Rwandan government. Moreover, by continuing to recognize and 
negotiate with the Rwandan government, the international community legitimated the 
continuation o f a genocidal regime.
There were those in Congress who endorsed strong support for a more active U.S. 
role in Rwanda. In late April, nine representatives from the House African Affairs 
Subcommittee wrote a letter to Clinton to ask for support, but they stopped short of being
DA
willing to commit troops. Senator Paul Simon (D, Illinois), a member of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and Chair o f the Subcommittee on African Affairs, hand 
delivered a letter to President Clinton on May 14, asking that the United States
78. United States House, Hearing Before the Subcommittee, 4 May 1994, 1.
79. Ibid, 47.
80. M elvem ,/I People Betrayed, 190.
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immediately request the UN to send troops to Rwanda to stop the slaughter. The letter 
went unanswered for twenty-seven days, and the reply on 9 June was a long list o f efforts 
and initiatives that the administration had made to resolve the crisis, including a 
statement that the President agreed that an effective UN mission was needed.
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) also petitioned the White House to take a 
leading role on Rwanda. One CBC letter dated 4 May, signed by the then-Chair, Kweisi 
Mfume and Donald Payne Congressman o f New Jersey, requested that the United States 
“urge the UN to move.”81 A second letter dated 16 June, suggested three steps for 
improving the situation in Rwanda. In the third letter dated 20 July, the CBC requested 
the president send assistance to Rwanda. In addition to these efforts by the CBC, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged Clinton in a letter 16 June to “acknowledge 
formally that genocide is occurring in Rwanda,” and the letter was “signed by virtually 
all the committee members, including Senator Claiborne Pelt of Rhode Island, the 
ranking Democrat, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the senior Republican.”82 
In June, these members o f Congress criticized Clinton for allowing delays in assistance 
and deployments. After this, Clinton stepped up efforts to help for UN forces to Rwanda, 
for example by delivering Dallaire’s APCs to Uganda on 23 June.
On 25 July there was a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. Mainly 
the hearing consisted of a briefing about logistics and problems involved in humanitarian 
relief in Rwanda. There were four main concerns: numbers of displaced persons, water, 
distribution capabilities and reducing negative media reports. In a country o f 8 million
81. See United States House, “Testimony by Donald M. Payne,” in H earing before the 
Subcommittee, 5 May 1998, 18.
82. Michael R. Gordon, “United States to supply 60 Vehicles for U.N. Troops in Rwanda,” New York 
Times, 16 June 1994, A12L.
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people, 8 to 12 percent had been killed, 40 percent of the people were refugees out of 
country, and 60 percent were either refugees, displaced or both.83
The sheer numbers o f refugees and displaced persons resulted in overcrowding 
camps. To alleviate this condition, airdrops were sent to “demagnetize the refugee 
attraction” of the camps to further numbers.84 Moreover, efforts were made to convince 
Rwandans to return home, where crops awaited them. The water in camps available to 
most refugees was contaminated, contributing to the spread of Cholera. Water 
purification systems were brought in from many countries to alleviate this problem, 
however, distributing water, food, and other relief items was complicated because of poor 
infrastructure and refugee clogged roads.
In the hearing, there was considerable attention to the role played by the media. 
Some effort had been made to strategically place the press within range of relief efforts, 
however negative reports continued to place pressure on Congress to be more efficient. 
Estimates for the cost o f the operation were at $250 million and the Department of 
Defense raised this supplemental total to $370 million. To demonstrate Congress’s 
change of heart, $100 million was ear marked to restore the Emergency Response Fund, 
which Congress had offered earlier, and it was agreed that efforts needed to be 
undertaken to increase public awareness and support for relief efforts in Rwanda.85 In 
general, the committee supported U.S. relief efforts.
In a 26 July hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Illinois 
Senator Paul Simon questioned whether the United States responded “as adequately as
83. See United States Senate, Hearing before the Committee on Arm ed Services United States Senate: 
Department o f  Defense Briefing on the Situation in Rwanda, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 July 1994, 23-4 .
84. Ibid., 15.
85. Ibid., 16-7, 24.
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we should have early on.”86 Brian Atwood, Administrator for the Agency for 
International Development said, “I think the response o f the United States since the 
exodus began, only a few days ago on the 13th of July has been beyond reproach.”87 The 
subcommittee largely credited the United States for responding to the plight o f the 
refugees, even though it began to question why and how the United States had failed to 
take action earlier in response to catastrophes abroad.
Congress did not support involvement in Rwanda until the media became 
involved and CNN began to broadcast images o f refugees in Goma. Once public 
pressure came to bear, Congress was more willing to commit financial resources to 
reduce the humanitarian suffering. In late July, Congress was more willing to allocate 
funds for the relief effort, and also contributed to the Emergency Relief Fund that had 
been cut completely after Somalia. When it came to sending troops, however, Congress 
stipulated that funds were to be used only for non-military, humanitarian operations and
on
set a pull out deadline for 1 October 1994. Increased willingness to assist those in need 
did not mean injecting American troops into civil conflict.
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
During the early weeks of the crisis in Rwanda events were understood by the 
American public as violence in a collapsing state that was tom apart by ancient tribal 
hatred. A front-page article in the Washington Post on 14 April 1994, reported a: “Free-
86. United States Senate, H earing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs o f  the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 26 July 1994, 1.
87. “Testimony o f  Honorable Brian Atwood,” in ibid., 5.
88. See Klinghoffer, International Dimension o f  Genocide, 94.
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QQ
For-All Slaughter ... Among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs.” The media, 
like the international community, did not understand the planned genocide in Rwanda for 
what it was: violence by the Rwandan government against its own people, while being 
misrepresented to the outside world. According to Linda Melvem, the “media’s failure to 
report that genocide was taking place, and thereby generate public pressure for something 
to be done to stop it, contributed to the international inaction.”90 Certainly, this failure 
contributed to the fact that the American public was unwilling to sacrifice American 
soldiers to settle an ongoing conflict on a distant continent, until the injustice of it all 
came to light. As Catherine Newbury stated, “the deaths and brutality that have most 
mesmerized public attention.”91
While American public opinion was generally not in favor o f military intervention 
in Rwanda, this shifted once the media showed the suffering in the Goma refugee camps. 
Steven Livingson and Todd Eachus examine the impact of television coverage in Rwanda 
on public opinion. The television coverage is broken into three phases: no coverage 
prior to April 6, little coverage from April 6 until mid-July, and exclusive coverage o f the 
Goma refugee camp but not the civil war after July. Livingston and Eachus conclude that 
television coverage almost exclusively focused on images o f suffering after the genocide 
mainly because in April 1994, conditions in Rwanda were too dangerous to send 
reporters, not to mention inadequate staffing levels in African offices. Livingston and 
Eachus also point out that those “who carry out the massacre o f civilians have no qualms
89. Jennifer Parmelee, “Rwanda’s ‘Sad, Sad, Sad’ Self-Imolation: Free-For-All Slaughter Continues 
among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs,” The Washington Post, 14 April 1994, A l.
90. M elvem, “The Security Council,” 109-10.
91. Catherine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal o f  Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995):
1 2 .
92. They used quantitative analysis o f  ABC World News, CNN, NBC Nightly News, and CBS 
Nightly News for the five-month period o f  April to August 1994.
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about killing journalists, as data from the Committee for the Protection of Journalists can 
attest.”93 Reporting was therefore largely left up to parachute journalists, who knew little 
or nothing about the region and its history.
Media coverage followed the development of U.S. policy, rather than informed it. 
Therefore, television coverage had a “minimal effect” on policy and gave the president 
latitude for a “limited policy response.”94 In addition to the low amount o f media 
coverage of the Rwanda crisis, there was an emergence o f other news, which was 
“actually eclipsing coverage of Rwanda by a significant degree.”95 These included the 0 . 
J. Simpson trial and the growing situation with Haitian refugees.
There were three news “stories” from the crisis in Rwanda. The first began in 
October 1990 with the Tutsi offensive into Rwandan territory that ultimately brought the 
French in to assist the Hutu government. The second began with the downing of 
Habyarimana’s plane that killed not only the president o f Rwanda, but also the president 
of Burundi. This event, the beginning of the genocide, was largely missed by outside 
viewers due to extremely hazardous conditions in Rwanda at the time. The third story 
began with Operation Turquoise, as it sparked the tremendous flow of displaced persons 
in Rwanda and refugees across the borders. It was during this time that the media made 
compelling footage o f human suffering and consequently drew attention to the plight of 
the people there. As a result, the United States was pressured to act after CNN aired 
disturbing images o f refugees and the American public saw them, then the Clinton 
administration expressed sympathy and horror with the victims.
93. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, “Rwanda: United States Policy and Television Coverage,” 
in The Path o f  A Genocide, ed. Adelman, and Suhrke, 223.
94. Ibid., 224, and 210.
95. Ibid., 218.
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The role o f the international and U.S. media during the Rwanda crisis was that it 
missed reporting the genocide, until it was nearly over. This was because few reporters 
in Africa received information, as outside attention was diverted. Besides, 
misinformation campaigns from within, Rwanda decried accusations of atrocities. 
Moreover, leadership in Rwanda shut down communications so that information was 
difficult to receive.
The Director o f the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Roger Winter, attempted to 
dispel the belief that the conflict was merely tribal in nature, but his article was only 
picked up by a Toronto paper and made little impact in the United States.96 On 28 April 
Oxfam published a report with the first use of the term “genocide.” This article 
reportedly placed pressure on the Clinton administration shifting rhetoric from hard line 
noninvolvement to sympathy and concern. An international inquiry determined that 
“although the coverage had been handicapped by danger on the ground, the press, in 
characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, was fundamentally irresponsible.”97 Such 
reporting contributed to the ability o f the Rwandan government to commit genocide 
without being discovered until too late to save lives. Moreover, this type of reporting 
also increased the impunity of those involved, as events and names were not documented 
and were more easily forgotten or covered up.
In an oft-cited article from 10 June, Douglas Jehl explains that “the Clinton 
administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the deaths there as genocide,
96. Roger Winter, “Power, not Tribalism, Stokes Rwanda’s Slaughter,” G lobe and Mail, Toronto, 14 
April 1994.
97. Linda M elvem , A People Betrayed, 138.
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Q Q
even though some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent.” The 
check on rhetoric was partly aimed at the American public, according to administration 
officials, if the United States used the word genocide, then “it would be natural— and 
unwelcome— for voters to expect that the response would include dispatching troops.”99 
Media reports about U.S. delaying tactics to provide assistance in Rwanda helped 
pressure the administration to move faster on delivering promised APCs by air, rather 
than surface, saving three weeks delivery time.100 When the French intervened to create a 
safe zone on 23 June 1994, Hutu refugees went into, and Tutsi fled away from the area. 
Photographs taken from the refugee camp in Goma were published around the world, and 
increased pressure on the international community to help. Thus, the “CNN factor” 
prompted an “uproar of public outrage,”101 and within three days, U.S. troops were in 
Goma distributing humanitarian aid.
Polling data regarding public opinion at the time of the crisis in Rwanda is largely 
unavailable. However, there were two relevant questions regarding Rwanda in a Gallup 
poll taken between 7 and 25 October 1994.102 Responding to the first question, only 3 
percent o f those polled thought the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation was excellent, 
while 17 percent thought the U.S. response was good, 28 percent thought it was fair, 29 
percent dismissed it as poor, and 23 percent were unsure. Even though 29 percent of the 
respondents found the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation poor, among the majority of
98. Douglas Jehl, “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘G enocide,’” New York Times, 
10 June 1994, 8A.
99. Ibid.
100. See for example, Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 Vehicles.”
101. Melvem, A People Betrayed, 219.
102. “Government Ratings Africa Diplomacy,” Gallup Organization, 15 October 1995. The author 
received questions USGALLUP.94CFRP.R15E and USGALLUP.94CFRP.R16BX upon request on 19 
February 2002.
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1 mrespondents who held an opinion, 62 percent were not opposed. This suggests that 
public opinion was more likely to agree with Clinton’s response to the Rwanda crisis, 
even after a media event had taken place.
Based on the responses to this question, a larger portion of the American public 
believed that the United States should not have intervened militarily in Rwanda to halt 
the civil war, the ethnic hostilities, or the genocide. It also indicates that the majority of 
Americans felt that Clinton did the right thing to help provide humanitarian assistance to 
the refugee camps. In light o f the media attention to the refugees in Goma in July,
August and later, it is telling that 29 percent of the respondents were unsure o f how they 
felt about the way the United States responded to the situation in Rwanda. This is not 
unusual in polls, especially when there is a low level o f knowledge in the United States 
about the area in question.
The second question in the poll asked whether the respondent believed that the 
United States does or does not have a vital political, economic, or security interest in 
Rwanda. Among the respondents, 35 percent said that the United States does have 
interest in Rwanda, 46 percent said that it does not have interest in Rwanda, and 19 
percent were not sure. Of those respondents with an opinion, a majority of 57 percent 
thought the United States did not have any interests in Rwanda.104 While this is not an 
overwhelming majority, it does confirm that more Americans believed there was no 
reason to go to Rwanda. As we have already seen in the previous section, this position 
was reflected in the U.S. Congress as well.
Public opinion held a good deal of sway on policy makers, and television images
103. This figure is a percentage o f  only those with an opinion. It excludes those without an opinion.
104. This number excludes those without an opinion.
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played a large role in increasing public awareness and subsequently prompting the United 
States to take action. While the media remained largely critical o f U.S. inaction during 
the genocide, television coverage in Rwanda did not develop until reporters were able to 
safely enter the area and to document refugee flows and increased suffering in 
surrounding camps.
Although polling evidence indicates that American public opinion mildly 
supported the policy set by the Clinton administration in not becoming involved in what 
was thought to be a long-term civil and ethnic conflict, the media coverage of human 
suffering brought about a reevaluation of U.S. policy. Therefore, early media coverage 
o f the situation in Rwanda, including civil war and genocide, was a key missing element 
for prompting the United States to intervene and stop bloodshed in Rwanda. In 
conjunction, the television coverage, particularly of the Goma refugee situation beginning 
in late June 1994, brought attention to the crisis in July and August and led the American 
public to support relief efforts. Indeed, the change of heart in public opinion increased 
the likelihood that policy makers would follow suit.
U.S. INTERESTS
This section explains the actions and the rhetoric o f the Clinton administration 
during the crisis in Rwanda. As already explained, the United States initially perceived 
the violence as renewed civil war. After witnessing Belgian peacekeepers suffer a similar 
fate as had the American Rangers in Somalia, and the United States was more convinced 
than ever not to intervene with force. Barry Blechman shows that a lack o f public 
interest in paying the price o f foreign intervention is an important part o f what he calls
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the “intervention dilemma,” in which “intervening governments can only rarely use 
peaceful instruments o f conflict resolution knowing that they could credibly threaten 
military intervention should peaceful means fail.”105 Blechman points to the key reason 
for Clinton’s decision not to intervene with force in Rwanda: the UN went along with the 
United States, until France decided in late June to unilaterally intervene to save their 
Hutu allies.
This was an important time in this crisis, because during June and July Clinton 
changed policy on Rwanda. This shift was a direct result o f the increasing numbers of 
displaced persons and refugees in and around Rwanda, who were fleeing violence. Once 
conditions in refugee camps became known in the United States, the public and the 
Congress shifted to favoring humanitarian assistance. Clinton responded to this domestic 
pressure and sent troops, but only to distribute humanitarian relief.
In January 1994, the CIA reported that renewed hostilities in Rwanda could kill as 
many as 500,000 people. Their estimate was low. A month later, the United States 
issued a travel advisory for Rwanda and opposed Belgian requests to enlarge the 
UNAMIR mandate, force levels, or rules o f engagement. The United States resisted 
action in Rwanda, because o f high costs associated with operations in Africa. Besides, 
the United States did not want to become embroiled in another Somalia situation, in 
which peacemaking operations failed.
Initial Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports o f the 7 April violence in 
Rwanda were largely interpreted as renewed civil war. The stated White House policy 
regarding intervening in civil war stipulated that the United States had nothing to do in
105. Barry M. Blechman, “The Intervention Dilemma,” The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1995):
65.
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Rwanda. Moreover, Jones asserts that the United States “had exactly one foreign direct 
investment in Rwanda, a minimal presence, and in general no special interest in the 
country.”106 After U.S. nationals were evacuated to Burundi, the U.S. embassy in Kigali 
closed on 10 April. The interpretation of early massacres as genocide reduced to civil 
war delayed reports from reaching President Clinton until around April 20, when the CIA 
published a report o f genocide. The DIA made estimates o f the initial killings based on 
satellite photographic intelligence taken on 7 April. These estimates were low, because 
the figures were extrapolations o f counted observable bodies in the outdoor areas that 
were visible to the satellite. Possibly due to the low figures, this intelligence was 
dismissed as renewed civil war by other agencies such as the Pentagon, Department of 
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. As a result, 
Kuperman asserts that “key agencies in W ashington. . .  either failed to absorb this 
information or explicitly rejected it as unreliable and thus did not become aware of the 
genocide until further evidence emerged on or after April 20.”107
When Belgium formally withdrew from UNAMIR on 14 April 1994, one State 
Department official said, “you can’t overstate the impact on our policy process o f the 
Belgians leaving. People were saying, ‘How can we get in, if  it is so bad the Belgians 
have to leave?” ’108 Immediately, the United States said that without a cease-fire in 
Rwanda, there was no role for a peacekeeping mission,109 and after some debate in the 
UN Security Council, the United States on April 15 considered withdrawing completely 
from UNAMIR, but reduced UNAMIR instead.
106. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, 75.
107. Kuperman, Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention, 36-37 .
108. Quoted in Burkhalter, “Question o f  Genocide,”46. Burkhalter outlines the bureaucratic politics 
behind the U.S. decision to stay out o f  Rwanda.
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The United States first used the term “genocide” in a CIA report on April 19, 
which translated and published a 17 April RPF radio announcement that the “world 
cannot and should not forget the genocide which is being perpetrated in Rwanda 
today.”110 Human Rights Watch immediately wrote to the UN Security Council about 
concerns regarding genocide, and on 21 April 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 
912 withdrew most o f the UNAMIR troops.
After Oxfam’s press release on 28 April and lengthy debate in the Security 
Council on the official use of the word genocide, the United States and the U.K. decided 
to refrain from using the word. On 30 April, Clinton made a one-minute radio address to 
Rwanda, saying that he “hoped that all Rwandans would recognize their common bonds 
of humanity.” Rather than a reproach for the massacres, the speech reassured the 
Rwandan extremists that the United States would take no action.
In a 29 April letter, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali petitioned the 
Security Council to increase UNAMIR troops and mandate, but by 30 April, the U.S. 
position on Rwanda had become key to UN Security Council decisions. U.S. 
representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeleine Albright worked to block the dispatch 
o f troops by delaying negotiations in the UN Security Council in two ways. First, it 
applied PDD 25 closely, limiting U.S. involvement in peacekeeping missions by insisting 
that a ceasefire be reached in Rwanda’s civil war prior to deployment o f UNAMIR II, 
and that clear pre-planning should be solidified before deployment, and only a few 
hundred troops should be dispatched to secure the area. Second, there was considerable
109. For a thorough discussion o f  the debate in the UN Security Council, see Des Forges, Leave 
None, 629.
110. (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, 1900 GMT, 17 April 1994, in FB IS-A F R -94-075, 19 April 
1994, quoted in Kuperman, Limits o f  Humanitarian Intervention, 31.
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debate about whether it was appropriate to use the term genocide in the situation in 
Rwanda. If the international community were to employ the word, then it would 
automatically invoke the 1948 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  
the Crime o f  Genocide. This would require that the international community take action 
to halt the genocide immediately, regardless of where it was taking place. Thus, military 
intervention into a conflict would require high costs, both monetarily and in terms of 
human life. In early May, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began to solicit 
African states to contribute forces. A few days later, on 5 May, Clinton’s PDD 25 
officially responded to Somalia, specifying that U.S. ground troops should not be 
deployed to humanitarian interventions in the midst o f ongoing civil wars.
Increased pressure from the UN, Congress, the media, and public opinion led the 
Clinton administration to gradually give way, change its rhetoric, and take steps to 
provide some assistance. On 27 May, the United States imposed an arms embargo 
against Rwanda. Commander Dallaire asked on 1 June that the United States supply 
APCs, but the vehicles were delayed for several weeks, due to negotiations between the 
United States and UN on cost sharing.111 After the UN used the term “genocide” on 8 
June, international pressure increased to at least stop the killings and to provide 
humanitarian assistance. Congress for its part opposed military intervention, but agreed 
to humanitarian relief operations if they were ended by 1 October. Clinton complied and 
ended Operation Support Hope on 27 August 1994. Congressional criticism of Clinton 
for allowing delays in assistance and deployments to Rwanda pressured Clinton move 
more quickly to get UN forces to Rwanda.112
111. See Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 Vehicles.”
112. See discussion in the above Congress section.
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A shift occurred in White House rhetoric amidst public pressure for not calling 
the genocide by its proper name. The widely read Jehl article appeared against Clinton 
not using the word genocide.113 On the same day, 10 June, Secretary o f State Warren 
Christopher admitted that genocide had occurred and that “if  there is any particular magic 
in calling it genocide, I have ho hesitancy in saying that.”114 However, on 17 June, the 
Washington Post reported that administration officials claimed that the 1948 Genocide 
Convention “enables,” but does not require states to detect genocide and intervene 
against it.115
France’s Operation Turquoise began on 23 June, the same day that the U.S. APCs 
arrived in Uganda for training and the $10 million bill was sent to the UN.116 On the 
surface, Operation Turquoise relieved the international community o f the responsibility 
for helping Rwanda, and it “did more to slow the U.N. force’s recruitment and 
deployment than to hasten it.”117 Regional security began to emerge as a more pressing 
issue with never-before-seen numbers of refugees overwhelmed the entire region.
Media attention to the plight o f the refugees brought pressure on Clinton from the 
public. By 15 July 1994, the Clinton administration announced that the United States no 
longer recognized the interim government of Rwanda. The White House issued a 
statement that the United States would no longer “allow representatives o f a regime that 
supports genocidal massacres to remain on our soil.”118 The United States stated that it
113. Jehl, “Officials Told.”
114. Quoted by Gordon, “United States to Supply 60 Vehicles.”
115. Thomas W. Lippman, “United States Aides Fear New Violence in Burundi,” Washington Post 
17 June 1994, A 19.
116. “France Helps in Rwanda— so far,” New York Times, 14 July 1994, A16N, A22L.
117. Burkhalter, “Question o f  Genocide,” 53.
118. The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, 15 July 1994, quoted in Des Forges, Leave 
None, 690.
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would move to remove the Rwandan representative from the Security Council. On the 
same day, the administration ordered the Rwandan embassy closed and froze its assets. 
More importantly, on 16 July, Clinton announced “an increase in aid o f $35 million to 
handle this problem” in the Goma refugee camps.119 On 19 July, the Cholera epidemic 
was rapidly taking lives and the United States announced an additional $41 million to 
respond. After pictures o f the horrible conditions in the refugee camps began to hit the 
international media, the Clinton administration dispatched 4000 troops to reinforce 
hundreds o f civilian relief workers to the Goma refugee camp in Zaire. On 22 July, 
Clinton announced that it was preparing to send troops to help refugees, and he described 
the camps conditions as the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation.
The U.S. mandate in Rwanda “was to provide humanitarian assistance as opposed 
to nation-building or peacekeeping,” despite continuing violence and lack of 
infrastructure.120 The After Action Review for Operation Support Hope hails the Joint 
Task Force mission a complete success from beginning to end, using 3600 troops without 
casualties. Davis Thomas defends Clinton, writing that the president “made the right 
choice” according to U.S. strategic interests, because Central Africa poses little security 
threat to the United States, little threat o f economic loss, and little threat of diminished
191
U.S. sphere o f influence. Clearly, Clinton could and did remain highly cautious after 
Somalia, as exemplified by PDD 25. Moreover, Clinton kept a close eye on public
119. These figures are taken from United States House, “Testimony o f  Honorable Brian Atwood,” in 
United States Senate, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 26 July 1994, 5.
120. See United States European Command Headquarters, Operation Support Hope, 1.
121. Davis M. Thomas, “Commentary; Bill Clinton May be Sorry, but the President Made the Right 
Choice; Rwanda: After Somalia, with Haiti and Bosnia Looming, Sending Troops would have been a 
Strategic and Political Mistake,” Los Angeles Times, 1 April 1998, B7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
opinion and followed a course that generated least public disapproval. Indeed, it was not 
until images o f refugee suffering reached the American public and brought them to 
demand action that the Clinton administration sent relief troops. By then, however, the 
civil war was mostly resolved and the troops were sent into a relatively safe situation. In 
sum, there were vital and peripheral interests: vital for France, which intervened; and 
peripheral for the United States, which did not intervene.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five 
variables of foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the 
foreign policy o f President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is 
that the United States blocked international timely action to stop the progress of 
genocide. As a result, the United States contributed to inaction, and obstructing a 
multilateral effort to halt the genocide.122 The Clinton administration has been 
thoroughly criticized for refusing to become involved in Rwanda.
Four years after the crisis in Rwanda, Clinton gave a speech at the Airport in 
Kigali on 26 March 1998. Clinton apologized to Rwanda and the world for not 
responding in a more timely fashion to those needing help in Rwanda. He said that at the 
time, he “did not fully appreciate the depth and speed, with which you were being 
engulfed by this unimaginable terror,” and admitted that “we did not immediately call
122. One o f  the most critical essays about the Clinton Rwanda policy is found in Samantha Power, 
“Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, September 2001: 84-108.
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these crimes by their rightful name: genocide,” He said that there had been three main 
errors made by the international community, including: “not acting quickly to halt the 
killing; permitting refugee camps in neighboring Zaire to become havens for Hutu killers, 
and not immediately labeling the slaughter ‘genocide.’”124
Many sources point at the United States’ inconsistent and apathetic behavior as 
the main reason that little action was seen from the West, and base their analysis on the 
morality of foreign policy, rather than questions o f national interest.125 The United 
States began to provide humanitarian aid on 22 July 1994 in the aftermath of the 
genocide.
123. Quoted in James Bennet, “Clinton Declares United States, with World, Failed Rwandans, ” New  
York Times, 26 March 1998, A l, A12L; and Tim Weiner, “Critics Say United States Ignored C.I.A. 
Warnings o f  Genocide in Rwanda,” New York Times, 26 March 1998, A12.
124. Ibid.
125. For an excellent example, see African Rights, Rwanda.
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CHAPTERV
CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN HAITI
This chapter focuses on the 1991 democratic crisis in Haiti, and the subsequent 
U.S. intervention to restore Haiti’s democratically elected President Bertrand Aristide in 
1994. In assessing why, how, and when the Clinton administration decided to intervene, 
this study begins with a brief historical section and then looks specifically at the five 
international political variables outlined in Chapter III.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The 1991-94 crisis is yet another chapter in Haiti’s tumultuous history that 
sparked the interest o f the largest hemispheric power, the United States.1 There are at 
least six important themes found in the history o f Haiti. These include: 1) colonization, 
2) tension between the elites and the masses, 3) U.S. occupation that brought the military 
to the political fore, 4) a tradition of authoritarian leadership that lacks respect for human 
rights, 5) long-term demographic shifts in regional refugee movement, and 6) U.S. 
responses to refugee issues within the context o f larger security interests in the region. 
Historian Anthony Maingot identifies three basic layers throughout Haitian history, 
including the importance o f hard won independence, a fierce sense o f autonomy among 
Haitian elites above the masses, and the pervasive poverty stricken post-plantation
1. For good overviews o f  Haitian history, language and culture, see Joan Dayan, Haiti, History, and  
the Gods (Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1995); Alex Dupuy, H aiti in the N ew World 
Order: Limits o f  the D em ocratic Revolution (Oxford: W estview Press, 1997); and Charles R. Foster and 
Albert Valdman, ed., H aiti—Today and Tomorrow: An Interdisciplinary Study (Lanham, MD: University 
Press o f  America, 1984).
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economy.2 U.S. responses to regional instability varied throughout Haiti’s history, 
covering the range from occupation, to monetary aid, to refugee repatriation, to embargo, 
and back to military intervention.
Early colonization of Haiti by the Spanish and French created lasting ties between 
Europe and Haiti. During its colonial period, Haiti developed a plantation economy 
based on slavery and designed primarily for exporting luxury consumables, such as sugar, 
molasses, rum, coffee, and tobacco to Europe. Trade in the region improved consistently 
until 1790, at which time the “Caribbean was the epicenter o f the New World due to 
novel food items.”
Over time, a three-tiered society developed and social tension between groups led 
to long-lasting political instability. The upper layer of the social hierarchy was 
dominated by wealthy plantation owning Europeans. Racial boundaries within Saint 
Dominique, as Haiti was known then, grew complicated because children stemming from 
the union of French colonial planters and female slaves were “frequently recognized by 
their fathers, sent to France to be educated and empowered to inherit.”4 Thus, a powerful 
middle class sprang up from these land-owning children that maintained deep ties to the 
French.
The introduction o f this middle class into the colonial arrangement made for 
resentment between groups, destabilizing the internal balance of power in Haiti. The 
lowest strata in the social hierarchy consisted of the majority o f people, who were of
2. Anthony P. Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges o f  an Asymmetrical 
Relationship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 205.
3. Sidney W. Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (1995): 74.
4. Ibid., 75.
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African descent, owned no land and were mainly slaves. By 1791 social tensions erupted 
in a slave revolution lasting until 1804. It ended colonial rule and destroyed much of the 
existing plantation economy. Saint Dominique ceased to exist and Haiti was bom. Even 
though Haiti had won independence, it remained haunted by its colonial past, as the 
masses replaced earlier resentment of colonial rulers with the new resentment of lighter 
skinned leadership that would lead to renewed revolution.
Long before the end of the cold war, the United States came to view the 
Caribbean as part o f a vital sphere of influence—its backyard. In 1832, the Monroe 
Doctrine placed Latin America within the U.S. sphere o f influence and warned Europe’s 
colonial powers to stay clear. Viewed by some as coercive, the Monroe Doctrine set the 
course of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.5 The United States dominated the 
Western Hemisphere, and increasingly justified intervention as efforts to maintain 
regional stability.
German investment in Haiti on the eve of the First World War increased U.S. 
security concerns in the region. Anthony Maingot explains that in 1910, about 200 
Germans “controlled 80 percent o f the island’s international trade, all the major utilities, 
and the one railroad and tramcar line.”6 To stem the tide o f German influence, the United 
States occupied Haiti from 1915 until 1934. Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach state that 
during the early twentieth century, “the islands of the Caribbean were perceived as 
strategic points o f control over the primary crossroads o f global commerce and a
5. See Martha L. Cottam, Images and Interventions: U.S. Policies in Latin America  (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 4 ,141.
6. Anthony P. Maingot, “Haiti: The Political Rot Within,” Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 59.
For more information on German interests in Haiti, see Gaddis Smith, “From Intervention to Intervasion,” 
Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 54-55.
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permanent U.S. presence in the region became a key element o f the nation's security 
agenda.”7 Haiti, situated just 90 miles off the coast o f Florida, was too close to the 
United States to allow either a German presence, or the pirate vessels that threatened 
budding trade.
U.S. occupation marked a shift in Haitian culture and politics, by creating a 
military in Haiti, which provided a new path, aside from the priesthood, for peasants to
o
rise to power. Military loyalties bred and institutionalized corruption in Haiti over the 
years, and enabled the rise of General Duvalier, who used social division to lead the 
Duvalier Revolution. The majority black population revolted against the elite light 
skinned upper class and made Jean Claude Duvalier president in 1958. He ruled Haiti 
with an iron fist and in 1971, made himself president-for-life by law. Duvalier reinforced 
a long tradition of authoritarian repression that eliminated many of the wealthy elites in 
Haiti, but failed to improve living conditions for the people at large, and resistance 
mounted.
Increased population contributed to severe environmental and economic 
degradation, and depleted land resources including agriculture and forestation. By 1980, 
the arable land was cut by more than half and worsening humanitarian and economic 
conditions left many without hope o f escaping extreme poverty. In 1982, President 
Ronald Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative was a stopgap measure to improve the 
regional economy and, more importantly, to stem increasing numbers o f refugees moving 
to America.
7. Joseph S. Tulchin, and Ralph H. Espach, ed., Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge o f  
Regional Cooperation  (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 2.
8. See Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?” 85.
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A new era dawned over Haiti, as emerging signs o f democratic institution 
building brought the first municipal elections in 1983. Jorge Dominguez asserts that 
Haitians are deeply attached to liberal democratic institutions and respect human rights as 
a result o f experiences o f subjugation.9 Haiti was the poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere, and by 1990, poverty was unavoidable for most people. Migration 
increasingly functioned as a population pressure-valve, as people moved to towns, cities, 
and other countries. The Dominican Republic just next door was unable to absorb the 
large numbers o f Haitian refugees and they spilled into the region.
The Crisis
In a free election on 16 December 1990, Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 
was elected President o f a “bankrupt” Haiti.10 Victory for democracy in Haiti lasted less 
than a year, because Aristide's policies advocated sweeping reform, and threatened elites, 
the military and the small middle class. As a result, the crisis in Haiti began on 30 
September 1991, when General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide and installed a military 
government. Brutality under the Cedras regime increased the numbers o f migrants and 
presented a security challenge to the larger region.
The U.S. response to increased numbers of Haitian refugees was mostly to return 
them to Haiti. White House figures show that of the 34,000 refugees picked up in the 
Caribbean between September 1991 and May 1992, around 9,000 were allowed to claim
9. Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Caribbean Question: Why Has Liberal Democracy (Surprisingly) 
Flourished?” in Dem ocracy in the Caribbean, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle 
Worrel (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 1-25.
10. Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean, 217.
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political asylum with 6,000 of those in the United States,11 which accepted more than 
10,000 refugees in the month of May alone. The refugee holding site at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba quickly filled to capacity at 12,000. Despite international criticism, former 
President Bush thought that most refugees had fled for economic, rather than political 
reasons, and were therefore not eligible for asylum in the United States.
After Cedras took power, the OAS imposed sanctions on Haiti in October 1991, 
but the Bush administration’s policies largely circumvented the embargo for U.S.-based 
firms in Haiti. Dupuy argues that this “supported the interests o f the Haitian military and 
bourgeoisie and was more responsive to the Right within the U.S. Congress, the CIA, and 
the State Department, all o f which opposed Aristide’s return.”12 Bush’s strategy 
weakened the embargo, downplayed human rights abuses, accused Aristide of 
intransigence, and always wanted more concessions from Aristide. This approach 
possibly conveyed a lack of credible threat to Cedras, because he refused to step 
down.
To force Cedras out of power, the OAS amended its charter with the Protocol of 
Washington on 23 February 1992, condemning the overthrow of democracy in Haiti and 
granting general amnesty for Cedras and his supporters if  they would step down.13 For 
some, “Washington was reluctant to commit itself to a formula based on substituting
11. See Michael W ines, “Switching Policy, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Haiti,” New York Times, 25 
May 1992:4L.
12. Dupuy, H aiti in the New World Order, 139.
13. Organization o f  American States (hereafter cited as OAS), “Protocol o f  Amendments to the 
Charter o f  the Organization o f  the American States: The Protocol o f  Washington,” 14 December 1992 
(www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-56.htm, accessed on 20 September 2001).
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Aristide for the Duvalierist armed forces.”14 The lack of U.S. resolve to hold the 
embargo rewarded Cedras, the Haitian Parliament declared the Protocol o f Washington 
illegal on 6 March 1992. A few days later, the Haitian Parliament rejected the 
international plan to restore Aristide. By late May, the refugee situation threatened to 
increase further and Bush reinstated the policy to intercept refugee boats and return all 
undocumented passengers. In the United States, the refugee issue grew more politically 
charged, particularly in Florida.
In his campaign, Clinton promised to end Bush’s repatriation policy. He fulfilled 
this promise as president, however, the reversal lasted only a matter of days. Clinton was 
compelled to reinstate Bush’s repatriation policy, when numbers o f migrants became 
unmanageable despite temporary facilities in the Dominican Republic and Florida. As 
numbers o f migrants outpaced capacity, the immigration process was put into place 
onboard naval vessels. In the case of the Haitian crisis, outward migration drew 
international attention, and heightened regional security concerns. The United States was 
compelled to intervene due to a growing regional culture o f migration.
U.S. ALLIES
U.S. allies demonstrated considerable support for the establishment and 
maintenance o f democracy in Haiti. Early on, the international community heavily 
funded the elections that brought Aristide to the presidency in 1990. The bankrupt 
Haitian economy received an estimated $40 million o f foreign funding with foreign
14. Morris Morley, and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics o f  
Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti,” P olitical Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (Fall 
1997): 366.
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civilian and military election supervision assistance for managing and conducting the 
election.15 The most important U.S. ally in this case study was the Organization of 
American States (OAS), however the Caribbean Community 16also strongly supported 
the intervention efforts. The OAS was “the first international organization to act in 
defense o f democracy in Haiti.”17 Furthermore, the OAS was instrumental in 
crystallizing international consensus regarding action in Haiti, and then the United States 
stepped in to provide further leadership. The United States responded to a call from the 
OAS to protect regional stability. The actions o f the OAS and the United States were 
received well in the UN and it authorized military intervention.
The Organization of American States (OAS)
The OAS response became the launching board for international action to 
reinstate democracy in Haiti and as a result, shaped international policy regarding Haiti 
throughout the crisis. The OAS in particular demonstrated significant interest in seeing 
democracy upheld in Haiti, and especially when exiled President Aristide asked the OAS
t o
for help, it was ready to comply. The same day of the coup, the OAS Permanent 
Council condemned it, calling for an immediate meeting o f the Ministers o f Foreign
15. See Anthony P. Maingot, “Haiti and Aristide: The Legacy o f  History,” Current H istory 91, no. 
562 (1992): 68.
16. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a collection o f  12 independent English-speaking 
states and one U.K. dependency in the Caribbean. CARICOM strongly supported UN Resolution 940 in a 
12 August 1994 statement. See Statement by Strobe Talbott and John Deutch, “U.S.-CARICOM Efforts to 
Support U N Security Council Resolution 940,” U.S. Department o f  State D ispatch  5, no. 36, 5 September 
1994 ,5 8 9 -9 3 . (http://netserv.lib.odu.edu:2263/itw/infomark/972/49/16121572w4/purl=rcl_EAIM_0_A
15 8 ... ,  accessed on 3 October 2001)
17. John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future o f  Collective Enforcement o f  Democratic 
Governance,” Law  and P olicy in International Business 27, no. 2 (1996): 482.
18. For analysis regarding the impact o f  diaspora on the struggle o f  overseas communities to unseat 
authoritarian regimes, including a case study on how Haitians in the United States impacted U.S. foreign
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Affairs. On 3 October 1991 the Foreign Ministers passed OAS Resolution 1/91 
supporting democratic governance in Haiti. A few days later, Aristide sent a letter to the 
OAS Secretary General to request assistance in restoring democratic leadership in Haiti.19
In resolution 2/91 on 8 October, the OAS again condemned the coup, rebuffed the 
illegal Haitian government, and urged “all member states to proceed immediately to 
freeze the assets o f the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti.”20 The 
OAS wanted to force the military leaders to negotiate. In addition, the resolution 
requested UN members “to adopt the same measures” as those adopted by the OAS.21 By 
doing so, the OAS Ministers made two significant decisions that influenced the unfolding 
of events after the coup and before the reinstatement o f Aristide. Although, the ministers 
agreed to impose sanctions against Haiti, they preferred to forgo military intervention as 
stipulated in the OAS charter.
In a meeting on 10 October, the OAS Foreign Ministers considered a 7 October 
letter from Aristide and pledged further support. On the same day, the UN General 
Assembly drafted a resolution to uphold OAS sanctions. The OAS called upon its 
members to respect sanctions by placing an embargo on Haiti yet, to uphold sanctions in 
reality presented difficult challenges.22 Some critics identified OAS actions as a “porous
policy and intervention, see Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science 
Quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994-5): 811-41.
19. See OAS, “The Ministers o f  Foreign Affairs Resolution 1/91: Support for Democrativ 
Government o f  Haiti,” 3 October 1991.
20. OAS, “MRE/RES. 2/91: Support for Democracy in Haiti,” 8 October 1991 
(www.upd.oas.org/documents/basic/mreres%202%2091eng.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).
21. Claudette Antoine Werleigh, “Haiti and the Halfhearted,” The Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists 
49, no. 9 (1993): 21.
22. See UN, “General Assembly Resolution 7,” 7 October 1992 (hereafter cited as: UN GA RES) 
(www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).
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embargo,” which made high profits for a few well-positioned people in Haiti, and
countries, such as Panama, Venezuela and Colombia openly violated the embargo, while
the United States partially lifted the embargo as early as November 1992 for U.S.
companies. Moreover, the Dominican Republic remained a pipeline for goods flowing
into Haiti. Monroe Leigh outlines some problems with imposing economic embargoes in
general. He explains that
they seldom achieve their declared objectives; that they deny trading 
opportunities to enterprises in the embargo-imposing country; that they 
bestow windfall profits on third-country traders; that economic embargoes 
are inherently illegal; that they despoil the poor and enrich the wealthy; 
that they fail to unseat the dictatorial regimes; that they are inherently 
immoral; that in American practice they almost always include extreme 
assertions o f extraterritorial jurisdiction; and that most o f our allies . . .  
consider American claims o f extraterritorial jurisdiction violative of 
international l a w . . .  and they usually entail serious domestic political 
embarrassment.24
Regardless of policy shortcomings, the OAS embargo made a strong enough statement 
that the United States considered complying.
An important breakthrough for the OAS came on 23 February 1992, when 
President-in-exile Aristide signed the Protocol of Washington. This document consists of 
amendments to the OAS Charter, condemning and suspending any member “whose 
democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force.”25 Unfortunately, 
the agreement failed to provide a deadline for the reinstatement o f democracy. It also 
called for an interim prime minister in Haiti, as well as offered general amnesty for 
Cedras and his supporters, if  they would to step down. On 6 March 1992, Cedras defied
23. For a critical internal economic analysis o f  the effects o f  the Haitian embargo on Haiti and how it 
profited the few, see Werleigh, “Haiti and the Halfhearted,” 22-23 .
24. Monroe Leigh, “The Political Consequences o f  Economic Embargoes,” The American Journal o f  
International Law  89, no. 1 (1995): 74.
25. OAS, “Protocol o f  Washington.”
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the agreement by appointing Joseph Nerette as president and declared the Protocol of 
Washington illegal.26
In the 17 May 1992 meeting of the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, the OAS 
condemned “the disruption of the democratic system in Haiti and recommended the 
isolation of the de facto  regime.”27 Cedras probably learned that there was little 
international resolve, and as Naom Chomsky stated, “the criminals are informed that they 
can do their work with impunity.”28 Cedras repeatedly rebuffed outside attempts to 
negotiate or restore President Aristide to power. OAS Resolution 3/92 on 17 May 
expressed hardened resolve to restore democratic rule in Haiti, as it intensified sanctions 
(excluding humanitarian assistance), and increased isolation o f the military regime.29 
Member states were urged to deny port access to Haitian vessels, deny visas to Haitians, 
and freeze Haitian assets.
By the summer o f 1992, the inability o f the OAS to bring about a political 
solution became evident, and a major shift in policy was set into action. For example, the 
9 June OAS Ministers o f Foreign Affairs meeting passed resolution 6/94 to strengthen the 
mandate o f the UN Mission In Haiti (UNMIH), passed by the UN on 16 June for a global 
oil and arms embargo. Sanctions were credited with pressuring Cedras to negotiate the 
Governor's Island July 1993 agreement, which brought hope that the crisis could be 
resolved without force. The agreement consisted of eight main points. First, the UN
26. “Haiti’s President W on’t Step Down,” Miami H erald , 7 March 1992, A6.
27. OAS, “MRE/RES. 3/92: Restoration o f  Democracy in Haiti,” 17 May 1992 (www.upd.oas.org, 
accessed on 20 September 2001).
28. Naom Chomsky, “Democracy Restored? Intervention in Haiti, its Meaning and Prospects,” Z 
Magazine 7, no. 11 (1994): 51.
29. OAS, “MRE/RES, 3/92.”
30. See UN, “Security Council Resolution 841,” 16 June 1993 (hereafter cited as “SC/RES”) 
(www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).
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embargo would continue in force until ratification by the Haitian Assembly. Second, the 
Haitian Assembly would legislate reforms for the police and armed forces. Third, the 
preparations for Aristide’s return would be made. Fourth, plans would be made for 
Haiti’s economic recovery. Fifth, Cedras and his supporters would receive amnesty and 
go into retirement. Sixth, Aristide would name a new Prime Minister. Seventh, UN 
peacekeeping forces would assist in rebuilding the infrastructure o f Haiti. Eighth,
October 30 was set for Aristide’s return and Haiti was given until 15 January 1994 to 
fulfill the agreement. An encouraging sign that Cedras would uphold the agreement was 
when he made a televised address urging Haitians to accept the agreement. The Haiti 
Assembly approved Aristide’s appointment of Robert Malval as Prime Minister, and 
sanctions were quickly lifted.
Kate Doyle argues that the Governor’s Island agreement was “profoundly 
flawed,” mainly because o f the assumption that Cedras was reliable to act as an “honest
n  |
broker.” Generous measures of lifting sanctions unfortunately encouraged the Cedras 
regime, which immediately increased human rights violations, as the “army and police 
unleashed their thuggish paramilitary ‘attaches,’ who threatened Malval and a number of 
his cabinet ministers, and assassinated or attempted to murder prominent Aristide civilian 
and political supporters.” These practices indicated Cedras’ intention to hold on to 
power as long as possible.
Despite these setbacks, the UN continued to implement the Governor’s Island 
agreement in good faith, and dispatched peacekeepers to Haiti to address infrastructure
31. Kate Doyle, “Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti,” World Policy Journal 11, no. 1 (1994): 53-4.
32. Morris Moreley and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 369.
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weaknesses.33 On 11 October, the USS Harlan County set sail for Haiti carrying 200 
lightly armed U.S. soldiers and 25 Canadian military trainers, but when it arrived, found 
the port blocked by vessels and a Cuban tanker was moored at the dock. The trip turned 
into a disaster for international negotiations, and the Haitian crisis took on a new urgency. 
Cedras’ supporters blocked the docks, shouting Somalia, Somalia, and in the wake of the 
Somalia debacle only days before, the ship’s captain U.S. Navy Commander Marvin E. 
Butcher ordered it to return to the United States.34 The Harlan County incident was a 
clear victory for Cedras and served to embolden his home-front activities and 
intimidation tactics continued to increase. Yet, the incident also bolstered international 
resolve to reinstate democracy, partly because it embarrassed Clinton, who reinstated 
sanctions against Haiti, but also began planning a military alternative. Thus, the Harlan 
County incident was a turning point in the Haitian crisis, as hopes of restored democracy 
were dashed. Some argued that this event generated “an unintended but unmistakable 
sign of international disengagement from the Haitian crisis.”35 The incident brought 
pause to the international community, but deepened international understanding.
After the Harlan County incident, the UN Security Council took action without 
prompting by the OAS. UN Security Council Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993 
confirmed UN readiness for additional measures if  Cedras continued to violate the 
Governor’s Island agreement. The spiral of violence in Haiti hit a high point with the 14
33. See UN, “SC/RES 867,” 23 September 1993 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 
October 2001).
34. For details, see Walter E. Kratchick, Robert F. Bauman, and John T. Fishel, A Concise History o f  
the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KA: United States Army Command 
and General Staff College Press, 1997).
35. Pamela Constable, “Haiti: A  Nation in Despair, A  Policy Adrift,” Current History 93, no. 581 
(1994): 108.
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October assassination o f Justice Minister Guy Malary, since it marked the breakdown of 
the Governor’s Island agreement, and this time, the UN Security Council responded 
quickly by increasing UN sanctions within two days. In addition, the failure of the 
Governor’s Island agreement allowed the OAS to step aside so that others, especially the 
UN and United States, could engage. Restrained by its charter, the OAS profile 
diminished. By the 15 January 1994 deadline, none of the conditions set out in the 
Governor’s Island agreement had been met by the Cedras regime.
After the Harlan County incident, the OAS prompted the UN to up its profile and 
spearhead international policy, and the OAS fell from the lead, even though it continued 
to support and pressure the UN to restore democracy to Haiti. The OAS by its charter 
could support sanctions, but not military force, and asked the UN and the United States to 
find alternatives other than the use of force. As the time for intervention approached a 
new OAS General Secretary took office. The United States favored former Colombian 
President Cesar Gaviria as the candidate of choice for the office, and “lobbied hard on 
Gaviria’s behalf.” The new OAS Secretary General, Gaviria refused “to take a stand on 
plans for a U.S.-led invasion.”37 In his inaugural address, he said, “no one doubts that 
Cuba must undertake reforms leading to the restoration o f democracy,” indicating his 
support for the promotion o f democracy in the region, if  not specifically in Haiti.38
In summary, while the OAS initialized the international response to the coup in 
Haiti, the United States and the UN eventually took over leading the effort. Nonetheless,
36. George Gedda, “N ew  OAS Chief predicts Democracy will return to Haiti,” The Associated Press 
Political Service, 15 September 1994 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 2 April 
2002).
37. Ibid.
38. “Colombian Sworn as New OAS Chief,” The Boston Globe, 16 September 1994.
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regional allies were a very necessary component for bringing about a military solution to 
the Haitian crisis, if  only by catalyzing initial international response.
THE UNITED NATIONS
This section discusses the UN response to the September 1991 coup in Haiti. The 
argument made here is that UN success in Haiti was a result o f cooperation between 
international organizations at the request of member states. More specifically, the UN 
supported the effort to restore democracy to Haiti only after the OAS requested action. In 
fact, the OAS set the tone for international action against the Haitian military leaders 
until momentum in the UN led it to spearhead the effort. Moreover, once the UN began 
to lead, the United States stepped up its involvement, and leadership rotated between 
them.
After the coup, the OAS immediately convened and formulated a plan for 
international action against the illegal military government in Haiti. Despite the fact the 
Aristide addressed the UN General Assembly at the end o f September, the first resolution 
passed in the UN on 8 October. The resolution sought member action “consistent with 
the steps already taken by the OAS,”39 and on 10 October 1991, the UN Security Council 
passed a further resolution to uphold OAS sanctions.40 The next day, the UN General 
Assembly requested that the Secretary-General consider implementing OAS requests.41
As already explained, increased flows of refugees in 1991 heightened regional
39. John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future,” 481.
40. See UN, “SC/RES 45/2 ,” United Nations, 10 October 1991.
41. UN, “General Assembly Resolution 46/7,” 11 October 1991 (hereafter cited as UN “GA/RES/”) 
(un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 16 October 2001).
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tension and brought the problem into the international limelight. International concerns 
increased because o f the threat to regional stability generated by Haitian refugees in 
neighboring countries, and merited UN General Assembly Resolution 46/138, requesting 
assistance and calling international attention to the “fate o f the Haitian nationals who are 
fleeing the country.”42 UN Resolution 47/20 reiterated concerns put forth earlier 
regarding refugees and human rights violations in Haiti, and urged increased 
humanitarian assistance from the international community.43 It further called on member 
states to abide by international law within the UN framework and to cease providing 
Haitian illegal leaders with military assistance, petroleum, munitions, or arms. The 
resolution also authorized the deployment of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti, a 
joint project with the OAS, to verify human rights compliance.
The UN played an increasingly significant role in pressuring Cedras beginning in 
December 1992, and UN General Assembly Resolution 47/143 reported that Cedras’ 
regime was practicing “flagrant human rights violations,” including “summary 
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, searches without warrant, rape, 
restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association and the 
repression of popular demonstrations calling for the return o f President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide.”44 Further, it expressed concern regarding refugees and urged humanitarian 
assistance.
On 16 June 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a
42. UN, “G A/RES/46/138,” 17 December 1991 (un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46rl38, accessed on 
16 October 2001).
43. UN, “GA/RES/47/20,” 24 November 1992 (un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r20, accessed on 16 
October 2001).
44. UN, “GA/RES/47/143,” 18 December 1992 (un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47rl43, accessed on 
16 October 2001).
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global oil and arms embargo on Haiti. It was widely thought that UN sanctions against 
Haiti were “responsible for the major breakthrough o f the Governor’s Island agreement” 
on 3 July 1993.45 The agreement brought hope that the crisis could be resolved without 
military force, and on 27 and 31 August 1993, UN Security Council resolutions 86land 
862 lifted sanctions against Haiti in good faith. Thus, the international community 
rewarded the Haitian junta by suspending all regional and global sanctions. In keeping 
with the Governor’s Island agreement, the UN Security Council Resolution 867 on 23 
September 1993 approved the dispatch of United States and Canadian peacekeepers to go 
to Haiti to help with infrastructure issues. Unfortunately, these measures of generosity 
encouraged the Cedras regime to break the agreement, and negotiations stalled in the next 
months. As discussed above, the early October USS Harlan County diplomatic disaster 
forced the UN to take action, and Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993, prepared for 
additional measures as necessary. After the 14 October assassination of Justice Minister 
Guy Malary, the UN responded quickly with UN Security Council Resolution 875. The 
resolution increased UN sanctions, and included an oil and arms embargo. The 30 
October date for Aristide’s reinstatement came and went without fulfillment, and by the 
15 January 1994 deadline, Cedras had clearly not complied with any of the Governor’s 
Island agreement conditions.
During the first half o f 1994, the UN rhetoric sharpened considerably leading up 
to the momentous July resolution that authorized the use of military force. Following the 
Clinton administration’s late April appeal, the UN shift took place in the form o f UN 
Security Council Resolution 917 on 6 May. It marked a strong departure from previous
45. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future,” 106.
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resolutions, as is noticeable in the extended length o f the document (just over six pages), 
as compared to previous resolutions (usually two to three pages). Moreover, the 
document employed rhetoric that was more severe than previous documents, for example, 
using stronger phrases, such as “commending” efforts to bring compliance, “strongly 
condemning” the extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, 
rape and enforced disappearances, and “strongly urges.” The urgency of the document is 
evident in the use o f words such as “without delay” (used three times), expeditiously 
(used once), and “in the shortest time possible.” Not only is this document more severe 
than earlier resolutions, but it repeats an earlier warning of “additional measures.” It lists 
sanctions imposed that are in line with those requested by Clinton, including limitations 
on flights, visas, assets, imports/exports/trade, and traffic by sea. It also reiterates 
demands and other conditions found in the Governor’s Island agreement and promises to 
end sanctions with compliance. When the content o f UN Security Council Resolution 
917 is compared to Clinton’s April appeal, it is surprisingly similar. Two shifts had 
occurred: 1) the United States began to take on a more assertive role in determining the 
direction o f international policy on the Haitian Crisis, and 2) the UN had shifted its 
rhetoric.
On 9 June, the OAS Ministers o f Foreign Affairs made Resolution 6/94, which 
calls on the UN to further strengthen the mandate o f UNMIH. The following day,
Clinton broadened UN sanctions on Haiti, but it took the UN until the end of the month to 
draft a reply. The next UN resolution occurred on 30 June with UN Security Council 
Resolution 933, extending UNMIH and authorizing preparation for rapid deployment of 
UNMIH, and inviting members to supply troops. Resolution 933 emphasized that the
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UN Security Council “strongly deplores the refusal o f the military authorities to
implement the Governor’s Island agreement.”46 Despite the sanctions, strong language
and repeated warnings from the UN, the Cedras regime disregarded the gravity of the
situation and surprised the world with the expulsion o f the International Civilian Mission
(MICIVIH) from Haiti on 12 July 1994. At the end of the month, Aristide made a further
appeal to the UN for support.
Two days later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, at the high point
o f UN legitimacy in Haiti. Resolution 940 authorized intervention with military force to
restore democracy to Haiti. Resolution 940 paragraph four authorized
member states to form a multinational force under unified command and control 
and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from 
Haiti o f the military leadership, consistent with the Governor’s Island agreement, 
the prompt return o f the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a 
secure and stable environment that will permit implementation o f the Governor’s 
Island agreement47
In paragraph five, the resolution approves an advance team to enter Haiti to coordinate 
and monitor multinational force operations.
On 26 August 1994, Clinton authorized the final invasion plan for Operation 
Restore Democracy, and the United States took the lead in the intervention, on 18 
September. Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate argue that the UN “resorted 
to the ‘sheriffs posse’ approach” to the Haitian crisis, meaning that the UN contracted 
one o f its member states to actually run the intervention it had authorized.48 The United
46. UN, “SC/RES 933,” 30 June 1994 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 21 September 
2001).
47. UN, “SC/RES 940,” 31 July 1994,2  (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 
2001).
48. Thomas G. W eiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, ed., The United Nations and  
Changing W orld Politics , 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 37; see also Richard Haass, The
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States fulfilled this function for the UN by taking the lead on military action when the 
time came.
The next UN action took place with Resolution 944 on 29 September, laying the 
plans to end sanctions after Aristide’s return. On 4 October the UNMIH Advance 
Planning Team arrived in Port-au-Prince to plan the transition from Cedras to Aristide. 
Eleven days later, Aristide returned to Haiti, and was welcomed home by UN Security 
Council Resolution 948.
There were three phases of UN involvement during the crisis in Haiti. The first 
occurred between the coup on 30 September 1991 and lasted until December 1992.
During this time, the OAS led the campaign against the military junta in Haiti and 
favored reinstating democracy. The second phase began in December 1992, when the 
flow of refugees in the Caribbean region became destabilizing. At this point, the United 
Nations sought an understanding with the Cedras regime, however failed. The third 
phase began with Clinton’s April 1994 appeal to the UN to increase its mandate, after 
which active U.S involvement grew. After UN Security Council Resolution 944 
authorized intervention, the United States stepped into the lead role. The UN gained 
legitimacy as a useful world organization, and came away from the Haitian crisis more 
empowered to exercise authority at the international level, as UN efforts to resolve the 
crisis set precedents for intervention to restore democracy.
THE U.S. CONGRESS
Divisions in Congress regarding U.S. policy in Haiti largely led to inaction. Some
Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the C old War (N ew  York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations
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of the issues behind this division included the recent humiliation in Somalia, bureaucratic 
power struggles, strategic interests, immigration and refugee movement, and partisan 
politics. Congressional apathy about supporting democracy in Haiti stemmed partly from 
nervousness after the recent U.S. humiliation in Somalia on 3 October 1993 that made the 
killing o f 18 U.S. soldiers a world media event, and no one wanted to see this happen 
again. Moreover, after Somalia, there was concern that “there was and now remains the 
danger that the entire democratic trend could unravel as quickly and decisively as it was 
assembled.”49 Indeed, on 21 October 1993, the Senate rejected (81to 19) an attempt to 
prohibit defense appropriations from being spent on a Haiti invasion, except if  U.S. 
citizens were at risk.50 On the same day, the Senate approved (98 to 2) an amendment 
requiring the president to have prior approval from Congress for all military activities in 
Haiti, unless U.S. citizens there were in imminent risk.
For the most part the bureaucratic struggle between the Clinton administration, 
the Pentagon and the CIA over which Haitian leader was preferable generated conflicting 
information in congressional hearings, especially those regarding Aristide’s mental 
stability. Bureaucratic analysis o f the Haitian crisis has already been done by others, 
however, and is not repeated here.51 Misinformation given to Congress about Aristide 
brought out sharp criticism of Clinton’s policy to support him, and complicated the
Press, Brookings Institution Press, 1997).
49. Introductory comments by Robert G. Torricelli, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs o f  the Committee on Foreign Affairs House o f  Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1 st 
session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 October 1991), 1.
50. See “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1993-S Haiti,” Project Vote Smart, 21 October 1993 
(http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).
51. For an excellent explanation o f  this behind-the-scenes struggle, see MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  
U.S. Peacekeeping-, Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions, 50 -62; and Morely and 
McGillion, “’Disobedient’ Generals,” 363-84.
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debate regarding his reinstatement. Many in Congress believed that Haiti had no 
strategic value and produced no valuable exports, but they failed to acknowledge the 
impact of refugees or the rising drug trade through this impoverished country. Pamela 
Constable claims that the central issue in Congress over Haiti involved immigration and 
illegal refugees that generated constituency undercurrents and complicated the lives of 
representatives in Congress.52 Florida was the main state to be affected by refugee influx, 
due to costs of caring for them and local resentments that can influence politicians.
Large numbers refugees contributed to regional instability in the Caribbean and 
therefore affected foreign policy. Deputy Secretary o f State, Strobe Talbot explained it 
this way:
in many cases around the world, including this one, the disintegration of a 
political situation in one country can produce an outflow of refugees who, in 
various ways, impinge on the interests and capacities and resources of 
neighboring countries. And we saw that in spectacular and alarming fashion this 
summer in the case of Haiti.53
Despite the fact that Clinton had criticized Bush for refugee repatriation, it would
continue, like it or not. According to William Berman, even though “Clinton earlier had
been critical of Bush’s handling of the Haitian refugee problem, claiming that it had not
been humane in practice, he now felt the need to stem the tide coming from Haiti to
Florida, or face intense risk o f losing Democratic seats in Congress in 1994 and the state
to a Republican challenger in 1996.”54 Rightly so, Clinton feared a resurgent Republican
Congress in the midterm election of 1994.
52. Constable, “Haiti: A  Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift.”
53. Statement by Strobe Talbot, in United States House, Hearings and Markup before the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs House o f  Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 27 September 1994), 17.
54. Berman, From the Center to the Edge, 36.
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During the Haitian crisis, the Black Caucus rose up within Congress as a powerful 
proponent for military intervention, but was unable to sway congressional consensus 
overall. The Black Caucus criticized the refugee policy as racist and supported Aristide. 
They opposed Clinton’s demands on Aristide to accept measures that would appease the 
military regime. In March, the Black Caucus introduced a bill to tighten the economic 
embargo against Haiti, sever flight links, and stop refugee repatriation. Moreover, the 
Black Caucus introduced legislation calling for the resignation o f Clinton’s special envoy 
to Haiti since March 1993, Lawrence Pezzullo, who had tried to set up a “mini-plan” in 
hopes that Aristide would accept a deal that would neutralize him and protect Cedras.55 
Pezzullo was fired in April 1994, and Clinton announced on 18 May that the new Envoy 
to Haiti was the head of the Black Caucus, William H. Gray, a well-known proponent for 
intervention in Haiti.56 Gray’s appointment marked a shift in Clinton’s refugee policy. 
Henceforth, Haitian refugees would be granted asylum hearings on board U.S. ships or in 
other countries. The Black Caucus wanted tougher measures against Haiti, particularly 
harsher sanctions, and by April that meant considering a military alternative.57
The influence of the Black Caucus on the Clinton administration was further 
demonstrated, when Clinton had implemented most o f the Black Caucus’ earlier 
legislative policies, despite the fact that it had not passed by July. The New York Times 
reported that “one lawmaker who follows Haiti grumbled that administration officials 
consult more with key members of the black caucus than they do with the chairmen and
55. See Dupuy, H aiti in the New World Order, 155.
56. See Elaine Scioliono, “Clinton’s New Policy on Haiti Y ields little Progress, so far,” New York 
Times, 18 May 1994, A l ,  A10.
57. See Christopher Marquis, “Legislators prod U.S. on Haiti,” M iami Herald, 16 January 1994.
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ranking members o f the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over policy on 
Caribbean affairs.”58
Congress debated intervention in Haiti via a reexamination o f presidential war 
powers and concluded that, at least in the case of Haiti, it would not block Clinton’s use 
of military force. Congressional inactivity is a long-term issue for foreign policy, and 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, critiques the way 
Congress shirks its responsibility to shape solid foreign policy by remaining inactive and 
apathetic, because “in almost every case over the past 15 years, save for the Gulf War, 
Congress has failed to grant prior authority for intervention.”59 Congress was divided 
though, because some thought that Clinton overstepped his war powers authority by 
ordering military intervention in Haiti. Lori Fisler Damrosch argues that without prior 
congressional approval, Clinton’s military actions would have been illegal if  the military 
had actually landed in Haiti in 1994, regardless o f UN authorization.60 There were those 
who argued that it would have been illegal, because Congress had not yet approved the 
invasion and the War Powers Act was intended to allow for military defense, but not 
attack.61 In a vote on 29 June 1994, the Senate rejected by 65 to 34 the requirement that 
the president must “seek congressional authorization before ordering military action
•  • •  f \ )
against Haiti.” The Senate also rejected (57-42) a proposal to establish a congressional
58. Steven A. Holmes, “With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy,” New  
York Times, 14 July 1994, A10.
59. The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, “The Role o f  the Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Washington 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 November 1998 ,4  (www.csis.org/htmlsp98ham  
ilton.html, accessed on 21 June 2001).
60. Lori Fisler Damrosch, “AGORA: The 1994 Action in Haiti: The Constitutional Responsibility o f  
Congress for Military Engagements,” American Journal o f  International Law  89, no. 1 (1995): 58-70.
61. The War Powers Act allows the president 60 days o f  freedom to use military force. There is a 
debate however whether this includes attack without provocation.
62. “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Approval for Action in Haiti,” Project Vote 
Smart, 29 June 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).
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commission on Haiti in the middle of July, and in early August tabled (63-31) an
amendment requiring the Clinton administration to have congressional approval before
using military force.
In a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti only a few days before the intervention,
Republicans again called for further hearings about the appropriateness o f using military
force against Haiti to restore democracy and redress human rights violations. For
example, Representative Benjamin Gilman argued that “If the grounds for using military
force are undergoing redefinition, then Congress, I say, has an obligation to hear those
grounds and to make their views known before the ships and planes are launched.”64 The
Chair of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton, defended Clinton’s war
powers authority on 13 September 1994 just before the intervention took place, saying:
let me observe that whether you have prior authorization o f military action is a 
constant question in American political history. And I think history will show 
that the Congress has on occasion granted prior authorization for military action, 
on occasion we have not. On occasion we have done nothing at all. I don’t know 
that there is anything in the Constitution or in the War Powers Resolution that 
requires prior authorization.65
As a result o f the debate over war powers, Congress was deadlocked, which resulted in
inaction. This deadlock allowed the president to use his authority to order military
intervention. In an interview on 19 September 1994, Clinton explained his position on
the war powers issue. He said, “I think that every President and all my predecessors in
both parties have clearly maintained that they did not require, by constitution, did not
63. See “Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Commission on Haiti,” Project Vote 
Smart, 14 July 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/indexphtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).
64. Statement o f  Benjamin A. Gilman, in United States House, “U.S. Policy toward, and Presence in, 
Haiti,” in Hearings an d  Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House o f  Representatives, 103rd 
Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 September 1994), 5.
65. Statement o f  Dana Rohrbacher, in ibid., 5.
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have to have congressional approval for every kind of military action.”66 It was not until 
some days past the actual peak of the crisis, and after military intervention, that Congress 
came to a resolution on the matter. House Joint Resolution 416, introduced on 24 
September, heavily stressed congressional prohibition o f continued use o f U.S. armed 
forces in Haiti, and requested detailed reports from the administration.67 President 
Clinton signed Senate Joint Resolution 229 on 25 October 1994, which criticized the 
president for not seeking congressional approval prior to deploying forces to Haiti.68 The 
resolution again called for a “prompt and orderly withdrawal o f all United States Armed 
Forces from Haiti.”69 The fact that Congress did not come to resolution on intervention 
until after it was over gave Clinton “a free hand” to carry out foreign policy as he deemed
70appropriate.
Congressional debate served as an ever-present reminder to President Clinton that 
a military alternative could be difficult to get past a reluctant Congress. John Sweeny 
described congressional opposition to intervention in Haiti as a “collision course” 
between the executive and the legislature.71 This is an overstatement; however, it does 
portray the potential for Congress to counter foreign policy decisions taken by the
66. William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with President Carter, General Powell, 
and Senator Nunn on Haiti,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 38, 19 September 
1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+4+0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, 
accessed on 19 March 2002).
67. United States House, “House Joint Resolution 416: Limited Authorization for the United States- 
led Force in Haiti,” 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 28 September 1994 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
D ?cl03:l:./tem p/~cl03tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).
68. See William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing Legislation on United States Policy on Haiti,” 
Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 43, 31 October 1994 ,2 1 8 2 -4 .
69. United States Senate, “Senate Joint Resolution 229: Regarding United States Policy toward 
Haiti,” 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 25 October 1994 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/queiy/D?cl03:5:./ 
tem p/~cl03tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).
70. Carroll J. Doherty, “Congress, after a Sharp Debate, gives Clinton a Free Hand,” Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly R eport 52, no. 39 (1994): 2895-6 .
71. John Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,” Foreign Policy  no. 102 (1996): 144.
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president. Debate in Congress fueled a reexamination o f presidential war powers in 
general, mainly over who has the power to do what. Opposition in Congress lacked the 
backing to impede the intervention effort, because Congress “had ample time and 
opportunity to act” but did not.72
Overall, the Haitian crisis did not move Congress to overwhelmingly support or 
oppose Clinton’s plans for intervention, because Congress was divided on many issues. 
This analysis finds that division over issues basically incapacitated Congress to fully 
support or reject Clinton’s plans for intervention beyond sanctions. As a result, Congress 
neither hindered, nor helped, Clinton’s foreign policy in Haiti. Moreover, regardless o f 
complaints, the inability o f Congress to form a mandate on the course o f U.S. policy in 
Haiti ultimately left the president to decide the best course o f action.
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
American public opinion regarding the crisis in Haiti neither favored, nor opposed 
intervention. A Gallup Poll published in July 1993 showed that 65 percent of the 
American public believed that the presence o f Haitian immigrants “generally created 
problems for the country.”73 This likely stems from the fact that Haitian refugees were 
often illiterate and unskilled. In the same poll, only 19 percent o f the American public 
believed that “their presence has benefited the country.”74 Such measurements indicated 
that bias against Haitian immigration was nearly 3 and one-half times greater than that 
favoring it. Clearly, this would seem to be an indication that a stringent repatriation
72. Trimble, “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Use Limited Military Force,” 84.
73. “Immigration Prejudices: Selected Nations,” The Gallup P oll Monthly, no. 334 (1993): 14.
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policy regarding Haitian boat people would be more welcomed than opposed. Only half 
of Americans believed that Clinton was doing a good job with foreign affairs and many 
Americans held no opinion at all regarding foreign policy in general. There was a slight 
rise in public approval o f the way Clinton was handling foreign affairs after 16 June 
1994, when the UN placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.
The results of a poll taken on 15-17 July 1994 indicated that 54 percent of the 
public thought that the United States should send troops to Haiti to restore democracy.75 
Of these, 43 percent felt that the United States should send troops to Haiti only in a 
multilateral action, and a further 11 percent believed that the United States should send 
troops whether or not other countries participated. While 54 percent is over half, it is 
only slightly more than half and is therefore less convincing, as it could quickly turn 
either way. Clinton addressed the nation on 15 September 1994 to present his case in 
favor of sending troops to remove the military regime in Haiti. The speech inspired a 
frequently seen “rally around the president” effect, which was measured in a two part 
Gallup poll taken before and after the speech.76 For example, prior to the speech 35 
percent o f those surveyed approved of the way Clinton was handling the situation in 
Haiti, whereas after the speech, this percentage jumped to 53 percent. Those 
disapproving fell from 49 percent to 43 percent and those with no opinion fell from 16 to 
4 percent. When asked if  the United States should send troops in a multilateral effort 
after all other diplomatic efforts failed, those who agreed in sending troops rose after the
74. The same figures were published in a similar poll in January 1994, see “United States 
Immigration Prejudices,” World Opinion Update 18, no. 1 (1994): 2.
75. David W. Moore, “America Hesitant about War in Haiti,” The Gallup P oll Monthly, no. 346 
(1994): 18.
76. David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, “After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor o f  Haiti 
Invasion,” The Gallup P oll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 16-17.
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speech from 40 percent to 56 percent, while those who said not to fell from 48 percent to 
41 percent. While these figures are more amenable toward intervention than earlier 
figures, they show a divided public.
In his September 15 address to the nation, Clinton outlined several reasons for 
justifying military action. According to a poll done at the time of the speech, the most 
persuasive reason (supported by viewers at 67 percent) was to stop human rights
77violations by the Cedras regime in Haiti. Clearly, this is a very close tie-in to the 
Clinton Doctrine, since protecting human rights contains stopping ethnic genocide, albeit 
in Haiti the political killings were not ethnic genocide, but would, however, support the 
argument that Clinton did wish to promote human rights abroad. In the same poll, more 
than half (56 percent) of the viewers supported a military alternative to reduce the flow of 
Haitian refugees, and 55 percent were convinced that the United States should intervene 
to promote democracy. The mixed message from the public for intervention increase 
Clinton’s available alternatives. Moreover, a majority o f 58 percent did not believe that 
intervention was merited to maintain U.S. credibility abroad. Overall, 66 percent were 
convinced by Clinton’s reasons for the United States to intervene, while 33 percent were 
not.
Despite increased public support for Clinton’s upcoming intervention, 63 percent 
believed that the president should seek approval from Congress prior to sending troops to 
Haiti. Clearly, “going public” had a favorable impact on public opinion for intervention, 
but the approval rate o f 53 percent in favor o f intervention was a fragile majority. This is
77. Ibid., 16.
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especially true given the possible sampling error set at plus or minus 6 percent for this 
poll.
Polls showed that popular opinion regarding U.S. activity in Haiti received mixed 
reviews, and a majority o f Americans were “skeptical that many of the basic goals o f the 
intervention will ever be achieved.”78 Table 3 shows public approval regarding how 
Clinton handled the Haiti crisis.
Table 3
Ratings on Clinton’s Handling the Situation in Haiti79
Approve Disapprove
1994Jul 15-17 28 56
1994 Sep 6-7 27 58
1994 Sep 16-18 35 55
1994 Sep 19 Intervention
1994 Sep 23-25 48 48
Source: Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, “Haiti Yields Clinton Small ‘Rally 
Effect,’” The Gallup Poll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 31.
The approval ratings improved from 27 percent in early September to 48 percent after the 
speech in late September. In the week following the arrival o f troops in Haiti, American 
support for troops in Haiti increased from 46 percent on 19 September to 54 percent on 
23-25 September. The pattern o f public opinion regarding Operation Restore Democracy 
clearly reveals that approval for the intervention increased as intervention showed 
success. It is likely that this increase in public opinion regarding intervention reflected
78. Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, “Haiti Y ields Clinton Small ‘Rally Effect,’” The Gallup  
Poll Monthly, no. 348 (1994): 30 -2 .
79. It is important to note that different polls do not always reflect the exact same results in data 
percentages; however, it is valid to consider similar trends.
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the phenomenon in which the public typically rallies around the president during times of 
crisis.
While the President’s address to the nation improved levels of public support for 
intervention, critical media reports may have reduced popular support for Clinton around 
the same time. Despite the majority approval in the polls, reports accused Clinton of 
exhibiting insecurity about public opinion, and criticized him for couching the 
intervention in terms of humanitarian concern rather than boldly explaining the true 
interests involved,80 or o f being “ashamed of tough-mindedness,”81 or o f using the 
successful intervention to boost his political credibility while claiming it was an issue of 
U.S. credibility.82 Additionally, reports o f U.S. troops standing by while the Haitian 
Police used “brutal crowd control tactics” against demonstrators tainted White House 
declarations regarding a “much stronger and safer position” in Haiti.83 Such negative 
media attention regarding intervention and the president did not improve the public view
O  A
o f U.S. policy. One report, however, explained that the press unjustly criticized
Clinton’s diplomatic and military decisions regarding Haiti, because he was successful in 
accomplishing what he set out to do.85
Michael Mandelbaum claimed that Clinton’s “distinctive vision o f post-cold war 
American foreign policy failed because it did not command public support.”86 Public
80. See Michael Kramer, “The Case for Intervention,” Time 144, no. 13 (1994): 28.
81. William Safire, “Jimmy Clinton, II,” New York Times, 22 September 1994, A 27L.
82. Gloria Borger, “W hose Credibility is it anyway?” U.S. News & W orld Report 117, no. 12 (1994):
54.
83. John H. Cushman, Jr., “Haitian Police Crush Rally as American Troops Watch,” N ew York Times, 
21 September 1994, A l.
84. For a discussion o f  humanitarian measures exercised by the U.S. troops regarding detainees in 
Haiti after the intervention, see Theodor Meron, “Extraterritoriality o f  Human Rights Treaties,” The 
American Journal o f  International Law  89, no. 1 (1995): 78-82 .
85. Hendrik Hertzberg, “Haiti so Far,” The New Yorker 70, no. 33 (1994): 7.
86. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (1996): 16.
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opinion early in the Haitian crisis was generally against intervention, however, as 
intervention came closer public opinion grew mixed to favorable. This phenomenon also 
happened prior to the Persian Gulf War for George Bush, but like Clinton, this did not 
severely hamper his ability to achieve his goals.
The Haiti crisis is an example o f how the media intervenes between the president 
and the public to convey a message of its own. Here, the message was more against 
intervention. Thus, the president went directly to the public with his message, and 
improved public support for action in Haiti. According to this analysis, the variable 
public opinion was not a decisive factor in influencing the decision to intervene in Haiti.
U.S. INTERESTS
At first glimpse, the role the Clinton administration played in resolving the 
Haitian crisis appears varied and occasionally ad hoc. While this has much to do with the 
president’s personality and personal style, upon deeper examination, the Haitian crisis, 
was about protecting U.S. interests. For this reason, official rhetoric during the crisis 
favored supporting democracy in the Caribbean, as a strategy to induce potential refugees 
to stay home. In addition, Clinton pressured Aristide to remain flexible,87 and to implore 
Haitian masses to remain in Haiti. As explained in an earlier chapter, situations of 
refugee movement often pose difficult challenges to countries, which then take steps to 
ensure the safety of citizens and refugees. This was also true during the Haitian crisis.
Democratic enlargement, as vital strategic interest, has highlighted a newer more 
abstract peripheral interest for human rights, which emerged during the Carter
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administration. When faced with human rights violations, Bill Clinton, could not ignore 
the disruption o f democracy in Haiti, just next door, when such an approach goes against 
the fundamental nature o f America, which protects democracy and human rights and yet 
allows the freedom to refuse to do the same. This dilemma brings vigorous debate to the 
floor o f the U.S. Congress, to clarify what the American public wants from policy 
makers.
In a sense, the president found himself in a “catch 22” during the crisis in Haiti. 
Some argued that Clinton’s lack of attention to U.S. interests led him to deepen the 
commitment to Aristide, which left him “with no obvious way out other than prolonged 
sanctions or the intervention of foreign peacekeepers.”88 It is questionable however, how 
deep Clinton’s commitment to Aristide was in actuality, because the United States 
pressured Aristide to negotiate and concede until Aristide was forced to comply or give 
up. Clearly Aristide needed the United States far more than the other way around, but we 
must not overlook a very real reason for U.S. action in Haiti, to stabilize demographic 
shifts. As such, Clinton did in fact operate to protect U.S. interests by supporting 
democracy.
Without congressional or public support of using military force, Clinton
consistently considered all viable alternatives. For example, he said,
Just because the cold war is over does not mean the United States can 
withdraw from the world. Just because it is almost always not necessary 
to resort to force, and we must always do everything we can to avoid it, 
does not mean there are never circumstances in which it might be 
necessary ... And that is why we have sought for 3 years to restore 
democracy to Haiti, to end violence and terrorism and human rights
87. Alex Doyle argues that this was a hold over from the Bush administration, which lacked support 
for Aristide reinstatement.
88. Paul D. Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s First Year,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 41.
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violations, to see that all parties lived up to their commitments, to keep 
democracy on the move in our hemisphere and to encourage those 
fledgling democracies to be brave and to go forward, to stabilize the 
borders and the territorial integrity of all countries, including ours.89
Here, Clinton used rhetoric akin to the Clinton Doctrine to explain U.S. action in Haiti.
As one U.S. official said: “We are using every means at our disposal to get rid o f this
regime in the hopes o f avoiding the necessity of an invasion.. . .  Every means.”90 U.S.
progress toward eventual military alternatives was therefore slow and cautious.
The key strategy for regional stabilization was to return democratic rule to Haiti
in hopes that such steps would ease human suffering and restore demographic stability.
Initially, Clinton had some difficulty to overcome momentum set in place by Bush, but
Clinton’s policy suffered because of a cleavage between conservative and liberal forces
in the U.S. bureaucracy. The Washington bureaucracy complicated matters for the
Clinton administration, because it lacked consensus on which Haitian leader was
preferable. In a biting critique, Naom Chomsky explains that not only did the CIA give
Congress misinformation about the Aristide’s psychological soundness, but it maintained
connections to Cedras’ military establishment that were contrary to removing him from
power.91 For example, the CIA worked against Clinton’s policy by inciting the junta to
block the docks that led to the USS Harlan County incident. Moreover, thirty-year CIA
national intelligence officer, Brian Latell, gave Congress counterfactual information in a
89. William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Dinner,” Weekly 
Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 3 8 ,2 6  September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin...D=5624962297+47+0+0& W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).
90. Quoted in D oyle McManus and Robin Wright, “U.S. Tried Covert Action to Rid Haiti o f  Rulers,” 
Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1994.
91. Naom Chomsky, “Democracy Restored,” 50.
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secret briefing about Aristide’s mental health.92 This report increased deadlock in 
Congress over backing Aristide. Second, this bureaucratic split was compounded by 
Clinton’s initial decision to retain Bush’s key personnel in the State Department as they 
undermined Clinton’s efforts to negotiate the removal of Cedras in a legitimate fashion.
Under Clinton’s strategy, Aristide needed to be reinstated as legitimate ruler of 
Haiti, and it was hoped that these steps would better the humanitarian situation, restore 
political and regional stability, and lessen refugee migration. As one commentator noted, 
“Clinton and most people in Haiti are pinning their hopes on a political settlement that 
will make Haitians want to stay home.”93 Clinton argued in his presidential campaign 
that when elected his policy on Haitian refugees would look much different than that of 
the Bush administration, but as explained earlier, this policy did not last long. The 
presidential campaign therefore complicated domestic pressures regarding the influx of 
Haitian refugees, because Clinton campaigned against forced repatriation. Once in 
office, however, he quickly learned the unfeasibility of fulfilling his campaign rhetoric, 
because “Haitians took his election victory as a guarantee o f Uncle Sam’s embrace and 
began to build more boats.”94 Accepting one wave of immigrants seemed innocuous, but 
in light o f potential waves to follow, Clinton found himself constrained by a reducing 
number o f foreign policy choices, and he quickly returned to the Bush policy of returning 
Haitian refugees.
When the UN imposed a global oil and arms embargo in mid-June 1993, Clinton
92. See details o f  the report in Mark Danner, “The Fall o f  a Prophet,” New York Review o f  Books 40, 
no. 20 (1993): 44-53 .
93. J. F. 0 .  McAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time 141, no. 5 (1993): 51.
94. Ibid., 50.
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followed suit and announced tougher sanctions at the end of June. Less than a month 
later, the military junta in Haiti signed the Governor’s Island agreement, and the approval 
of Robert Malval as Prime Minister of Haiti was an encouraging development in late 
August, as it fulfilled one of the Governor’s Island conditions. Taking this appointment 
as an act of good faith, the international community suspended sanctions, but the Cedras 
regime immediately increased violence and international concern elevated.95 In 
September, Clinton sought “support for imposing a global trade embargo on the country, 
together with financial sanctions (the freezing of overseas assets) and travel bans against 
600 military officers who supported the autocratic regime or participated in the 
September 1991 coup.”96
The USS Harlan County incident on 11 October 1993 posed problems for the 
Clinton administration for several reasons. First, reports surfaced that the Department of 
Internal Affairs (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were behind Haitian 
militant activities to block the ports, and anti-Aristide DIA and CIA agents reportedly 
encouraged resistance by advising Cedras that the UN could be easily run off. Indeed, 
the United States, having recently experienced humiliation in Somalia was hesitant to 
take further injuries and was reluctant to enter into combat type exchanges. Second, 
Haitian intimidation tactics were successful for Cedras, because the Harlan County 
withdrew, causing the loss o f credibility, not only for Clinton, but also for the United 
States. As misinformation about Aristide circulated, Clinton was forced to regroup, as 
Congress debated the soundness of intervention in Haiti.97
95. See Morely and McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 369.
96. Ibid., 374.
97. See ibid., 370.
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Third, Cedras continued to ignore hard won agreements to restore democracy. 
Pamela Constable argues that the Clinton administration had “to an astonishing degree 
. . ,  underestimated the cynicism, greed, ruthlessness, and deep hostility to Aristide 
among military leaders and their civilian confederates, who also include conservative 
businessmen and criminal gangs.”98 Newly appointed Justice Minister, Guy Malary, was 
assassinated in broad daylight as he drove from his Port-au-Prince office on 14 October 
1993. Malary, an aggressive reformist trained in the United States, was preparing 
legislation to bring the Haitian police under civilian control.99 Even though Malary’s 
attackers were never identified, the murder was widely interpreted as a direct military 
right-wing civilian challenge to international authority. The assassination was 
immediately met with reimposed U.S. and UN sanctions, which were enforced by six 
U.S. Navy warships. On 18 October 1993, Clinton imposed additional sanctions on Haiti 
to block properties held by certain Haitians.
The Governor’s Island agreement did what the Protocol o f Washington had failed 
to do: set a deadline o f 30 October 1993 for Aristide’s return. Clinton had worked hard 
to get Aristide to bend to political negotiations, and the administration was more likely 
frustrated than surprised when the 30 October Governor’s Island agreement deadline to 
restore Aristide came and went, and persecution o f Haitian citizens heightened. 
International concerns arose that a new wave of refugees could move out o f Haiti.100
Fourth, the failure of economic sanctions often embarrasses the administration,
98. Constable, “Haiti,” 110.
99. See Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, “Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and 
Congressional Concerns in 1994,” Congressional Research Service, 22 September 1994: 9.
100. “Thousands in Haiti ask Asylum in the U .S.,” New York Times, 9 December 1993, A7L.
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which imposes them, because they hurt the poor more than the wealthy who find 
loopholes to exploit the embargo. Once made public, this situation showed the world the 
hollowness o f diplomatic efforts, and given the futility o f his approach, Clinton moved to 
a stronger and more direct policy, even though Congress and the American public 
remained uncommitted to the use of force. In a move to toughen the U.S. stance on 21 
April 1994, and after being pressured by Senate legislation for stiffer sanctions against 
Haiti, Clinton announced strict enforcement of the economic embargo and sent a naval 
blockade to enforce it.101 Thus, in late April 1994 there was a mild shift between the 
United States and United Nations, as the United States began to take the lead and 
requested a global trade embargo from the UN Security Council.
Shortly thereafter, further policy reversals were apparent, as Clinton displayed a 
new understanding o f real-politik in the context of the Haitian crisis. On 5 May Clinton 
issued PDD 25, limiting U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, as explained 
in Chapter I. PDD 25 revised U.S. strategic rationale behind peacekeeping within the 
broader context of foreign policy, and proposed reform for UN peace operations. On 6 
May 1994, the UN called for increased sanctions against Haiti in Security Council 
Resolution 814, and a day later, the United States also increased import restrictions.102 In 
his remarks on 10 June, President Clinton expressed concern regarding refugee flows into 
the United States, saying “I want to be clear about this issue, I continue to urge all
101. See Mary E. Kortanek, “Democrats push Clinton to Toughen Embargo, ” Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 52, no. 16 (1994): 1015.
102. For more details, see William J. Clinton, “Message to the Congress on Haiti," Weekly 
Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 21, 30 May 1994 (http://frwebgate5.accessgpo.gov/cgi- 
bin...D=56249622997+12++0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).
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Haitians to avoid risking lives in treacherous boat voyages.” Strobe Talbot went 
before the OAS in mid-June and delivered four points on policy: the United States would 
1) strictly enforce tight, comprehensive sanctions “as a primary element o f pressure”; 2) 
provide “massive aid for economic and social reconstruction once democracy is 
restored”; 3) encourage “nations in the hemisphere to provide asylum for Haitian political 
refugees”; and 4) work to reform and strengthen UN efforts in UNMIH.104
By 30 June, the UN authorized rapid deployment of UNMIH and invited member 
states to commit troops to the mission. Clinton announced on 6 July, that the United 
States would only allow into the United States those refugees who applied for asylum 
from offices in Haiti. Otherwise, boat people would be returned to Haiti or to other “safe 
havens.”105 By 25 June, the Clinton administration cut U.S. commercial flights to Haiti 
and tightened other sanctions. When the Haitian military regime expulsed the 
International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) on 12 July, Clinton began seeking a UN 
resolution authorizing member countries to use “all necessary means” to restore President 
Aristide to power. The same day, Clinton went before the UN to request approval for an 
invasion o f Haiti. At the end of July, Aristide appealed to the UN for support and the 
next day, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council authorized a “multinational force 
under unified command and control. . .  to use all necessary means to facilitate the
103. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing Additional Sanctions against Haiti,” Weekly 
Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 23 ,13  June 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi- 
bin...D=56249622997+30+0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
104. Statement by Strobe Talbott, see Organization o f  American States, U.S. Department o f  State 
Dispatch  5, no. 24 (June 1994): 384-5.
105. Quoted in Elizabeth A. Palmer, “A Haitian Chronology," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 52, no. 36 (1994): 2579.
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departure from Haiti of the military leadership.”106 Thus, the UN approved military 
intervention in Haiti and cleared the way for Clinton’s leadership in the military mission.
At the beginning of August, Clinton countered opposition saying that he did not 
believe he was mandated to receive approval from Congress prior to intervention.107 On 
26 August, Clinton authorized the final version of the invasion plan that the military had 
been drafting for months.108 Thus, the momentum toward intervention had already begun 
some time before intervention was mentioned publicly.
As explained earlier, in his 14 September address to the nation, Clinton outlined 
several reasons for justifying military action. He said, the United States “must protect 
our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to 
secure our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the 
commitments others make to us.”109 Clinton explained in strong language that Cedras 
was responsible for atrocities and must step down, and he had already ordered military 
intervention.
Three days later he made another address in which he reiterated the U.S. reasons 
for going to Haiti: to restore democracy, reduce suffering, uphold commitments, “avert 
the flow o f thousands o f more refugees and to secure our borders.”110 While on the air, 
Clinton warned that “the Cedras regime’s time is up. Their time is up. The remaining
106. UN, “SC RES/940,” 31 July 1994.
107. See “ 140 Congressional Record,” at S10, Congressional Record, daily ed., 5 August 1994, 663.
108. See John C. Cushman, Jr., Steven Greenhouse, Douglas Jehl, and Elaine Sciolino, “On the Brink 
o f  War, A Tense Battle o f  W ills,” New York Times, 20 September 1994, A l ,  A13.
109. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti.”
110. William J. Clinton, “The President’s Radio Address,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential 
Documents. 30, no. 3 8 ,1 7  September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622  
997+20+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
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question is not whether they will leave but how they will leave. They can go peacefully
. . .  or they will be removed by force.”111 President Clinton sent a letter to congressional
leaders regarding the crisis in Haiti dated 18 September 1994, the necessity, objectives
and risks, the U.S. interests in the region, entry and exit-strategies, and projected costs (at
110levels of $500-600 million) o f military intervention. Both Congress and the American 
public remained ambivalent that a military intervention was necessary, but plans went 
forward.
As part o f the plan, Clinton sent former-President Carter to Haiti to negotiate with 
the Cedras regime on the eve o f the invasion. Richard Betts points out that compromise 
is most probable, when “both sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain from 
fighting” and that peace agreements more often occur prior to the breakout o f violence.113 
Clinton’s intervention worked well as the U.S. military backed Carter, and the U.S.-led 
multinational force launched Operation Restore Democracy from Pope Air Force Base in 
North Carolina, at 6:47 p.m. During negotiations, Cedras learned that 61 American 
planes were already in the air on the way to Haiti with more behind them. He reached 
agreement within hours o f their arrival in Haiti.
Carter’s agreement with Cedras was vague, but allowed U.S. entry into Haiti, and 
forced Cedras to step down by mid-October.114 In addition, it stipulated conditions for 
Aristide’s subsequent reinstatement, and granted general amnesty to Cedras. The
111. Ibid.
112. The text o f  the letter can be viewed in William J. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on 
Haiti,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 38 (1994): 1801-3 (http://frwebgate5. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+0+0+0&W AISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).
113. Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion o f  Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 21.
114. A text o f  the one page document can be viewed in “Text o f  Agreement Averting U.S. Invasion 
o f  Haiti,” New York Times, 20 September 1994, A 12.
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agreement seemed to have “caught the Clinton administration by surprise and forced a 
rethink of the invasion plans literally in mid-flight,”115 but military use o f force was 
averted and, even though the military junta would remain for a month, Aristide 
successfully returned on 15 October 1994. Haiti scholar and staunch intervention 
supporter, Robert Rotberg, argues that despite continued economic turmoil and political 
instability after the intervention, Haiti had become “much better and much more livable” 
than before.116
On 14 October 1994 Clinton signed an executive order to lift all economic 
sanctions against Haiti as soon as Aristide was returned to power and the crisis ended.117 
A demonstrable shift in policy from “assertive multilateralism” to a more moderate 
stance could be seen, as Clinton learned from experiences, such as the Harlan County 
incident and Somalia. PDD 25 demonstrated this shift in early August 1994, after the 
Somalia debacle, when there was a distancing from a policy o f assertive multilateralism. 
Clinton used economic sanctions against Haiti throughout the crisis,118 arguing that these 
steps “demonstrated my determination and that o f the international community to see that 
Haiti and the Haitian people resume their rightful place in our hemispheric community of 
democracies.”119 Despite many frustrations and setbacks, Clinton pursued restoring 
democracy in Haiti as a way to stabilize the region. Clinton intervened on 18 September
115. Morely and McGillion, “ ‘Disobedient’ Generals,” 381.
116. Robert Rotberg, “Clinton was Right,” Foreign P olicy  102 (1996): 140.
117. William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12932: Termination o f  Emergency with Respect to Haiti,” 
Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 30, no. 41, 14 October 1994 (http://Frwebgate5.access.gp
o.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622997+32+0+0& W AISsction=retrieve, accessed on 19 M arch2002).
118. For a detailed account o f  U.S. sanctions against Haiti from December 1990 through October 
1994, see William J. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti,” Weekly Compilation o f  
Presidential Documents 30, no. 41, 13 October 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID- 
56249622997+0+0+0&W AISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
119. William J. Clinton, “Message to the Congress on Haiti,” Weekly Compilation o f  Presidential 
Documents 30, no. 17 ,25  April 1994 (http://frwebgate5 .access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID =56249622997+
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1994 to restore democratically elected Aristide as president o f Haiti. Despite initial 
inclinations to soften the U.S. stance on Haiti, Clinton followed a cautious and reserved 
strategy that ultimately exhausted alternatives to military intervention.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five 
variables on decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the foreign policy of 
President Clinton. There are three overarching considerations in this case study. First, 
the United States was concerned about the numbers of refugees leaving Haiti. Second, 
the Clinton administration wanted to restore democracy in Haiti. Third, responsibility 
and leadership for the intervention ultimately fell to the United States.
The general debate on intervention in Haiti points out many sides of the issues. 
Critics argued that intervention was too costly and only marginally held to U.S. security 
interests. For example, the 1994 mission cost the United States over $1.5 billion and 
triggered a $1.2 billion multinational reconstruction commitment. Fareed Zakaria 
cautioned that by getting distracted in small hot spots in peripheral areas, conflicts, and 
crises, the United States could risk long-term strategic interests and that “America, like 
Britain before it, will lose the core.”121 Moreover, critics decried intervention in this 
small and overpopulated country, claiming that the goal of institutionalizing democracy 
in Haiti was unachievable. This was especially disconcerting for the short-run, but there
l+0+0&WAISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).
120. See Georges A. Fauriol, “Before the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources: The New Haitian End-Game,” Washington, D.C.: 
Center fo r  Strategic and International Studies, 12 April 2000, 2 (www.csis.org/hill/ts000816fauriol.html, 
accessed on 21 June 2001).
121. Fareed Zakaria, “The Core vs. the Periphery,” Commentary 96, no. 6 (1993): 26.
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were also concerns over potential costs of long-term involvement and unintended 
consequences, such as a backlash against the United States, due to resentment similar to 
what is found in post-colonial states.122 On this note, Richard Betts charged that the 
Clinton short-term strategy was problematic partly because of the initial limited character 
of the intervention that prolonged suffering brought on by embargoes.123 He also argued 
that the long-term strategy of intervention failed, because it was not impartial, leaving the 
internal political balance-of-power off-kilter in Haiti. This points to the question of what 
will become of Haiti in the future after the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) peacekeeping 
forces withdraw, and whether this expensive undertaking is in vain. Along this line, Eirin 
Mobekk writes that the intervention in Haiti did not succeed in reinstating the type of 
democracy envisioned by many Haitians.124 When speaking of long-term commitments, 
Peter Rodman argues that the liberal “new age” internationalism was overdone by the 
Clinton administration, producing an isolationist backlash in the United States, which 
discredits intervention per se, and which will be difficult to overcome in the future.125 
Michael Mandelbaum picks up where Rodman leaves off, warning that intervention for 
purely humanitarian purposes is too costly considering the return on investment in terms 
of promoting U.S. interests, or in terms of resolving more pressing issues that merit a 
higher priority, such as strengthening relations with important allies around the world. 
Moreover, he points out that “restoration” o f democracy in Haiti is a misnomer and is 
more accurately called creation of democracy in Haiti.126 Critics charged that
122. Zachary Karabell, “D on’t Do It,” Tikkim 9, no. 5 (1994): 12.
123. Betts, “The Delusion o f  Impartial Intervention,” 25.
124. Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement o f  Democracy in Haiti,” Democratization  8, no. 3 (2001): 173-88.
125. Peter Rodman, “Points o f  Order: Flaws in the N ew  Paradigm,” National Review  47, no. 8 
(1995): 36.
126. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” 20.
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intervention in Haiti to restore democracy was unrealistic, because the political history 
there was not democratic until the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and that 
government held out less than a year. In addition, they argued that intervention 
constituted a diversion o f U.S. assets and attention from more important issues.
Those favoring intervention in Haiti pointed to destabilization of U.S. security 
interests in the region due to drug trafficking, irritations due to disruption of trade, and 
especially an infusion o f poverty stricken refugees. The United States had waged war 
against drugs for at least two decades and by 1996, the Caribbean Basin had become a 
“key trafficking route and location for money laundering.”127 Allowing instability to 
continue unhampered would serve the lawless interests o f those in the lucrative drug 
trade. Thus, stopping the drug trade was a long established U.S. interest.
The potential for new waves o f refugees setting sail for the United States proved 
enough to pressure Clinton to reverse campaign promises (although, according to some, 
the refugee quagmire was largely a side effect o f the economic embargo).128 In addition, 
intervention proponents wanted to promote and export traditional American principles of 
democracy and human rights. W. Michael Reisman points out that those, who criticize 
intervention on the grounds o f humanitarian service, have “already dismissed human 
rights as a valid foreign policy concern.”129 Accordingly, this precedent should put to 
rest the question o f whether human rights violations generate security concerns meriting 
intervention. Moreover, if  action against Haiti was not warranted, then one could
127. Elliott Abrams, “The Shiprider Solution,” The N ational Interest, no. 43 (1996): 87.
128. There are many articles on this topic, see for example, J. F. O. McAllister, “Lives on Hold.”
129. W. Michael Reisman, “Haiti and the Validity o f  International Action,” American Journal o f  Law  
89, no. 1 (1995): 83.
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question why did the United States impose sanctions against Haiti in the first place. 
Besides, proponents argued that an ignored crisis ultimately costs more to fix than an 
early intervention.130
130. For an economic analysis o f  the reconstruction o f  Haiti after the 1994 intervention, see Anthony 
Bryan, “Haiti: Kick Starting the Economy,” Current H istory 94, no. 589 (1995): 65-71; and on institution 
building after intervention, see Colin Granderson, Sofia Clark D ’Escoto, and Christelle Loupforest, “The 
Haiti Challenge: Following the Restoration o f  Constitutional Order in October 1994,” OAS Newsletter 
(www.upd.oas.org/newsletter/thc.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN EAST TIMOR
This chapter focuses on the 1999 crisis in East Timor. It entails an examination of 
U.S. foreign policy during the crisis to reveal, why, how and when the Clinton 
administration chose not to intervene in this crisis. This chapter begins with a brief 
historical overview and then examines the five political variables that are outlined in 
Chapter III, and concludes with a summary of findings.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Historically, both Europe and the United States shaped developments in Southeast 
Asia. Until April 1974, Portugal colonized East Timor, when preparations were made for 
a transitional government away from colonial rule until democratic elections could be 
held in 1976. Decolonization deteriorated into civil war in the latter half o f 1975. 
President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta on 6 December 
1975, and established that “Indonesia was of strategic U.S. economic and military interest 
because o f its location near vital sea lanes used by U.S. military and commercial fleets.” 1 
The following day, Indonesia invaded East Timor, and despite reservations voiced in the 
UN, Indonesia began in mid-1976 to integrate East Timor into Indonesia.2 From 1976 
until 1981, the UN General Assembly passed annual resolutions reaffirming East Timor’s
1. Comments made by Cynthia McKinney, see United States House, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights o f  the Committee on International Relations, 
106 Cong., 1st sess., 30 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.
2. For more on Indonesia’s occupation o f  East Timor, see John Taylor, East Timor: The Price o f  
Freedom  (London: Zed Books, 1999); and James Dunn, Timor: A People B etrayed  (Sydney, Australia: 
ABC Books, 1996).
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right to self-determination. Despite these resolutions, U.S. policy on East Timor was 
couched in anti-Communist rhetoric, highlighting broader policy goals and sublimating 
human rights.
Throughout the next fifteen years, Indonesia’s suppression of the opposition 
generated hundreds o f thousands of internally displaced persons. Until 1999, the United 
States supported and trained Indonesian military officers and special forces, despite its 
occupation o f East Timor. Over time, only Portugal maintained interest in developments 
in East Timor and kept the issue alive.
The Crisis
Despite human rights violations, the crisis in East Timor received little 
international attention until Indonesian forces open-fired on a pro-independence 
demonstration in Dili in November 1991. This date marks the beginning of the crisis in 
East Timor. Journalists at the demonstration brought international attention to the 
situation, and UN redoubled its efforts to resolve the persistent issue of self- 
determination for East Timor. After learning of the Indonesian military’s continued 
human rights violations in East Timor, the U.S. Congress cut military aid to Indonesia in 
1992, but the Department o f Defense rerouted aid through a different program.
Indonesia resisted the involvement of East Timorese political leaders in 
international politics. East Timor resistance leader Jose Alexandre Xanana Gusmao
3. For an overview o f  U.S. policy from Nixon to Carter, see Robert J. McMahon, The Limits o f  
Empire: The U.S. and Southeast Asia since World War II { 1999); and Daniel Southerland, “U.S. Role in 
Plight o f  Timor: An Issue That Won’t Go Away,” The Christian Science M onitor, 6 March 1980, 7.
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remained imprisoned for seven years after his capture in 1992.4 Gusmao, who would 
become president o f East Timor after independence, had a significant following. He 
advocated a transitional period for East Timor, followed by referendum to decide how the 
East Timorese wished to be governed. He also influenced pro-independence resistance in 
East Timor to absorb tremendous amounts o f violence before retaliation, bringing favor 
from international community on the resistance.
Michael Gordon Jackson argues that the international community’s response to 
the crisis in East Timor was a “new phenomenon,” because “many states, backed by 
military muscle, are increasingly not willing to allow genocide to occur without 
challenge.”5 The Security Council wanted to maintain stability in Indonesia, yet was 
forced to face events in East Timor, as had not been the case previously.
By the mid-1990s, the resistance movement in East Timor had grown due to 
increasing disillusionment with Indonesian rule. The formation of the National Council 
of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in April 1998 strengthened and unified the resistance 
movement, and clashes with Indonesian security forces grew in frequency and intensity 
during 1998.
The fall o f President Suharto6 in May 1998 left Indonesia at the doorstep of 
democracy and offered a window opportunity for East Timor’s independence, as Portugal 
again raised the issue in the UN. The new president o f Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, proposed
4. For a personal account o f  East Timor’s history, see Sarah Niner, ed., To Resist is to Win: The 
Autobiography o f  Xanana Gusmao (Victoria, Australia: Aurora Books, 2000).
5. Michael Gordon Jackson, “Something must be done? Genocidal Chaos and World Responses to 
Mass Murder in East Timor between 1975 and 1999,” International Journal o f  Politics and Ethics 1, no. 1 
(2001): 58 (web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A82651431&dyn=60!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva.odu, accessed 
on 15 March 2002), 45.
6. This name is spelled in three different ways: Suharto, Sueharto, and S ’Harto. President Suharto, 
like many Indonesians, only had one name. For more, see O. G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President 
Soeharto o f  Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Djakarta, Indonesia: Gunnung Agung Ltd., 1970).
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autonomy for East Timor, in which Indonesia would retain power over foreign affairs, 
external defense and some aspects of monetary and fiscal policy. In the UN, Portugal 
and Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to discuss preparations for autonomy of East Timor. 
Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to involve East Timor’s resistance leaders in political 
negotiations. In November 1998, however, after the East Timor resistance killed 
Indonesian soldiers and captured arms in Alas, Indonesian forces retaliated. As a result, 
there were increased numbers of displaced persons in East Timor, as Indonesians and 
East Timorese fled, and by the end of 1998, a weary Indonesia was ready to “let Timor 
go.”8
Australia supported Indonesian mle in East Timor since the 1970s, but in 
December 1998 surprised Habibie by pressuring him to seek more active negotiations 
with East Timorese leaders. This shift in Australian policy possibly “tipped the balance” 
in convincing Habibie to negotiate over East Timor.9 Thus, Indonesia’s goal for special 
autonomy for East Timor shifted during late 1998 and early 1999, when Habibie 
announced that if  East Timor rejected its offer of autonomy, then the 1976 law 
integrating East Timor into Indonesia might be revoked.
Regardless o f this shift in policy, Indonesia quickly began a paramilitary 
campaign against East Timor’s pro-independence leaders and supporters. Gross 
violations of human rights increased as independence activists and supporters were taken 
captive, tortured, and sometimes killed. It was not uncommon in pro-independence
7. See Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and  
International Intervention  (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001), 19.
8. David Lamb, “Indonesia Tries to Pull ‘Thom’ o f  Timor Asia: The Annexed Ex-Portuguese Colony 
is Offered Autonomy— or Independence,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1999, A 12.
9. Paul Daley, “Protecting Timor Riches a Priority,” The Age, 29 January 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.eom/c 
croot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).
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communities to find rape and mistreatment o f women, “who in some cases were 
subjected to continuing sexual slavery.”10 As a result, many homes were destroyed and 
many citizens displaced. The worst of the killings occurred on 6 April 1999 at a church 
in Lequifa, where around 2000 people had taken refuge. The Besi Merah Putih (BMP) 
militia along with the Indonesian military attacked a church, and killing at least 30 
people. On 17 April, the BMP and the Aitarak militia began attacking pro-independence 
leaders.
The international community largely placed responsibility for calming the 
violence and restoring peace on Indonesia, because Indonesian military indicated that if  
the UN were to intervene with force, then it would be considered in Jakarta as an act of 
war. Thus, before sending any kind of force into East Timor, an agreement had to be 
reached regarding Indonesian sovereignty. Such an agreement was reached in New York 
on 5 May 1999 between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, giving special autonomy to East 
Timor, and allowing an August referendum on independence.
In preparation for the referendum, the Security Council approved the UN Mission 
in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. This date marks the beginning of the second 
phase of the crisis in East Timor. To a large extent, violence eased once a UN presence 
was established, however, there were areas where militia violence impeded UN 
operations, as evidenced by militia found with stolen UN humanitarian delivery and 
transport vehicles. The referendum was postponed due to violence, but independence 
voters won the majority in the August 30 referendum. The Indonesian supported militia 
immediately began a punitive campaign. Mass mayhem ended the lives of many in East
10. Martin, Self-Determination, 45.
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Timor, uprooted many others and threatened the presence o f UN representatives. As the 
situation escalated, UNAMET was besieged and fired upon, and several UNAMET 
personnel were killed, leading to partial withdrawal o f UNAMET from East Timor. The 
international community remained largely inactive however, and called on Indonesia to 
fulfill its agreement to quell the violence.
The violence targeted pro-independence East Timorese, but reached into the 
religious division, since Indonesia is mainly Muslim and East Timor Christian. Churches 
were defaced and some clergy murdered. Church artifacts dating to the 1600s were 
destroyed or defaced.11 Paramilitary attacks on the church increasingly fell into disfavor 
at the UN. Nobel laureate Bishop Belo, whose parish and home were completely 
destroyed and many parishioners killed, went to Rome, after which the Pope denounced 
the violence in East Timor. The papal support o f the independence option helped 
increase international pressure on Habibie, and the UN to find closure to the crisis. Of a 
pre-referendum population of roughly 850,000, about 300,000 East Timorese were 
displaced and an additional 200,000 or more people were forcibly moved across the to 
other parts o f Indonesia.12
The violence caused dislocation and refugees, which resulted in a humanitarian 
crisis. Indonesian forces intimidated refugees and kept them from reaching UN officials 
and relief agencies. The crisis came to a head on 12 September and Indonesian leaders 
gave in to international diplomatic and economic pressure and invited a UN military 
force into East Timor. The UN quickly authorized the Australian-led the International
11. For more details, see Arnold Kohen, “Going Home with Bishop Belo: Eyewitness,” The Tablet,
23 October 1999.
12. Human Rights Watch, Indonesia/East Timor: Forced Expulsions to West Timor and The Refugee 
Crisis, vol. 11, no. 7 (N ew  York: Human Rights Watch, December 1999), 2.
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Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with a Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East 
Timor on 15 September, which marks the beginning of the third phase of the crisis in 
East Timor. Even though order was swiftly restored, there were nearly 230,000 refugees 
moving to West Timor by the end of September.
On 28 September 1999 a new tripartite agreement was reached between the UN, 
Portugal and Indonesia. The agreement acknowledged that Indonesia remained 
responsible for maintaining order until East Timor could become independent, however, 
the UN filled the vacuum of power in East Timor during the transition. On 19 October, 
among claims that the referendum had been rigged, Indonesia invalidated the integration 
o f East Timor and cleared the way for its independence.
With order restored, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) began on 25 October 1999 peacekeeping and humanitarian mission to 
institutionalize democracy, and marks the fourth phase o f the crisis. To a large extent, 
the violence had destroyed the infrastructure in East Timor, and around 70 percent o f the 
homes were destroyed. As a result o f the widespread destruction in East Timor, recovery 
and democratic transition was challenging. As time passed, the UN increased the 
numbers o f civil police due to intense poverty and increased crime. Claims arose that at 
the expense o f member nations the UN was institutionalizing itself to rule East Timor.13 
In addition, the UN bureaucracy in East Timor failed to embrace East Timorese in the
13. See for example, Jarat Chopra, “The U N ’s Kingdom o f  East Timor,” Survival 42, no. 3 (autumn 
2000): 27-40; and Astri Suhrke, “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas o f  the UN in East Timor,” 
International Peacekeeping  8, no. 4 (2001): 3.
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transitional governing process. Because o f prolonged UN governance without East 
Timorese participation, leaders in East Timor had virtually disappeared.14
U.S. ALLIES
The countries that played a main role in the crisis in East Timor were Indonesia, 
Portugal, and Australia. Indonesia was a critical component of the crisis as is addressed 
throughout this chapter. Portugal was a very important player in the developing crisis, 
because it initially supported the move toward autonomy in the UN, keeping international 
pressure on Indonesia. Australia however, proved to be the key element that influenced 
Indonesia’s decision to hold the referendum. Moreover, it remained a pivotal player 
throughout the crisis and afterwards, as it led the UN mission to establish order in the 
newly independent East Timor.
Portugal
As discussed above, Portugal colonized East Timor until 1975, when the UN 
pressured for decolonization, which intended to lead to democratic self-rule in East 
Timor. Portugal remained the legal administrator of the tiny half-island, and was not 
pleased when Indonesia took possession of East Timor. As a result, relations between 
Portugal and Indonesia were troubled and a dispute transpired in the UN over many 
years. Even though the UN condemned Indonesia’s occupation o f East Timor, it did 
nothing. It seemed unfair that Indonesia remained, but Portugal could not.
Consequently, Portugal pursued the issue through UN legal channels.
14. For assessments o f  the challenges facing East Timor, see Hal Hill and Joano M Saldanha, ed., 
East Timor: Developm ent Challenges fo r  the World's Newest Nation  (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).
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Once Habibie succeeded Suharto as president o f Indonesia, Portugal redoubled 
the pressure on the UN for talks on self-determination for East Timor. Finally Habibie 
agreed to discuss preparations for the autonomy of East Timor and entered into talks with 
Portugal under UN auspices in 1983. By 1986, Indonesia promised to allow East Timor 
to participate in the 1987 elections, and extended the right to vote to the East Timorese. 
With this compromise, Portugal eased pressure.
After the 1991 Indonesian killing of demonstrators in Dili, however, it became 
clear that Indonesia had not institutionalized reforms. The violence brought human rights 
to the fore o f international concerns over East Timor. Portugal again defended the tiny 
fledgling state, especially since “many Portuguese regret dumping East Timor and feel 
some guilt for the deaths of many thousands o f Timorese during the campaign that 
Indonesia has carried out against opponents o f its occupation.”15 Once again, Portugal 
went to the UN with complaints against Indonesia.
Indonesia offered a type of autonomy to East Timor, in which Indonesia would 
retain control of East Timor in a similar manner as before. This time, however, Portugal 
insisted that autonomy could only be acceptable as a transitional state o f affairs until a 
form of self-governance could be reached. By renewing discussion in the UN, Portugal 
initiated and shaped international involvement to resolve the democratic crisis in East 
Timor. The UN continued to support self-determination for East Timor, as it had since 
the 1970s, however this time mandated a mission to hold a referendum on the matter.
The referendum determined that East Timor overwhelmingly voted for independence 
from Indonesia, but was followed by days o f heavy punitive violence against East
15. “Lost Leader: East Timor,” The Economist 325, no. 7 7 8 7 ,2 8  November 1992, 38.
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Timorese. In mid-September, Portugal turned to the international media to remind the 
United States of its own participation in peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and in return, 
expected U.S. participation in East Timor.
Indonesia
Once violence broke out in East Timor in 1991, the UN became increasingly 
concerned with human rights and security in the region. The Indonesian position on a 
UN peacekeeping force in East Timor however, was tentative at best, and insisted on the 
need for an agreement that would ensure its sovereignty. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia 
signed an agreement, and appended the Indonesian Constitution, giving special autonomy 
to East Timor. The same day, however, the Indonesian Deputy Chief o f Staff of the 
Indonesian Army sent orders for preparations to “prevent the outbreak o f civil war,” 
including “repressive/coercive actions as well as plans for moving back evacuation of 
[East Timorese].”16 A referendum date was set for Sunday, 8 August 1999 and the UN 
was invited to establish a mission in East Timor.
Despite the invitation, Indonesia did not want the referendum to take place. As a 
result, the Indonesian military in East Timor used violence to delay the referendum, 
which was rescheduled for 30 August. The UNTAET began to register East Timorese for 
the upcoming referendum despite unsafe conditions, and intimidation from local militia 
bands did not stop the referendum, which had a remarkable turnout o f 98.5 percent. 
Theresults tilted heavily in favor o f independence (78.5 percent) at 344,580 votes and
16. Document reproduced in Human Rights Watch, Appendix to Indonesia/East Timor, 18.
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94,388 against.17 Indonesia accused the UN of bias and fraud and rejected the 
referendum results. In addition, the Governor o f East Timor attempted to partition East 
Timor into a western, pro-integration state and an eastern pro-independence state. These 
tactics only irritated the international community.18 As a result, elements of the 
Indonesian militia unleashed a furor of violence immediately after the referendum that 
called international attention to severe human rights abuses and atrocities.19
By 9 September 1999, it was clear that Indonesia was either unable or unwilling 
to live up to its 5 May agreement to provide security in East Timor or to invite the UN to 
do so.20 Moreover, it had become increasingly clear that Indonesia had role in the 
violence against citizens in East Timor. In an attempt to disguise Indonesia’s 
involvement in the militia violence, Habibie declared martial law in East Timor on 7 
September. Resistance leader, Gusmao was released on the same day, projecting the 
appearance that Jakarta had come to its senses. Under the pretense o f restoring order, 
Habibie temporarily relieved external pressure to stop the violence, but in fact the militia 
continued to slash and bum.
17. United States House, “Resolution 292,” Markup before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 
o f  the Committee on International Relations House o f  Representatives, 106th Cong., lstse ss ., 15 
September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 2.
18. See the Statement o f  Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f  State, in United States Congress, “The Political Futures o f  Indonesia and East Timor,” Joint 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific o f  the com mittee on International Relations 
House o f  Representatives, and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs o f  the Committee on 
Foreign Relations U nited States Senate, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 9 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2000), 9.
19. For a report on the involvement o f the Indonesian military in the atrocities, expulsions and 
refugee crisis, see Human Rights Watch, Indonesia/East Timor, and Allan Naim , “U.S. Support for the 
Indonesian Military: Congressional Testimony,” in Bitter Flowers, Sw eet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, 
and the W orld Community, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 163-73.
20. See the Statement o f  Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f  State, in United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1999, 9.
21. See Keith B. Richburg, “Mayhem Continues in East Timor: Martial Law, N ew  Indonesian Troops 
Fail to Halt Militia Rampage,” The Washington Post, 8 September 1999, A l.
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Indonesia claimed that it was doing everything it could to stem the violence, 
despite evidence to the contrary. Indonesia’s deception did not last however, and two 
days later, the United States suspended military relations with Indonesia. Amidst 
mounting pressure from the international community, Indonesian president Habibie 
announced on 12 September that he would allow a UN multinational presence in East 
Timor. In the following days, there was concern that Indonesia was stalling, while it 
forcibly relocated East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia. Thus, despite supportive 
rhetoric from Indonesia, evidence in September indicated that Indonesian militia 
remained in East Timor and continued looting, burning, intimidating and killing.
Benedict Anderson explains the crisis in East Timor as a function of a culture, in 
which military prominence absolves leaders from all moral or ethical responsibility. He 
writes that a “culture has developed in the military according to which, in ‘security’ 
matters, every element of human decency can be set aside, with complete impunity— 
provided ‘the boss’ gives them the orders.”22 This culture grew over time until 
Indonesians have little sense of shame, a necessary ingredient for a responsible nation to 
function. Moreover, he argues, that compared to some leaders in Indonesia’s past, 
Habibie was not so bad, considering that he allowed a referendum to take place, set free 
resistance political prisoners, and ultimately invited the UN into East Timor to end the 
violence. The lack o f security in East Timor made outside efforts to reduce suffering 
difficult in many isolated areas. This was especially true in the western region of East 
Timor, as militia from West Timor engaged in cross border violence.
22. Benedict Anderson, “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future,” The New Left Review, no. 
235 (1999): 3.
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Australia
Australia valued relations with Indonesia, its largest neighbor, but Australia’s 
position on Indonesia’s suppression in East Timor shifted in August 1998 for four 
reasons.24 First, the Australian government ran a survey and found that nearly all East 
Tiomorese wanted a voice in negotiations on autonomy and independence. Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard sent a letter dated 19 December 1998 to President Habibie, 
suggesting that Indonesia implement a “built-in review mechanism” into the autonomy 
process to delay actual autonomy or independence.25 He recommended that Indonesia 
enter into negotiations with East Timorese leaders to distract the international community 
into thinking it was making reasonable progress on the East Timor issue. Despite 
continued Australian insistence on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, this shift 
generated tension, even bitterness between the neighbors. Even so, Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard remained “reluctant to commit Australia to a peacekeeping role in 
East Timor.”26
Second, Australia and New Zealand presented the only European presence in the 
region. As a result, Indonesia insisted that the Asian component be increased in 
negotiations and participation in UN missions. This instance threatened Australia’s 
influence in the region. Third, in its struggle to retain East Timor, Indonesia was losing a 
key long-term symbolic ally within the European camp. This loss occurred, because of
23. For a thorough examination o f  Australia’s foreign policy concerns regarding Indonesia and East 
Timor, see Henry S. Albinski, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999,” Australian 
Journal o f  Politics and History 46, no. 2 (2000): 194-214.
24. The Australians were themselves very divided on the Indonesia-East Timor debate. See for 
example, Paul Monk, “East Timor: Truth and Consequences,” Quadrant (January/February 2000): 33-40.
25. Laurie Brereton, “Media Release: Howard’s Letter to Habibie,” 22 September 1999 (http://search. 
aph.gov.au/search/parllnf...Item=0&ResultsID=29NP9&action-view&WCU, accessed on 15 March 2002).
26. Paul Daley, “Howard Unwilling on Peace Force for Timor,” The Age, 30 January 1999 
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).
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the West’s turn to policy fostering the protection of human rights, rather than turning a 
blind eye, as had been the case for so many years. As part o f the West, Australia found 
that human rights abuses in East Timor could no longer be easily ignored. Delicate 
relations between Australia and Indonesia had the potential to derail progress toward 
resolving the violence in East Timor. To keep this from happening, the United States and 
Australia asked Jaheed Marker, the UN Representative to East Timor, not to endanger the 
April 1999 agreements by pressing Jakarta about security concerns.27 These efforts to 
reach an agreement on holding a referendum came to fruition in early May 1999. Once 
UNAMET was established on 11 June, Australia committed funds, vehicles and troops 
for the mission, and became increasingly intertwined in resolving the crisis as the 
referendum approached in late August.
Fourth, Australian public opinion increasingly pressed its government to stop the 
violence. Australia experienced internal pressure to intervene, because it had a large 
number o f East Timorese citizens and refugees, and the Australian people were highly 
sensitized to their neighbor’s plight. Popular approval o f intervention by Australia
A O
reached well over 70 percent. Consequently, many Australians took to the streets in 
demonstrations that pressured the government o f Australia to work harder to resolve the 
crisis. As a result, Australia lobbied the UN, the United States, and other countries to 
intervene to restore order, and when violence erupted after the referendum, Australia was 
ready to use force.
Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, phoned Clinton in early September to
27. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Ambassador Jamsheed Marker o f  Pakistan in 1997 
as his Personal Representative for East Timor.
28. See Albinski, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy,” 196.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
186
appeal personally for U.S. support. Australia also had a strong lobby in Congress, and 
applied pressure to step up U.S. participation. Moreover, Australian Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer used the media pressure Clinton in a television interview to remind 
the United States o f its support during the Gulf War.
Australia insisted on leading INTERFET even though it was concerned over 
strained relations with Indonesia, which voiced reservations. Australia demanded a 
robust mandate to fulfill the mission, and on 15 September 1999, the UN Security 
Council approved Resolution 1264, mandating Australia to lead a Chapter VII peace- 
enforcing mission into East Timor. Australia committed half o f the 8,000 initial troops 
for the UN mission and quickly brought calm. Thus, INTERFET stopped civil war, cross 
border fighting, and widespread militia violence in East Timor. INTERFET transitioned 
to UNTAET to begin institutionalizing democracy in East Timor.
Australia was concerned with oil mining rights in the Timor Gap, and surprised 
the international community in October 2000, saying it “was not giving up its claim to 
half o f East Timor’s oil and gas reserves,” and would continue to honor a 1989 treaty
Art
with Indonesia. Since international lines are drawn in the middle o f the waterway and 
the field is mainly on the East Timor side, UN law o f the sea indicated that the main oil 
field lies in East Timor’s economic zone. The final agreement gave East Timor 85 
percent o f the oil and gas royalties, with Australia receiving the remaining 15 percent.31
29. UN, “Security Council Resolution 1264,” 15 September 1999 (hereafter cited as UN, “SC/RES”) 
(www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/scl264.htm , accessed on 15 March 2002).
30. “Petro Trouble,” Business Week 3 7 0 6 ,6  November 2000, 68E2 (http://web4.infotrac.galegroup. 
com/itw/i..._A66532779&dyn=70!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva_odu, accessed on 15 March 2002).
31. My appreciation goes to Don Greenlees for his comments on the economy o f  East Timor, 
communication with the author, 14 April 2002.
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Ironically, the oil must be shipped to the northern Australian port o f Darwin to be refined, 
stored and distributed. East Timor stands to begin receiving money in 2005.
THE UNITED NATIONS
Since the end o f the cold war, we have seen an increased number o f small 
conflicts, and have consequently threatened regional security and become an international 
concern. As a result, the UN has experienced increased demands for peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcing missions. Moreen Dee proposes that there has been an “emergence of a 
possible new paradigm in the mechanisms of collective security which has seen the 
delegation of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations to regional organizations and 
defense alliances.” The UN Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East Timor fell to 
Australia, a dominant regional power.
The United Nations peacekeeping efforts during the crisis can be separated into 
four phases. The first phase begins with the November 1991 massacres in Dili and is 
mostly inactive, other than disapproving of the human rights violations. Phase Two starts 
with UNAMET in June 1999 and entails assistance in preparations for the referendum in 
East Timor. Phase three begins in September 1999 with INTERFET, the UN Chapter VII 
mandate for an Australian-led intervention. Phase four begins with UNTAET in late 
February 2000 for disarming, repatriation, rebuilding and transition to self-govemance. 
UN responsibilities under UNTAET included all legislative and executive authority, as
32. Peter O’Connor, “East Timor and Australia negotiating Maritime Boundary, Oil Revenues,” 
Associated Press Newswires, 17 June 2002 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 22 
June 2002).
33. Moreen Dee, ‘“Coalitions o f  the W illing’ and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s 
Involvement with INTERFET,” International Peacekeeping  8, no. 3 (2001): 2.
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well as administration, electoral, repatriation and rehabilitation tasks for up to three years. 
East Timor’s independence from Portugal might not have happened at all, had the UN not 
insisted in 1960 that Portuguese territories were self-governing according to Chapter VI 
provisions. The UN had pressured Portugal to make provisions for independence of East 
Timor, and this explains Portugal’s later insistence on East Timor’s independence from 
Indonesian rule. After Indonesia took possession o f East Timor in 1975, the UN Security 
Council passed resolutions 384 on 22 December 1975, and 389 on 22 April 1976. The 
resolutions called on Indonesia “to withdraw without delay all its forces from the 
territory, and on all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the 
people’s right to self-determination.”34
Phase One
The UN approach to East Timor remained disapproving yet inactive for many 
years, until the killings o f demonstrators in Dili in November 1991, after which the 
Committee on Human Rights became involved. It took several more years for an 
agreement to be reached with Indonesia in 1994, so that UN human rights and 
humanitarian organizations could gain access to East Timor. The UN brought together 
East Timorese leaders in 1995 to form the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
(AIETD) to preserve and promote the cultural identity o f East Timor. After Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan took office in January 1997, the UN began to increase efforts to 
resolve the East Timor question of self-determination.
When Indonesian militia unleashed attacks against the pro-independence 
resistance in East Timor in April 1999, the UN seriously considered alternatives for
34. Martin, Self-Determination, 17-18.
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resolving the crisis. The UN sent an assessment team to East Timor in late April 1999, 
which found deficiencies in the delivery of basic services, health and education. After 
the UN finished assessments, the Secretary-General made recommendations on 22 May 
to the Security Council for a new resolution, which was delayed to wait for U.S. 
Congressional approval until June.
In the meantime, Indonesia agreed to give special autonomy to East Timor, and 
invite the UN to oversee the referendum set for early August. In addition, Indonesia 
agreed to provide for the safety o f unarmed UN representatives. Two days later, UN 
Security Resolution 1236 welcomed the 5 May agreement between the UN, Portugal and 
Indonesia, and announced the UN’s intention to establish a UN presence in East Timor 
“as soon as practicable.”36 The resolution promised to assess the security situation in 
East Timor, and to decide on a mission in East Timor. The speed with which UNAMET 
was set up was unprecedented. The largest contributions were from Australia, Portugal, 
Japan and the United States, with substantial contributions from the European Union.37
Phase Two
UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June 1999, UNAMET. The 
resolution condemned the violence in East Timor and stressed “the responsibility o f the 
Government o f Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor.”38 The
35. For more, see Geoffrey C. Gunn, The New World Hegemony in the M alay W orld (Lawrenceville, 
NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2000), 275; and Martin, Self-Determination, 3 7 -8 .
36. UN, “SC/RES 1236,” 7 May 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99scl236.htm , accessed on 15 
March 2002).
37. Around $50 million o f  the $80 million cost o f  UNAMET was met through voluntary 
contributions.
38. See UN, “SC/RES 1246,” 11 June 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/99scl246.htm , 
accessed on 15 March 2002).
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resolution authorized 280 civilian police “to act as advisors to the Indonesian Police . . . ,  
to supervise the escort o f the ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.”
The resolution also authorized the deployment of 50 military liaison officers who 
maintained contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Despite these measures, security 
for UN officials in East Timor was a major obstacle in preparing for the August 
referendum. In addition, UNAMET faced hostile local media reports that “extended to 
deliberate fabrication.”40 As a result, UNAMET officials became targets of militia 
violence themselves. In at least one case on 29 June the stoning o f the regional office in 
Maliana, Bobonaro resulted in injuries to locals and the UNAMET official. On 4 July, a 
humanitarian convoy was attacked. The led to the evacuation o f the UNAMET staff 
from Liqui?a. During the evacuation, militia attacked UNAMET’s helicopter and 
vehicles. Both o f these incidents were captured by international news for the world.
Although Indonesia officially supported UN presence, its militia targeted 
UNAMET officials with violence and threats. Moreover, Indonesia insisted that 
UNAMET remain unarmed, making it very vulnerable. Indonesia also insisted that the 
referendum should take place before the end of August, but used covert activities to make 
such progress difficult. This strategy paid off at least in the short term, because the 
Secretary General postponed voter registration until 16 July, to give Indonesia time to 
bring the security under control41 Four days later, the UN Secretary-General 
recommended that despite violence and threats, the registration for the referendum vote
39. Ibid.
40. Martin, Self-Determination, 47.
41. UN, “Letter dated 10 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f  the 
Security Council,” S/1999/773, 10 July 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/sl999773.htm, accessed 
on 15 March 2002).
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should proceed, because Indonesian authorities had assured him that they were taking 
steps to improve security.42 Besides, registration had to begin on 16 July for the 
referendum to take place by the August deadline. Registration lasted from 16 July to 4 
August 1999 with 451,792 East Timorese registered. UNAMET was hailed as an 
overwhelming success. The campaign prior to the referendum began 14 August and 
lasted until 27 August, allowing for a two-day cooling off period before the referendum.
UN Security Council Resolution 1257 postponed the referendum until 30 August 
1999 and extended the mandate for UNAMET.43 In late August, Resolution 1262 
extended UNAMET until 30 November 1999, but increased the number o f civilian police 
in East Timor to 460, and upped the military liaison component to 300 personnel. The 
resolution aimed “to build confidence and support stability” during the post-referendum 
period.44
The day after the referendum, severe violence broke out, as militia units 
implemented a “scorched earth” policy across East Timor. Hundreds o f militia attacked 
and burned houses of pro-independence supporters. Journalists were attacked, and locals 
fled. On 2 September, militia surrounded UNAMET’s office in Maliana and killed two 
local staff members. As a result, UNAMET pulled international and local staff to Dili the 
following day. Immediately, BBC pulled out all o f its news correspondents, and took 
other journalists with them. The departure of the international press was cause for militia 
celebration, but not for UNAMET representatives left Dili.
42. UN, “Letter dated 14 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f  the 
Security Council,” S/1999/788, 14 July 1999 (www.un.org/TDocs/sc/letters/1999/sl999786.htm, accessed 
on 15 March 2002).
43. UN, “SC/RES 1257,” 3 August 1999 (vm w.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/99scl257.htm, accessed 
on 15 March 2002).
44. UN, “SC/RES 1262,” 27 August 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/scl262.htm , accessed on 
15 March 2002).
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The UN announced the referendum results on the morning o f 4 September. 
Immediately after the announcement, the militia renewed a punitive campaign against 
pro-independence East Timorese. In light o f the increased violence, UNAMET 
considered pulling out completely, but feared that a complete withdrawal might 
strengthen Indonesia’s resolve to keep East Timor, rather than honor the referendum. As 
a result, on 10 September, all but 80 UN volunteers evacuated from Dili to Australia. 
When UN volunteers again came under militia fire, international and domestic pressures 
squeezed Habibie. With the UNAMET volunteers in ever more danger, UN headquarters 
threatened Habibie with economic consequences, such as holding IMF and the World 
Bank funds, which were critical to Indonesia’s economic recovery.45 This pressure from 
the international community had the potential to bring domestic consequences and the 
political and economic isolation o f Indonesia began to take shape.
Domestically, Habibie was dependent on General Wiranto and the Indonesian 
military for power. Rumors of a potential coup swept through Jakarta, and Habibie, a 
lame duck leader, was increasingly vulnerable to forces in his government that could oust 
h im 46 In a conversation with UN Secretary-General, for example, Habibie agreed to 
allow in multinational forces, but when it came to negotiations that included the presence 
of his military general, Wiranto, he was uncommitted. Moreover, Habibie refused to 
invite a UN mission into East Timor to restore order until Wiranto had first visited Dili 
personally to assess the situation. Outsiders understood Habibie’s indecision as weakness 
and vulnerability relative to Wiranto, whose power was increasing. Moreover, even
45. The World Bank set a precedent, because it entered into politics by warning Indonesia that further 
violations o f  human rights in East Timor would result in halted funding.
46. See Seth Mydans, “Indonesia says N o to Timor Peacekeepers,” N ew York Times, 9 September 
1999, A8.
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though the militia in East Timor was shown to have ties to Jakarta, it is unclear whether it 
was Habibie, or Wiranto, who was controlling the troops. Wiranto visited Dili on 11 
September, where “members of the [UN] mission were convinced that he had been 
personally shocked by his visit.”47 Afterwards, Wiranto agreed to invite an international 
force into East Timor, which Habibie announced the very next day.
Remaining UNAMET volunteers in Dili were in precarious danger, despite 
Habibie’s announcement, and two days later, all but twelve UN volunteers were 
evacuated to Australia because o f continuing militia attacks48 The UNAMET 
headquarters was closed and those remaining were removed to the former Australian 
Consulate for safety. The UN remained reluctant to withdraw UNAMET completely 
from East Timor, because such action could signal the militia to continue violence with 
impunity.
Phase Three
The day after the evacuation, UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 
INTERFET to send a multinational force to restore peace and security, to protect and 
support UNAMET, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and authorize the participating 
States in the multinational force “to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate.”49 
Thus, Resolution 1264 authorized a Chapter VII mandate for the International Force in 
East Timor to restore order. Countries that participated in INTERFET included 
Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New
47. M artin,Self-Determination, 111.
48. Keith B. Richburg, “UN Staff flees East Timor: Local People sheltered in Compound taken along 
on Flights to Australia,” The Washington Post, 15 September 1999, A18.
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Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the United 
States. In addition, Brazil and China offered to send civilian police. The resolution also 
requested plans for a UN transitional administration in East Timor, and stressed the 
importance of encouraging and ensuring the safe return o f refugees to their homes in East 
Timor, as well as “full, safe, and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations.”50
Australian Commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove flew to Dili on 19 
September to meet with the Indonesian military and work out details of Indonesia’s 
withdrawal from East Timor. On the same day, Jakarta renounced the integration of East 
Timor into Indonesia, and announced Indonesia would cooperate with INTERFET 
operations. Jakarta added claims that the referendum had been rigged and requested an 
investigation, but the UN quickly dismissed such accusations. The following day, 
INTERFET forces arrived in East Timor, and according to Cosgrove, “met absolutely no 
resistance.”51
The success of the INTERFET mission in East Timor was largely due to the dual 
nature of mission implementation. First, initial success depended on depriving the 
adversary o f chances gained from using force by creating the perception that the 
Indonesian military and militia were out-manned and out-equipped. INTERFET 
carefully downplayed the connection between the Indonesian military and the militia by 
working through the military leadership. Second, INTERFET success was due to 
consistent and co-operative communication with the Indonesian military, so that they
49. UN, “SC/RES 1264,” 15 September 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/scl264.htm, accessed 
on 15 March 2002).
50. Ibid.
51. Quoted in Doug Struck, “In East Timor, Smiles Greet Peacekeepers: Armed Patrols Meet no 
Resistance,” The Washington Post, 21 September 1999, A13.
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were “given the space to retire gracefully from East Timor.”52 This required careful 
communication between INTERFET and the Indonesian military to prevent 
misunderstandings.
Phase Four
Within a month o f the Australian led intervention, the UN began the transition of 
East Timor to self-governance. On 4 October, the Secretary-General published a report 
with recommendations for the fourth phase of UN activity in East Timor, which began 
with Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. The resolution established the UNTAET.53 
With the last remaining Indonesian representatives departing East Timor on 30 October, 
the daunting task of UNTAET was to maintain order and institutionalize democracy in 
East Timor. It was estimated that the transition could take up to 3 years. In the 
meantime, UNTAET was “endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of 
East Timor” and “empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, 
including the administration of justice.”54 UNTAET could deploy 8,950 military 
personnel, 200 military observers, and 1640 civilian police in November, and formally 
replaced INTERFET on 23 February 2000.
The task before UNTAET was daunting because virtually all infrastructure and 
services had been interrupted or destroyed by the militia, and displacement and forced 
relocation had made conditions ripe for a humanitarian disaster. While East Timor was
52. David Dickens, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational 
Level,” Contemporary Southeast Asia  23, no. 2 (2001): 214.
53. UN, “SC/RES 1272,” 25 October 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99scl272.htm, accessed on 
15 March 2002).
54. Ibid.
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poor before the referendum, afterwards it was poorer still. Crime in East Timor grew to 
be a large problem complicated by the lack of a legal system. In addition, refugee issues 
in West Timor constituted a threat to regional stability.
Even though many factors favored UNTAET operations, it was plagued with 
persistent lack o f success. One key failure had to do with bureaucratic struggle between 
departments in the UN over who would administer UNTAET. The struggle was 
eventually settled by the Secretary-General, who decided to give leadership to the 
Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), rather than the Department o f Political 
Affairs (DPA), which had run the UNAMET preparations in country for the referendum. 
Thus, the “planning of UNTAET took place in the context o f a fierce bureaucratic 
struggle between the DPA and the DPKO.”55 The DPA had extensive in country 
experience and networks, while the DPKO did not. Therefore, when the DPKO received 
the leadership, much of the in-country experience and contacts were not used. As a 
consequence, the key failure o f UNTAET was that UN administrative, judicial and 
military operations failed to incorporate East Timorese in their operations, thereby 
prolonging East Timor’s dependence on the UN, and diffusing existing political influence 
o f East Timorese leaders. Under the auspices of remaining neutral, the UNTAET 
leadership refused to incorporate local leaders into its framework. A secondary 
consequence was that the already diminished numbers of skilled workers in East Timor 
received no critical training in institutions or governing. As a result, UNTAET ironically 
functioned as a pseudo-colonial government over East Timor, rather than as a transitional 
administrative body as planned.
55. Astri Shurke, “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders,” 6.
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Another flaw in the implementation o f UNTAET, was that “both legislative and 
executive powers are in the hands o f a single individual, the Special Representative o f the 
Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who is also 
the head of the UN’s Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.”56 Such 
consolidated power enabled a monarchy style rule, in which a double standard made 
locals, but not UN representatives, subject to UN laws.
A third concern with UNTAET was the growth of a dual economy by April 2000: 
one for the UN, and one to serve the UN. This was possible because the UN bureaucratic 
administration in East Timor resisted the incorporation of locals. For example, in April 
2000, de Mello resisted replacing the 13 UN central department deputies with East 
Timorese. In May however, Annan and Jose Ramos Horta demanded that the district 
deputies be removed and replaced with local leaders and that a terminal date for 
UNTAET be fixed.
In early September, the UN presence in East Timor came under renewed attack. 
Militia killed three UN personnel in West Timor, who were assisting refugees, and two 
UNTAET peacekeepers were killed in East Timor. The Indonesian government 
expressed outrage over these attacks and killings in a letter to the UN Security Council 
dated 7 September. The following day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1319, 
condemned the attacks and killings. It stated that Indonesia must “disarm and disband
56. Chopra, “The U N ’s Kingdom,” 29.
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the militias immediately” and that “UNTAET should respond robustly to the militia
en
threat in East Timor, consistent with its resolution 1272.”
THE U.S. CONGRESS
Congress had long disliked U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, due to its 
repressive policies in East Timor and other territories. Congress cut military aid to 
Indonesia in 1992 after learning that the Indonesian military committed human rights 
violations in East Timor. The U.S. Department of Defense continued military aid 
however, by using a different program under the code name “Iron Balance” to hide from 
Congress and the public its training of and equipment shipments to Indonesia’s military. 
In particular, an elite and especially feared force called the Kopassus received U.S. 
training. The Kopassus had played a large role in the 1975 genocide of an estimated 
200,000 people in East Timor. It received Joint Combined Education and Training, for 
“military expertise that could only be used internally against civilians, such as urban 
guerilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, sniper marksmanship and
co
‘psychological operations.’” Some of the U.S.-trained Kopassus were linked to the 
1991 massacre in Dili. In a UN Inquiry, the Kopassus was later linked to spearheading 
militia and police violence against pro-independent East Timorese.59
When the crisis occurred in 1999, the U.S. Congress preferred pressuring 
Indonesia to halt the human rights violations in East Timor. Moreover, Congress favored
57. UN, “SC/RES 1319,” 8 September 2000 (www.un.org, accessed on 15 March 2002).
58. Id Vulliamy, and Antony Barnett, “U.S. aided Butchers o f  Timor: Exclusive: Washington trained 
Death Squads in Secret while Britain has continued to help Indonesian Army,” The Guardian, 19 
September 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/st.. .AAAMjAwMjAzMTgoWTM2MDEAAAAK 
&refer=true, accessed on 18 March 2002).
59. Mark Riley, “UN Official Doubts Jakarta Probe,” The Age 2  February 2 0 0 0 ,7  (http://ptg.djnr
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sending a UN sanctioned multilateral force to provide humanitarian relief in East Timor, 
however, wanted to limit U.S. participation to supplemental assistance, rather than 
ground troops. Congress also debated a deeper commitment from Japan.
After the referendum on 30 August, the violence in East Timor generated a shift 
in Congress. Senator Russell D. Feingold (D Wis.) introduced a bill on 8 September, 
urging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government to cut 
off assistance to Indonesia.60 In a joint hearing on 9 September, Doug Bereuter, 
Representative of Nebraska and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 
warned “Jakarta that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World Bank 
Resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable order is restored in East 
Timor.”61 Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, 
declared that “what is happening in East Timor today is nothing short o f ethnic
69
cleansing.” He argued that genocide loomed and the international community should 
be prepared to assist in restoring order. As seen above, the urgings o f the IMF and the 
World Bank were instrumental in pressuring Habibie to invite the UN into East Timor.
In a testimony to Congress on 30 September, Allan Naim testified about 
continuing U.S. military assistance programs with Indonesia, and described assistance 
ranging from training from a variety o f branches of the U.S. bureaucracy, including, the 
Department o f Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, and the U.S. Marshals.
.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story_clean_cpy.asp?articles=AGEE0003200036’TINEA..., accessed on 1 May 
2002).
60. See Steven Mufson, “West’s Credibility at Stake, Laureate Says,” The Washington Post, 9 
September 1999, A17.
61. United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1999,4 .
62. Ibid., 7.
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He described equipment such as U.S. C-130s, new U.S. machine guns, U.S. M-16s, high- 
tech electronics and surveillance, ammunition and spare parts. Facilities that were 
employed in this assistance included for example, Virginia and California police 
departments, the New York City Police Department Police Academy, the U.S. Joint 
Combined Education and Training, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, and
i ' - j
training at Quantico.
During the last week of September 1999, the House passed Resolution 292, 
condemning Indonesian military efforts to overturn the referendum and called on 
Indonesia to help end the civil unrest and violence in East Timor.64 The resolution 
supported a UN Security Council move for a multinational force. Congress also 
supported further economic sanctions against Indonesia. During the remarks on 
Resolution 292, it became clear that the United States might support a UN multilateral 
intervention in East Timor, because regional actors such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia were willing to bear the most costs. Australia 
wanted to lead the mission, allowing the United States to remain less active. California 
Congressman Dana Rohrbacher said; “I support this resolution because the United States 
is not the lead player in this intervention for democracy. As should be the case, local and 
regional powers are committing their troops, and the United States is there in a supportive 
role, rather than having to play the lead role and rather than be the one that has to put out 
all the money.”65 At the same hearing, the Representative from American Samoa, Eni 
Faleomavaega, pointed out that international interest in East Timor had much to do with
63. Allan Naim , “U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military.
64. United States House, Resolution, 292.
65. United States House, H earing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights o f  the Committee on International Relations, 30 September 1999, 8.
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the mostly unpublicized oil reserves. Consequently, the question o f East is complicated 
“because o f the vast amount o f resources and corporate interests.”66
Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad and played a 
large role in pressuring Clinton to request the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East
(\HTimor operations on 7 October. Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back- 
dues and further reduced the UN assessments to 25 from 31 percent to reflect a more 
“fair” scale o f  assessments.68 In the 10 February 2001 joint hearing, Assistant Secretary 
Stanley Roth credited both the administration and Congress for their part in pressuring 
Indonesia to end the violence and to allow a multilateral force to enter East Timor.
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA
This section considers the role o f the media in the developments in East Timor, 
particularly as it relates to public opinion. The position of the media closely reflected the 
position o f the U.S. government and downplayed evidence that the United States was 
aware o f Indonesia’s involvement in violence against pro-independence East Timorese. 
Examination o f the media is followed up with evaluation o f U.S. public opinion 
regarding the crisis in East Timor a limited public survey. Overall, public opinion in the 
United States did not favor military intervention.
Michael Gordon Jackson examined press coverage o f East Timor by counting the 
times “Timor” appeared in the title or first paragraph of articles. The newspapers 
included the Washington Post and the New York Times (Times). Jackson found that in
66. Comments made by Eni F.H. Faleomavaega in ibid., 7 -8 .
67. Joe Lauria, “U.S. Asks UN for Trims in Force for East Timor,” Boston Globe 256, no. 100 
(1999): A l ,  A13.
68. Richard Holbrooke quoted in ibid., A13.
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1991 the Times published 35 stories and the Post 7. From 1991 until 1998, the Times 
contained 201 and the Post had 106 articles. In 1999, the Times presented 334 and the 
Post 223 reports. The trend is similar for both papers with the total trend showing that of 
the total 906 stories between 1991 and 1999,4.6 percent were in 1991, 34% were 
between 1992 and 1998, and 61.4 percent were in 1999. These figures indicate that media 
coverage in 1999 was over thirteen times greater in frequency than in 1991. Thus, the 
situation in East Timor clearly received increased media attention as the crisis in East 
Timor unfolded. There was a similar pattern for television coverage during the same 
periods, but though the coverage increased, “it would be wrong to assume that it 
clamored for U.S. military intervention,” since the “coverage gives the sense of general 
approval of the limited nature of the U.S. commitment, full-hearted support for 
INTERFET, and great sympathy for the goals of the East Timorese resistance.”69
The international media during the crisis in East Timor mostly remained uncritical 
of the West’s inaction on the part o f the West to prevent or stop the violence in East 
Timor. A “follow the flag” phenomenon on the part o f the media, which ignored 
evidence that Western countries and organizations, such as Great Britain, the United 
States, Australia, the UN, and Human Rights Watch knew that Indonesia had planned 
post-referendum violence. Indonesia’s plans for reprisal violence after a pro­
independence referendum were varied. The amount o f evidence “was considerable, 
including documents from the Indonesian army and militias, intercepted cables and
69. Jackson, “Something must be done?” 61.
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satellite telephone conversations, satellite photographs of troop movements along the 
border o f East and West Timor, and first-person testimonies.”70
As early as March 1999, it was clear, according to intelligence reports that 
Indonesia was working closely with as many as 24 militia groups in East Timor, however 
the media failed to take note. In the U.S. print media, there were virtually no reports on 
the situation in East Timor between 20 July and 24 August 1999, despite increased 
turmoil and harassment experienced by UN teams inside East Timor. The media reported 
that Indonesia had splintered authority, for example, Indonesia was supposedly 
controlling the military, but was also responsible for stopping militia violence. Here, the 
depiction o f a Habibie-Wiranto difference allowed the media to represent a moderate 
leadership as reasonable, while extremists ran out o f control. Therefore, a central part o f 
this interpretation was media complicity not to expose evidence proving that the 
Indonesian military supported the militia in East Timor. Thus, the West, particularly the 
United States, appeased Indonesia because o f long-term military relations with an 
important geopolitical ally.
Herman and Peterson argue that the New York Times so closely reflected U.S. 
official policy on Indonesia, that beginning in the 1970s, the paper’s reporting remained 
biased in favor of Indonesia, and against East Timor. They criticize Times reporters and 
editors for aligning too closely with U.S. official policy and rhetoric regarding Indonesia 
and East Timor, and as a result the public was misinformed or uninformed on actual 
events. They identify twelve different tactics used by the Times to misconstrue or
70. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “East Timor: From ‘Humanitarian’ Bombing to 
Inhumane Appeasement,” Covert Action Quarterly 68 (Fall/Winter 1999): 4.
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sidestep important information that could have changed public opinion about the crisis.71 
The public was led to believe that the crisis in East Timor was a civil war, rather than 
resistance to illegal, repressive occupation by Indonesia. The New York Times 
sidestepped important issues by not giving the events in East Timor “compelling attention 
and it continues to inject Indonesia-protective biases and misleading frames of reference 
that it has used since 1975.5,72 For example, the crisis in East Timor received no front­
page placement in the Times until 9 September 1999, when National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger highlighted the importance of the U.S.-Indonesian relationship at the 
expense o f East Timor. Moreover, the Times did not publish photos o f victims in East 
Timor or “anywhere in the Indonesian Archipelago for 1998 and 1999.”73 In contrast, 
during this period the Associated Press reported on 1 April the discovery o f a mass grave 
in Ermera, and Reuters reported bodies in the Bay o f Dili on 25 April 1999. Photos of 
such atrocities commonly stir up a public reaction, so their omission is notable. In 
addition, Times reporters never used the terms “genocide,” “ravaging,” or “horrors” to 
describe events on the ground in East Timor. The use o f such words generally conveys a 
sense of perverse injustice and therefore holds the potential to turn the tide of public 
opinion against the perpetrators o f such actions. As a result, readers received less 
compelling versions o f events, conveying a much lower sense of urgency about the crisis.
Times reporters approached the crisis as if  Indonesia legally occupied East Timor 
territory and that the violence was the result of separatist activities. In fact, pro­
71. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “Appendix: The Standard Forms o f  Apologetics on 
Indonesia and East Timor used by N ew  York Times Reporters,” Z M agazine 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 87-8 .
72. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “How the New York Times Protects Indonesian Terror in 
East Timor,” Z M agazine 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 84.
73. Ibid., 85.
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independence leaders asked supporters not to resort to violence in response to militia 
harassment, and as a result drew increased support from the UN. Reports on resistance 
activities were tagged as separatist and by implication illegal. An example o f this is that 
the Times failed to report that Indonesia supported the militia activities in East Timor, not 
only against East Timorese resistance and citizens, but also against the UN and 
humanitarian organizations. A deeper issue however, is that this approach sidestepped 
the issue o f U.S. support for the Indonesian military and possibly even U.S. intelligence 
on Indonesia used by the military to derail the referendum. As a result, the Times 
explained U.S. policy as assisting Indonesia to provide for its defense, rather than 
providing equipment and training to be used against East Timor.
Times reporting failed to identify that the militia was connected to and supported 
by the Indonesian military, thereby sidestepping the need to identify Indonesia as the 
critical agent in the violence and killings in East Timor. By failing to connect the militia 
to the Indonesian military and leadership, the Times reporters showed Habibie as a benign 
reformist leader in the midst o f difficult times. Such portrayal o f Habibie increased the 
image that Indonesia “means well and is trying to amend its ways.”74 Habibie was 
however hand picked by Suharto and maintained many o f his predecessor’s policies. 
Moreover, the portrayal of Habibie in a weak leadership position led to the gullible 
interpretation that neither Habibie, nor Wiranto could control the militia in East Timor. 
The Boston Globe portrayed this as an official Washington belief, when it printed that an 
administration official said that “U.S. intelligence analysts increasingly believe that 
neither Indonesian President Habibie nor Wiranto can control the military in East Timor,”
74. Herman and Peterson “Appendix,” 88.
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because they are “loyal to a rogue faction in the military.”75 Jeffrey Winters 
complimented the Boston Globe, which “deserves credit for a level o f completeness and 
accuracy that the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Chicago 
Tribune, and Washington Post failed miserably to provide” about the crisis in East
7 (\Timor. Thus, misconstruing, downplaying, or eliminating important information in 
American news did not lead to a sense of urgency in the American public that the 
violence should end, as is reflected in the poll taken in September 1999.
The amount o f data from polls pertaining to the crisis in East Timor is limited. At 
the end of September 1999, the Gallup Organization asked four questions with content on 
East Timor. This section examines that survey.77 In general, the poll indicated that the 
“American public is paying relatively little attention to the conflict in East Timor, and to 
date has little inclination to support the involvement o f U.S. military troops there as a part 
o f the international peacekeeping force.”78
The survey revealed that only 5 percent o f the respondents followed the news 
about the conflict in East Timor closely. Of the remaining respondents, 24 percent 
followed it somewhat closely, 29 percent followed it not too closely, and 41 percent did 
not follow it at all. Only 1 percent had no opinion. With 29 percent following the crisis 
relatively closely, the crisis rates in the lowest category o f news events followed by the
75. John Donnelley, “Pentagon Reluctant to Isolate Indonesia,” Boston Globe, 11 September 1999, 
A l, A10.
76. Jeffrey A. Winters, “Why U.S. owes East Timor a Moral Debt,” The Korea Herald, 30 May 2002 
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publiclib/story.asp, accessed on 22 June 2002).
77. The poll was conducted by random telephone interview o f  a national sample o f  1039 adults 
between 23 and 26 September 1999. There is a 95 percent confidence that the results o f  this survey fall 
within a plus or minus 3 percent margin o f  error due to sampling or other random effects.
78. “East Timor Has Yet to Register Strongly on Americans’ Consciousness: but Majority Says a 
Peaceful Solution Is at least Somewhat Important to U .S.,” The Gallup P oll News Service, 4 October 1999 
(www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991004.asp, accessed on 30 January 2002).
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Gallop Organization over the previous ten years. As such, it is above only one other 
news story tested by Gallup: the 1994 political reforms in Japan.
Many Americans knew little about what happened in East Timor. When asked, 
“with what country is East Timor currently having a dispute,” only 20 percent answered 
correctly with Indonesia. More to the point, 70 percent o f the respondents did not know,
1 percent thought it was with Australia, 1 percent with China, 2 percent thought it was a 
civil war, and another 6 percent thought it was with some other country. The level of 
disinterest in the crisis in East Timor likely led to a majority o f uninformed respondents, 
since 80 percent either knew that they did not know, or guessed incorrectly.
Despite a relative lack o f knowledge about the East Timor crisis, the majority of 
those surveyed considered a peaceful solution to the conflict important. O f the 56 
percent who considered peaceful resolution important, 14 percent said it was very 
important and 42 percent said it was somewhat important. O f the 33 percent who said it 
was not important, 20 percent said it was not too important, while 13 percent indicated it 
was not important at all. When compared to responses on other conflicts, including the 
Palestinian/Israeli, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, 33 percent ranked the lowest 
importance. A full 11 percent had no opinion. When asked if  the United States should 
send military troops to participate in a multilateral peacekeeping force in East Timor, 34 
percent favored, 59 percent opposed, and 7 percent had no opinion. These results suggest 
that public opinion was more against intervention than for it.
The role o f the media in the crisis in East Timor mainly endorsed the U.S. official 
policy. It did serve an important part in the crisis however, by bringing atrocities to light. 
For example, the plight o f East Timor went largely unnoticed until 1991, when the
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Indonesian military massacred pro-independence demonstrators at a rally in Dili. The 
media highlighted this event and increased international pressure to stop such 
practices. As explained above, the coverage by the New York Times o f the crisis in East 
Timor closely followed official U.S. policy and rhetoric supporting Indonesian 
occupation and downplaying the right to self-determination in East Timor. The role of 
the media during the crisis in East Timor therefore, reinforced a sense o f low 
importance.
U.S. INTERESTS
During the 1990s, the momentum of cold war anti-Communist containment 
abated, despite continuing concerns over growing Chinese influence in the larger region. 
Other competing concerns began to take on greater importance to U.S. policy makers, 
including the status o f Taiwan and potential North Korean nuclear armament. Thus, the 
United States shifted focus from Indonesia, to promoting regional stability through 
economic and democratic development. As a result, the United States was more 
interested in seeing stability in Indonesia, the largest and most populous country in the 
region, rather than worrying about tiny East Timor.
After the economic downturn in 1997-98, stability became increasingly 
worrisome in Indonesia as banks failed, the Rupiah fell, food prices shot up, students 
rioted, and the Indonesian Parliament initiated proceedings to impeach Suharto. Rolland 
Challis argues that the United States was the force behind the economic diplomacy 
packages from the IMF: President Clinton, giving a rare insight into whose voice really 
spoke when the IMF moved its lips, telephoned Suharto to make clear that the IMF
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package must be implemented if the proposed help was to be forthcoming.79 The IMF 
package forced economic reform on Suharto and ultimately led to his downfall, because it 
undermined what IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, called “an economic 
system based on conglomerates, the collusion between the state, banks, business, and
QA
restrictive markets.” Indeed, on the eve o f Suharto’s resignation, Secretary o f State 
Madeleine Albright phoned Suharto that it was time to go. Habibie replaced Suharto 
soon thereafter. The United States maintained strong relations with Indonesia however, 
to help sustain the fragile economy that threatened regional security. The United States 
was interested in seeing Indonesia recover from economic recession after the crash of the 
Thai Bahtin 1998.
The Clinton administration supported Indonesian progress toward democracy, but 
was forced to consider the question of East Timor’s self-determination. The 
administration’s approach to the crisis in East Timor was to deal diplomatically with 
Indonesia, rather than engage East Timor. This strategy may not have produced 
independence for East Timor at great speed, but it maximized results at the lowest cost 
and risk to the United States. The following examines more closely Clinton’s policies 
regarding East Timor and Indonesia.
In late February 1999, there was a meeting between senior United States and 
Australian officials. The United States was convinced that during transition in East 
Timor a full-scaled peacekeeping operation would be unavoidable, but the Australians 
wanted to avoid a military alternative. Washington was not however, yet willing to 
pressure Jakarta to accept a peacekeeping operation without some prior agreement on the
79. Roland Challis, Shadow o f  a  Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals (Glouchestershire: Sutton 
Publishing, 2001), 203.
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autonomy of East Timor under Indonesian sovereignty. The United States and Australia 
asked the UN Representative to East Timor to be patient so as not to endanger such an 
agreement, and the United States approached the situation in East Timor with diplomatic 
pressure on Indonesia to control the militias in East Timor. Secretary o f State Madeleine 
Albright visited Jakarta on 4 March 1999. While there, she officially met with 
imprisoned resistance leader Xanana Gusmao. Albrights’s spokesman called on the 
Indonesian government to bring under control the paramilitary activities in East Timor.81 
This visit officially acknowledged the increased importance for U.S. foreign policy of the 
situation in Indonesia regarding East Timor.
On 6 April, militias killed by machete many people gathered in a church in 
Liqui^a, East Timor. Two days later, U.S. Commander in Chief o f the Pacific Admiral 
Dennis Blair went to Jakarta to tell Wiranto to shut down militia activities. Blair did just 
the opposite, however, and invited Wiranto to Hawaii to participate in the upcoming 
July/August bilateral defense discussions, and promised “expert exchange for doctrinal 
development” and that he would “send a small team to provide technical assistance. . .  
on crowd control measures.”82 Once the State Department got wind of the meeting 
contents, however, it wired Ambassador Stapleton Roy at the embassy in Jakarta to 
arrange “a corrective phone call” on April 18 from Blair to Wironto. According to an 
official report on the call, Blair “again failed to tell Wiranto to shut the militia down,” and 
violence again increased.83 Reinforcing Albright’s earlier message, however, President
80. Quoted in ibid.
81. See Taylor, East Timor, 224-25.
82. Allan Naim, “U.S. Complicity in East Timor,” The Nation 269, no. 9 (1999): 5-6 .
83. Ibid.
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Clinton wrote to President Habibie o f Indonesia on 23 April 1999, expressing concern
fidabout East Timor and asked Habibie to control the militias.
Once the 5 May 1999 agreement was signed regarding the sovereignty of 
Indonesia, the UN began assessments for the upcoming UNAMET mission and on 22 
May the Secretary-General made his recommendations to the Security Council. With 
Congressional approval, the UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June 
1999, and cleared the way to prepare for the August referendum.
Militia activities were in full swing in East Timor by mid-July, when a meeting 
took place in Jakarta, involving Admiral Archie Clemens, Commander o f the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet. According to those present, “he offered the officers an increase, a step-up in the 
U.S. military relationship with Indonesia.. . .  He proposed that in Surabaya, at the 
Indonesian naval eastern fleet headquarters, training facilities be established for the U.S.
n c
military.” Clemens explained that “U.S. goals for the Asia-Pacific region depend on 
maintaining our strategic partnership with Indonesia.”86 This meeting happened 
concurrently with contradicting messages from the State Department, Congress, and 
Clinton.
On 23 July 1999, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia and Pacific 
Affairs visited Jakarta for three days and toured East Timor. While there, he warned 
Habibie that U.S.-Indonesian relations would be affected if the referendum had to be 
postponed until 30 August, due to impoverished security.87 In the initial days following 
the referendum, the United States stepped up diplomatic efforts by repeatedly requesting
84. See Jackson, “Something must be done?”56.
85. Naim, “U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military,” 167.
86. Ibid.
87. Taylor, East Timor, 221.
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Indonesia to stop the violence, but it is possible that low U.S. willingness to send troops 
to East Timor was misunderstood in Jakarta as an encouraging sign, because the violence 
did not abate. On 7 September, Habibie attempted to dupe the world by declaring martial 
law in East Timor under the pretense o f bringing order. While this may have bought him 
a day to continue devastating East Timor, it very quickly became clear that this measure 
was a tactic to delay UN action.
While the Clinton administration worked diplomatically to end the violence, it did 
not wish to damage U.S. relations with Indonesia. On 8 September, administration 
officials said the administration had “made the calculation that the United States must put 
its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral rich nation of more than 200 million people, 
ahead of its concern over the political fate o f East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of
QO
800,000.” Indeed, the Clinton administration viewed the crisis in East Timor as a 
greater Indonesian issue. For this reason, foreign policy favoring Indonesia took 
precedence in the administration over injustice in East Timor.
Despite the administration’s wishes not to damage relations with Jakarta, it also 
had to consider pressures from important allies. The Clinton administration received 
pressure in early September, especially from Australia and Portugal to increase levels of 
participation in a UN multinational force. Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, used 
several means to pressure Clinton. As explained earlier, he phoned personally, lobbied 
Congress, and went on television. Portugal used similar tactics. Clinton, ever mindful of 
the media and public opinion, knew that the violence had the potential to generate a 
public outcry, but Congress was not in the mood to send in U.S. ground troops.
88. Quoted in Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, “With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. moves 
gently on East Timor,” New York Times, 9 September 1999, A l.
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Whereas prior to the referendum, Clinton “refused to discuss” the alternative for 
an international force,89 after the referendum, the violence convinced him that stronger 
resolution was necessary. In a speech on 9 September, Clinton warned that Habibie must 
invite the international community into East Timor to restore order. On the same day, the 
United States suspended all military relations and arms sales to Indonesia. Clinton bent 
to international and congressional pressures, by cutting military ties to Jakarta and by 
supporting the IMF decision to suspend a loan program.90 Chief o f U.S. military forces 
in the Pacific, Dennis Blair delivered the message personally to Indonesian Defense 
Minister Wironto of the U.S. suspension of military ties on 9 September.91 In addition, 
the United States retracted Blair’s April invitation to Wiranto to attend the Hawaii 
meeting of Asia-Pacific defense chiefs. All together, the message from Washington was 
clear that Indonesia was responsible for security in East Timor, and would pay a high 
price if  it failed to do so.
Despite diplomatic and economic moves to isolate Indonesia, the United States 
supported Indonesian stability and pushed for reform in Indonesia to continue to 
institutionalize democracy. As a result, the United States continued to focus on 
Indonesia, rather than the much smaller East Timor. For example, on 10 September
1999, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger likened the crisis in East Timor 
to his daughter’s “very messy room up in college.”92 He thereby intimated that 
involvement in East Timor was insignificant messy business o f very low importance.
89. John Roosa, “Fatal Trust in Timor,” New York Times, 15 September 1999 ,29A.
90. See Steven Mufson, and Bradley Graham, “US, IMF move to Isolate Jakarta; Clinton cuts Ties to 
Indonesian Military; Loan Program suspended,” The Washington Post, 10 September 1999, A l.
91. U.S. military training o f  Indonesian officers resumed in February 2000, see Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Resumes Training Indonesian Army Officers,” The Washington Post, 19 Februaiy
2000, A21.
92. Quoted in “Another Messy Apartment,” The Washington Post, 10 September 1999, A36.
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According to some, Berger’s explanation of the U.S. inaction in East Timor was a side 
effect o f Euro-centric geopolitics after all East Timor is in Asia, not in Europe. Where 
U.S. interests in East Timor were low, interests in Indonesia were, according to Under 
Secretary Thomas Pickering, “profound.”93
The following day, Clinton strongly criticized Indonesian military involvement in 
the violence in East Timor, and finally admitted94 that it “is now clear that the Indonesian 
military is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is simply unacceptable.”95 He 
warned that the “Indonesian Government and military must reverse this course to do 
everything possible to stop the violence and allow an international force to make possible 
the restoration of security.”96
At the 12 September meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Auckland, New Zealand, President Clinton took advantage of an opportune 
moment to build consensus among important regional leaders regarding a united 
international response to Indonesian policy in East Timor. He urged other countries to 
join the United States to pressure Jakarta to control militia violence in East Timor, and 
indicated U.S. willingness to place economic diplomacy on the table as necessary and 
that the United States was ready to consider backing a UN multinational force in East 
Timor to restore order. He repeated his comments of 10 September and hammered home 
his remarks with a statement that invoked the Clinton Doctrine: “We must help both the
93. See the Statement o f  Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department o f  State, in United States Congress, Joint Hearing, 9 September 1999, 12.
94. As early as 11 June 1999, Australia had publicized that it had evidence connecting the Indonesian 
military to militia activities in East Timor.
95. William J. Clinton, “Statement on the Situation in East Timor,” Weekly Compilation o f  
Presidential Documents 35, no. 3 6 ,1 0  September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID- 
5605249287+4+0+0&WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
96. Ibid.
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people of East Timor and the democratic process in Indonesia because the world 
community seeks to have the integrity of democracy protected everywhere.”97 As a 
result, regional leaders came together at the APEC meeting against the violence in East 
Timor, creating tremendous pressure on Jakarta.
On the same evening, Habibie succumbed to international pressure and invited a 
UN mandated force into East Timor. The next day Clinton, still in Auckland, spoke to 
reporters, welcoming Indonesia’s invitation to a UN force. He kept on the pressure by 
saying that “its important to get the details worked out and get this force in a hurry, in a 
way that it can be effective.” Once this could be done he said, “we can resume our work 
with the people o f Indonesia ... to help their transition to democracy and the restoration
OR
of prosperity there.” On 14 September, Clinton explained that he was “strongly 
supportive” o f Australia leading INTERFET, regardless o f Indonesia’s reservations. 
Again reinforcing the Clinton Doctrine, he said, “The work we’ve done in the past few 
days will help build a more secure, more prosperous, more integrated Asia-Pacific region. 
It will give our citizens, all our citizens, all the way from New Zealand back to 
Washington, better lives in the 21st century.”99 His comments reflect U.S. interests in the 
larger region, rather than in East Timor.
During the days following the Indonesian invitation for the UN to enter East 
Timor, concern was raised that Indonesia was again stalling, possibly to gain time to
97. William J. Clinton, “Remarks to American and Asian Business Leaders in Auckland,” Weekly 
Compilation o f  Presidential Documents 35, no. 3 7 ,1 2  September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bi...D-56117930978+7+0+0&W AISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).
98. William J. Clinton, “Remarks on the Situation in East Timor and an Exchange with Reporters in 
Auckland,” 13 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID-5605249287+5+0+0&  
WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002), 1740.
99. William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Departure from Auckland and an Exchange with Reporters,” 14 
September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...D-5605249287+1 l+O+O&WAISaction-retrieve, 
accessed on 19 March 2002).
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forcibly relocate East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia. An example was given in the 
Washington Post on 14 September, in which Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said 
that he “needed time to discuss details of the United Nations’ proposal for the 
deployment o f as many as 7000 troops,” and that he would be there “as long as it takes.” 
U.S. Ambassador to the UN responded that “if he starts to stretch this out while the 
Indonesian forces continue to rampage, that would be a major deception. The 
Indonesians would be back in the depths o f the mess they created and only just began to 
bail themselves out of.” He further indicated that “Timing is o f the essence.”100
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September, establishing 
INTERFET with a Chapter VII mission to restore order in East Timor. President Clinton 
committed limited support to the multinational force, including “communications, 
intelligence, logistics, planning assistance, and transportation.”101 Clinton also deployed 
the amphibious ship USS Belleau Wood, carrying a special operations capable Marine 
Expeditionary Unit and helicopters to provide airlift, search and rescue. The president 
was unclear on how long the mission would last, however indicated that the objective 
was to support INTERFET until a transition to an upcoming UN peacekeeping mission 
could be achieved.
At the end of September, Harold H. Koh, of the State Department outlined the 
U.S. position on East Timor at a Congressional Hearing. He indicated that the United
100. Colum Lynch, “Indonesia asks UN for Discussion Time: Annan, Clinton Press for Quick 
Deployment o f  Peacekeepers to East Timor,” The Washington P ost, 14 September 1999, A25 
(http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 15 March 2002).
101. William J. Clinton, Communication from  the President o f  the United States: Transmitting a 
Report to Congress, Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Regarding U.S. M ilitary Forces in East 
Timor, 8 October 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999).
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States had a four-tiered policy.102 First, the human rights abuse had to end and refugees 
allowed to return home. Second, Indonesia should remove all militia from East Timor 
and refrain from hampering relief efforts in East and West Timor. Third, the United 
States promoted democracy in East Timor. Fourth, the United States supported the 
establishment of an international Commission of Inquiry to investigate and bring to 
justice the perpetrators o f human rights violations.
By late September, the United States had provided $10 million to the 
humanitarian relief effort in East Timor. On 29 September, the Department o f State 
added $5.1 million to this figure.103 The United States agreed to provide 200 support 
personnel for non-combat work in communications, logistics, intelligence, and strategic 
airlift, and in late September the increased its commitment o f personnel from 200 to 
500.104
On October 7 Clinton asked the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East Timor 
operations, as Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad.105 
Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back dues owed by the United States 
Despite Clinton’s desire to reduce the U.S. costs, Marine Corps Brigadier General John 
Castellaw made available on 10 October four C-53 Sea Stallion helicopters, based near 
D ili106 jh g  helicopters provided much needed heavy lift for the INTERFET force of 
6500 troops.
102. See the Harold Hongju Koh, in United States House, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights, 30 September 1999 ,11-17 .
103. See comments made by Assistant Secretary o f  the Bureau o f  Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, U.S. Department o f  State, Julia Taft, in ibid., 20.
104. See Jonah Blank, and Steven Butler, “A Plea for Peace from Someplace near Hell,” U.S. News 
& World Report 127, no. 12 (1999): 42.
105. Lauria, “U.S. asks UN for Trims in Force,” A l, A13.
106. See Slobodan Lekic, “U.S. adds Choppers, Specialists in E. Timor,” Boston G lobe  256, no. 102 
(1999): A12.
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By October, attention was drawn to the plight of the refugees across the border in 
West Timor. An estimated 260,000 of the 850,000 East Timorese population were living 
in these militia-controlled camps. The refugees were terrorized and starving. It was 
feared that the coming rains would worsen camp conditions. On 10 November, Clinton 
wrote to Congress and requested $40 million for the Timor and Caucus crises “to meet 
unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, including those o f refugees, displaced
107
persons at risk.” Refugee issues threatened to unravel progress made in the crisis.
U.S. involvement in the international response during the crisis was limited to 
non-combat troops, specifically the United States supplied communications, logistics and 
airlift personnel. In addition, the United States sent civilian police and military observers 
in varying numbers, but with a maximum of 200. U.S. policy remained consistent 
throughout the crisis that it would not commit combat troops, but rather it focused 
support on humanitarian relief efforts. During the INTERFET phase o f the international 
operations, the United States added a small force of rotational units to work in 
cooperation with, but not under the authority of the UN peacekeeping mission. The U.S. 
contribution to the UNTAET phase of the crisis was smaller yet. The U.S. contribution 
to UNTAET was small: three military observers and one judge advocate. These 
personnel served under UN operational control. Clinton said that the United States 
maintained “a credible and visible presence” in East Timor, but this credible presence
107. William J. Clinton, “Memorandum on Assistance for Refugees and Victims o f  the Timor and 
North Caucasus Crises,” Presidential Determination  35, no. 45 (1999): 2353.
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consisted of 30 military personnel under U.S. command, who coordinated U.S. military 
humanitarian and civic assistance.108
The United States pressured Indonesia to internally address its human rights 
violations. The United States supported the UN position that prior to an international 
tribunal alternative, Indonesia should investigate and prosecute the war crimes o f 
beginning with “33 individuals, including 6 generals, the Governor o f the province, the 
head of several o f the militia groups.”109 The United States made clear to Indonesia that 
if  the Indonesian domestic judicial process were inadequate or not credible, then the 
United States would “have to consider supporting an international process.”110
Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth testified before a joint hearing in February 2000 
that the administration’s position was to pressure Indonesia to resolve the refugee 
situation in West Timor by allowing refugees to return to East Timor, or by integrating 
them into Indonesian society. This pressure was applied via withholding military aid and 
through economic assistance. Moreover, the United States would not resume normal 
relations with Indonesia until the refugee matters had been resolved and finalized.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five 
variables on foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the
108. William J. Clinton, Communication from  the President o f  the United States: Transmitting a 
Report Consistent with the War Powers Resolution Regarding U.S. M ilitary Forces in East Timor, 1 March 
2000 (Washington, D.C.: U .S. Government Printing Office, 2000).
109. United States Senate, “East Timor: A New Beginning?” Joint H earing before the Subcommittee 
on Asia and the Pacific o f  the Committee on International Relations House o f  Representatives and the 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs o f  the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 February 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2000), 10.
110. Ibid., 11.
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foreign policy o f President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is 
that the United States approached the crisis in terms of its long-term relationship with 
Indonesia, an important strategic, military, and economic ally in the region.
The crisis in East Timor, beginning in 1991 and ending in 1999, culminated 
decades o f suppressed international action, a side effect o f larger cold war concerns 
regarding containing communism. Indonesia was a long time ally of the United States 
and had received significant military and economic assistance in reward for remaining a 
“bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.”111 As a result, the 
international community largely looked the other way as Indonesia committed crimes 
against humanity in tiny East Timor and elsewhere. The end of the cold war changed the 
international system and as a result, such crimes were no longer sustainable. Internal 
social turmoil toppled the leadership in Indonesia, which was replaced by more moderate 
leaders, who accepted reform as inevitable. This leadership too had to go, because it was 
too closely associated with the old regime and lacked popular support.
Scholar Naom Chomski argues that the atrocities in East Timor in 1998-99 
“could have easily been mitigated or terminated merely by the withdrawal of direct and
• 119
decisive participation.” The reasons no state advocated a forcible military intervention 
in East Timor had to do with the fact that “Indonesia possessed a strong military, that 
such an intervention was likely to be strongly opposed by nearby China, and that 
concerned states believed that Indonesia’s consent to a multinational force would, in any
111. Ramesh Thakur, “Cambodia, East Timor and The Brahimi Report,” International Peacekeeping 
8, no. 3 (2001): 117.
112. Chomsky, A New Generation, 30.
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case, soon be forthcoming.”113 Washington played a large role in resolving the crisis in 
East Timor, even though its focus remained firmly on Indonesia and regional stability. 
Clinton pressured Jakarta to invite the UN into East Timor at the point when Congress, 
the UN, and U.S. allies pressured him to do so. More importantly, the East Timor issue 
had grown into a regional issue that threatened U.S. interests in Indonesia. Thus, 
resolving the crisis in East Timor had become a subset of U.S. interests in Indonesia.
113. Sean D. Murphy, “Contemporary Practice o f  the United States Relating to International Law,” 
American Journal o f  International Law  94, no. 1 (2000), quoted in ibid., 20.




This dissertation examined the extent to which concerns about ethnic cleansing 
and democratic governance influenced President Clinton’s decision to intervene with 
military force in three specific and distinct cases. The previous chapters explored 
domestic and international constraints that shaped these decisions. This chapter 
summarizes the findings in the chapters on Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor based on the 
theoretical discussion laid out in Chapter III. The results are then compared across the 
case studies to assess patterns o f foreign policy. Next, the hypotheses, set out at the 
beginning o f this dissertation, are examined in the context o f these findings. In the 
concluding section, a comparison is made between the Clinton Doctrine and the policies 
implemented during the three crises. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
importance of this study and remarks regarding developments since September 11.
CASE SUMMARY FINDINGS
An overview o f case study findings is presented in Table 4, which emphasizes the 
important turning points for each case. Together, these turning points show that foreign 
policy decisions made by President Clinton were not improvised. In fact, his decisions 
fall into a framework that reveals the impact o f specific variables on his decisions to 
intervene or not. For example, in the case o f Rwanda, the allies involved included 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and the Organization o f American States. 
Belgium’s position, for instance, favored the use of military force to end the civil
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violence until 14 April 1994. After that date, Belgium opposed military intervention. 
France openly favored military intervention as of mid-June 1994, implemented that 
policy later in the month, and then turned its support to humanitarian assistance. The UN 
policy only approved military intervention on 22 June. The position of the U.S. Congress 
was that it never supported the use o f force and only favored humanitarian assistance 
after mid-June. Public opinion and the media, was similar to that in the Congress.
Finally, U.S. interests did not reflect the need for military intervention, and humanitarian 
assistance was not sent until September. The following section explains the impact of 
these variables with more depth.
Table 4
Evaluation of the Five Variables
U.S. Ally United Nations U.S. Congress Public Opinion U.S. Interests
Case: RWANDA
BELGIUM - mil to 22 Jun - mil -m il -m il
+ mil Jan 94 94 throughout throughout throughout
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Table 4 (continued)
U.S. Ally United Nations U.S. Congress Public Opinion U.S. Interests
Case: HAITI 
OAS
+ san 8 Oct 91 
- mil to Jul 92 
~ mil Jul 92
+ san 8 Oct 91 
+ mil 31 Jul 94
/ mil to 25 Oct 
94
+ mil 25 Oct 94
/ san
throughout 
/m ilto  15 Sep 
94
/+m il 15 Sep 
94
+ san 4 Oct 91 
+ mil 11 Oct 93 
- mil to Aug 94 
+ mil Feb 94 
mil intervention 
19 Sep 1994
U.S. Ally United Nations U.S. Congress Public Opinion U.S. Interests
Case: EAST TIMOR 
INDONESIA + san 
+ re f5 M ay 9 9  + mil 15 Sep 99 





+ mil san 92 
- mil
throughout 







+ mil san 4 Mar 
99
+ e san 9 Sep 
99
+ hum 12 Sep 
99
AUSTRALIA 
+ ref Aug 98 




+ favored san sanctions ref referendum
- opposed mil military intervention hum humanitarian relief
/ mixed or undecided e economic
~ unable to legally endorse military intervention
FINDINGS: RWANDA
After the crisis in Rwanda, “blame game” occurred for allowing the genocide to 
take place or to continue after it had started. The main failure o f the international 
community during the crisis in Rwanda was that it failed to distinguish between ongoing 
refugee hostilities, renewed civil war, and genocide. Misrepresentations o f the initial
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killings of both moderate Hutus and Tutsi generated the impression that killings were 
perpetrated on both sides. As a result, the genocide was mistaken for renewed civil war, 
which outside states were hesitant to enter. Thousands of Hutu refugees fled from 
advancing RPF forces as the government collapsed and the Tutsi regained control after 
several decades. Hutu gathered in the French protected safe zone, prompting Philip 
Gourevitch to say; “the humanitarian relief effort became a catering service for the 
largest genocidal movement on the planet at the time.”1
Behind a charade o f accusations and demands, Rwanda attempts to escape 
responsibility for the genocide that happened there. Clinton’s 1998 apology did not ease 
tension but precipitated further claims and accusations. Rwandans are left to come to 
terms with, and accept responsibility for the genocide that was planned and implemented 
by the government against the people. Rwanda’s claim that the UN owes apologies “is 
uncalled for.”2 In addition, the demand that the UN, the United States, France, and 
Belgium owe reparations to Rwanda for what it did to itself and then misrepresented to 
the world, exemplifies an attempt to extract economic benefits based on the judgement 
that Clinton was right to apologize. Despite Michael O’Hanlon’s argument that since all 
people are equal, then the decision to intervene becomes one o f pure numbers o f savable 
lives over and above the cost in number of lives required to stop the killing,4 the payment
1. Quoted in Gina Jae, “Interview with Philip Gourevitch: International Responses to Genocide in 
Rwanda,” The Journal o f  the American M edical Association  285, no. 9 (2001): 1216.
2. See Africa News Service, “Rwanda Genocide: Why the Truth Must Be Told,” Africa News 
Service, 10 Jan 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A58510962&dyn=77!ar_frnt?sw_aep=vi 
va_odu, 17 January 2002).
3. See Africa News Service, “International Community to Blame for Rwanda Genocide,” Africa 
News Service, 10 July 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A6320391&dyn=41!ar_fmt?sw_aep= 
viva_odu, 17 January 2002).
4. Michael O’Hanlon, “How to Stop Genocide: Saving Lives with Force,” The New Republic, 12 July 
1999,21.
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of reparations would reward Rwanda for having behaved so atrociously in the first place. 
Certainly, this is not to say that assistance should not be given to Rwanda per se, only 
that such assistance should be attributed to developments in Rwanda, rather than because 
it is associated with the genocide, guilt, or an erroneous apology.
U.S. Allies
U.S. allies have been highly criticized for their varying positions regarding the 
Rwanda crisis. France was accused of imperialist intentions aimed at maintaining a 
francophone sphere o f influence in the region. France played a crucial role in the 
Rwanda crisis however, by intervening to provide a safe zone in Southwestern Rwanda 
on 23 June 1994. This action not only protected the extremist Hutu government, but also 
simultaneously contributed to massive refugee movement that led to deadly conditions in 
overcrowded camps. Criticism against the French was due to the fact that France 
supported the Hutu genocidal regime. Consequently Rwanda demanded reparations from 
France in July 2000.5
The nature o f the French intervention generated moderate divisions between 
France and Belgium, which withdrew very early from the UNAMIR mission in mid-April 
1994, because o f domestic public pressure based on ethical and economic issues that 
were brought to the fore by the killings of Belgian forces. Belgium’s withdrawal from 
the UNAMIR was a severe blow to the effort, as it removed a significant force from 
Rwanda, consequently damaging Dallaire’s capacity to provide UN peacekeeping
5. See Barbara Crossette, “Report Says U.S. and Others A llowed Rwanda Genocide: Panel Urges 
Reparations for 1994 Killings,” New York Times, 8 July 2000, A4.
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services and lowering the morale o f troops from participant countries that were left 
behind.
The OAU was most supportive of intervention, as was evident by high levels of 
willingness found in its members to send troops. However, given the organization’s 
severe financial limitations, the OAU was unable to accomplish much more than provide 
consistent pressure on the warring sides to come to a cease-fire. The OAU was pivotal in 
facilitating negotiations for the Arusha Accord, and on other occasions, worked to bring 
about peace negotiations, albeit without significant success.
The United Nations
The United Nations was ambivalent at best. A Rwandan representative sowed 
confusion in the Security Council by giving false information, thereby misrepresenting 
the violence as renewed civil war. Regardless o f this confusing situation in the Security 
Council at the time, the UN was at fault for sluggish and ineffective administration of 
assistance and in efforts to resolve the crisis. The UN failure grew out of 
communications issues starting in the field, increasing in the Secretariat, and culminating 
with the Security Council that “was not informed” of early communications from Dallaire 
regarding the Hutu plans for genocide against the Tutsi.6 Moreover, the general UN 
membership was responsible to the extent that capable members were unwilling to 
commit troops, equipment and supplies to the mission. The main shift, which occurred 
with UN Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994, came at the insistence o f France to intervene 
unilaterally with Operation Turquoise, on 23 June 1994. With this exception, the UN
6. See “From Rwanda Study: ‘Serious Mistakes were M ade,’” New York Times, 17 December 1999,
A14.
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remained overall unwilling and ineffective in peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, as military 
intervention was not considered a viable alternative.
The U.S. Congress
The role played by the U.S. Congress during the crisis was two-fold. First, after 
the Somalia incident, Congress worked on legislation aimed at limiting the ability o f the 
president to commit the United States to UN missions abroad, especially in Africa. 
Essentially, Congress tended toward disengagement after Somalia. Second, after the 
news of possible genocide spread, public opinion began to show signs o f moving to a 
more sympathetic stance. As this happened, Congress began to shift accordingly in mid- 
June 1994, but only to the extent o f supporting humanitarian aid. At that time, Congress 
began to petition the president to step up support for humanitarian relief in Rwanda.
American Public Opinion and the Media
During the crisis in Rwanda, the U.S. public did not favor injecting U.S. military 
troops into the civil violence in Rwanda. The media characterized the genocide 
incorrectly as tribal conflict, and therefore failed to convey accurate and timely 
information. The media was instrumental in changing policy, however, when it 
publicized the terrible conditions that prevailed in refugee camps, where many people 
were dying o f cholera and other diseases. Once the tragic plight of the refugees came to 
light, public opinion shifted and favored humanitarian assistance. This shift in turn 
moved Congress as well, and as the president was urged to do the same, U.S. policy was
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reevaluated. At no time, however, did the U.S. public, or the media demand the use o f 
military force to end violence.
U.S. Interests
There were few vital or peripheral interests compelling the United States to 
intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. There were no direct military or economic interests 
and French strategic interests in the region were greater than U.S. interests. Peripheral 
U.S. interests at stake could be linked to international law, but the costs of military 
operations in such a geographically remote area outweighed any plausible benefits.
France relieved the pressure on the United States to take action when it intervened in 
southwest Rwanda to provide a short-term safe haven for Hutu. Thus, neither U.S. vital 
nor peripheral interests compelled the United States to take remedial action in Rwanda 
before France acted as the regional hegemon to promote stability. The Clinton 
administration was unwilling to intervene in Rwanda and blocked UN Security Council 
efforts to halt the genocide. This stance only softened after the genocide was ending, 
France intervened, and international attention turned to refugee camps, at which time the 
administration turned to providing humanitarian relief. Such humanitarian efforts held 
low risk and relatively low cost for the United States, both in terms of life and assistance.
Summary
U.S. policy on Rwanda differed from the policy set by France, a major ally and 
contender for influence in the region. Belgium however, set the tone o f international 
non-involvement, when it pulled out of the UN mission to Rwanda. The Clinton
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administration's policy did not differ significantly from UN policy, which can be seen a 
function of U.S. influence in the Security Council. Moreover, U.S. policy in Rwanda 
remained in line with public opinion and Congress. For example, until the American 
public learned o f the suffering in Goma, there was relatively little action taken by the 
Clinton administration. This inaction was largely due to U.S. hesitation to engage in UN 
peacekeeping missions abroad after Somalia. Once the American public became 
informed however, it supported humanitarian assistance. Then, the domestically oriented 
Clinton administration immediately sent relief assistance to the refugees in July 1994, 
albeit with strong limitations on the mandate for U.S. troops.
FINDINGS: HAITI
The crisis in Haiti demonstrated the importance of two main issues. First, despite 
Somalia, it revived international and especially U.S. willingness to establish democratic 
governance as the most stable and therefore preferable form o f governance. Moreover, 
the U.S. willingness to lead in Haiti reinforced norms of state behavior in a given sphere 
of influence. Second, it confirmed that refugee migration is indeed high politics. It took 
only a matter o f days to bring President Clinton to reverse his campaign promises to 
accept Haitian refugees into the United States. Moreover, Haitian refugees were flooding 
all countries in the region, including those that could not take care of them appropriately. 
Consequently, international pressure brought many countries together to root out the 
cause o f the refugee issue: representative governance at home. Clinton negotiated with 
Aristide in an effort to resolve the crisis in Haiti. Once it became clear that this approach
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was ineffective, he called an invasion to convince Cedras that the United States meant 
serious business.
U.S. Allies
In the case o f Haiti, this “variable” consisted mainly o f the OAS. The OAS 
initiated action because of its concern about the disruption o f democracy in Haiti. The 
OAS, however, did not endorse military intervention largely because its Charter declares 
such action illegal, since it erodes the law of sovereign authority. Most OAS members 
favored economic sanctions, including an embargo against Haiti after the September 
1990 coup. The 1993 Harlan County incident brought about a slight shift in the OAS, as 
it began to support, or rather not oppose, UN and U.S. measures for military intervention, 
despite its Charter limitations. In addition, the majority o f OAS member states 
cooperated with the UN and U.S. military intervention. This cooperation was explained 
by the need to contain the security threat posed by refuge migration around the region.
The United Nations
Initial UN activity was informed by urgings from the OAS, and consisted of 
sanctions against Haiti on 10 October 1991. Due to the increased threat to regional 
security, the UN intensified international pressure on Haiti in late 1992, by declaring that 
Haiti was committing human rights violations. Again in m id-1993, the UN increased 
sanctions against Haiti. The failure o f the 3 July 1993 Governor’s Island agreement 
followed by the Harlan County incident clarified the depth of the military junta’s 
commitment to remain in power, regardless o f sanctions and an oil embargo. By May,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
the UN began to take its lead from the United States, which expressed keen interest in 
resolving refugee issues as a result o f the situation in Haiti. On 31 July 1994, the UN 
Security Council authorized military intervention in Haiti under United States.
The U.S. Congress
The role o f the U.S. Congress during the crisis in Haiti was minimal. Divisions in 
Congress focused the debate on legal issues, such as the extent o f the president’s war 
powers. Throughout, Congress remained deeply divided on intervention, neither willing 
to endorse it nor prohibit it. Such a deadlock granted the president greater latitude and to 
a large extent allowed him to bypass Congressional approval.
American Public Opinion and the Media
Public opinion during the crisis in Haiti was mixed from beginning to end. The 
mixed nature of public opinion allowed the president greater freedom, even though he 
needed to proceed cautiously. As a result, Clinton exhausted all possible alternatives 
before a military solution emerged. Even then, Clinton made one last effort to negotiate 
with Cedras by sending Jimmy Carter as the warships were on their way. This course of 
action led to media accusations that “Clinton bungled his way into Haiti.”7 This 
conclusion is misleading however, because Clinton sought to resolve the crisis at the 
lowest cost possible. Thus, public opinion and the media neither hampered nor helped 
President Clinton in making his decision to intervene in Haiti.
7. Tony Smith, “In Defense o f  Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (1994): 35.
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U.S. Interests
President Clinton intervened in Haiti to restore democracy in an effort to protect 
U.S. vital and peripheral interests in the region. The United States sought to protect 
strategic interests by preserving regional stability through democratic enlargement 
against an authoritarian military government that violated human rights and caused a 
refugee problem. The United States promoted peripheral interests including the 
enforcement o f international law against the overthrow of a government, and by enacting 
a policy o f nation building to support democracy. Although the United States acted to 
impede the drug trade funneled through Haiti, the main U.S. interest involved halting the 
flow of Haitian refugees to the continental United States. Haiti’s geographic proximity to 
the United States led Clinton to acknowledge that accepting refugees was not acceptable, 
because as more followed, there would eventually be a significant political risk at home. 
The best solution for dealing with the increasing flow of refugees was to stabilize the 
internal situation in Haiti, or in other words, to reinstate democracy.
Summary
Initially, Clinton responded to the democratic crisis in Haiti by supporting OAS- 
UN initiatives for sanctions thereby easing tension in relations with regional allies. The 
later embargo supported the international effort to oust the military regime, but it hurt 
many people in Haiti. Under embargo conditions, Haiti was unable to provide economic 
prosperity for its citizens, and the brunt of economic sanctions fell on the poorest among 
them. As a result, the urgency for humanitarian intervention increased because poverty 
prompted an ever-greater outward migration. In this sense, international economic
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initiatives contributed to the already dire situation in Haiti and compounded threats to 
regional stability. Further destroying the fragile economy left many Haitians so desperate 
to survive that they risked life and limb to escape on the high seas. Returning refugees 
caught on the high seas is illegal according to international law, however, and caused 
some difficulty for the United States in intercepting refugees bound for Florida. As a 
result, Clinton eased sanctions, but that again raised tensions between the United States, 
the OAS and the UN. The OAS did not oppose intervention as early as the USS Harlan 
County incident on 11 October 1993, after which a major international shift was visible. 
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 authorizing multilateral joint forces 
intervention on 31 July 1994, and Clinton authorized plans for military intervention on 26 
August. Despite the fact that neither the U.S. Congress, nor public opinion fully favored 
a military alternative, Clinton successfully launched Operation Restore Democracy and 
U.S.-led intervention took place on 19 September 1994.
FINDINGS: EAST TIMOR
Preferring diplomatic and economic efforts to curb undesirable activities in 
Indonesia, the Clinton administration maintained a low profile during the crisis in East 
Timor. At no time did Clinton engage East Timor as a primary objective, instead the 
U.S. relationship with Indonesia was primary. Indeed, the United States continued to 
supply military training and equipment to Indonesia until international pressure mounted 
against such actions after the 30 August referendum consumed the territory in severe 
violence. As a result, Clinton cut off military assistance to Indonesia in September 1999, 
delivering the decisive message to Indonesia that this violence would no longer be
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tolerated. At the same time, Clinton added the needed boost to the efforts within the 
international community to take steps to stop the violence. Geographic proximity was an 
important element during the crisis in East Timor, because Clinton avoided U.S. 
involvement in the intervention, and it fell to Australia to maintain regional stability.
U.S. Allies
Portugal and Australia were most concerned with the situation in East Timor. 
Portugal shared a colonial past with East Timor, and did not want to lose its colony at the 
request of the UN, and to the benefit o f another regional power that would 
opportunistically take over. Consequently Portugal was key to early international focus 
on East Timor. Whereas Portugal was leaving the region, Australia, in close proximity to 
East Timor, ran the risk of absorbing refugees, or spillover violence. Australia was also 
concerned with the shipping and mining rights in the waterway between East Timor and 
Australia, an issue, which resurfaced immediately, even before East Timor received 
official independence. The strategic importance o f this waterway, the Timor Gap, 
brought international action, as Australia paid special attention to crisis resolution and 
regional stability.
The United Nations
The UN was initially involved in East Timor in an effort to settle the long-term 
dispute about colonial jurisdiction between Portugal, Indonesia, and East Timor. The UN 
became deeply involved in providing international pressure on Jakarta to relinquish its 
hold on East Timor. Consequently, UN actions in UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET
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were central to resolving the crisis in East Timor. Through negotiations in the UN, the 
United States began to reevaluate its protection o f Indonesia as international pressure to 
stop the violence in East Timor mounted. Moreover, the UN mandate to use force largely 
halted the rising violence against East Timorese, saving many lives in the process. The 
UN was subsequently criticized however, for administrative flaws in the UNTAET 
mission, which gave the UN overt control o f the tiny country without making it 
accountable to the East Timorese.
The U.S. Congress
Despite a strong Australian lobby, debate in the U.S. Congress was concerned 
mainly with rendering humanitarian assistance without committing troops other than for 
logistics, communications and airlift. Such debate was often characterized by ardent 
appeals on behalf o f human rights, while tempered with apologetic limitations. 
Congressional debate bore out that U.S. interests in East Timor did not merit military 
intervention. Besides, if regional allies were interested and willing to send troops, then 
the U.S. Congress would rather support that move thereby circumventing its own 
responsibility. This position enabled the United States to remain aloof from the crisis in 
East Timor, while supporting efforts o f other countries. Therefore, the U.S. Congress 
supported the UN humanitarian mission, but in light of poor security in East Timor, drew 
the line at behind the scenes peacekeeping.
American Public Opinion and the Media
The role o f public opinion and the media was an important part o f the U.S.
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response to the crisis in East Timor, because it closely followed the official policy o f non­
intervention. The media increased the exposure of the crisis in East Timor, but it failed to 
convey a sense of urgency to the public that the United States should intervene. Public 
interest in the East Timor crisis remained low throughout, as the American public tired of 
less than vital interventions. As a result, neither the media nor public opinion pressured 
Clinton to a significant degree to send troops and end the violence.
U.S. Interests
The examination of U.S. interests in East Timor reveals that even though some 
peripheral interests were at stake, these were less critical than the vital interests involving 
U.S. relations with Indonesia. The Clinton administration was concerned with the 
overarching pattern of abusive Indonesian rule, not only in East Timor, but also in other 
territories such as Irian Jaya, or states like Aceh. Consequently, the United States was 
more interested in seeing institutionalized democracy in Indonesia as a viable method for 
reducing such suppression by increasing representation in troubled areas. Thus, the 
United States worked with Indonesia, which had only recently had its first parliamentary 
elections in June 1999 after the fall o f Suharto in May. Clinton wanted to see democracy 
flourish in all o f Indonesia, and the issue o f East Timor was a stumbling block to 
democracy that needed to be addressed for Indonesia to move beyond repressive and 
military rule. In the aftermath o f the crisis, the task remained to investigate the crimes 
against humanity and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Considerable criticism was 
levied against the UN and the United States for supporting Indonesia’s insistence to
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internally investigate and prosecute crimes committed in East Timor. Under the 
direction o f the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia produced a list o f 33 
names of those charged with responsibility for crimes against humanity.
Summary
The main findings of this case study include the following. Indonesia agreed in 
early 1999 to allow the UN to hold a referendum in East Timor offering the choice 
between independence and integration. East Timor chose independence on 30 August, 
after which punitive violence backed by elements in the Indonesian military was 
unleashed against the East Timorese. Indonesia agreed in September to invite the UN 
peace-enforcing mission INTERFET into East Timor to restore order. Portugal remained 
pro-independence for East Timor throughout the entire history o f the crisis in East Timor. 
Australia shifted policy from supporting Indonesia’s integration o f East Timor to 
opposing it in August 1998. Consequently, Australia became a major proponent of 
military multilateral intervention in September 1999. The UN initially remained inactive 
except for annual condemnation of the illegal Indonesian occupation o f East Timor and 
its violent policy there. The UN changed course favoring multilateral intervention with 
Resolution 1264, providing a Chapter VII mandate to restore order. Congress remained 
consistent throughout the crisis. It paid lip service to stopping the violence, however, 
remained slow to pay UN back dues and staunchly refused entertain thoughts on 
contributions o f ground troops to resolve the crisis in East Timor. It did, however, 
authorize U.S. contributions of communications, logistics, and airlift capabilities. At no
8. See for example, Chomsky, A New Generation, 57.
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time during the crisis in East Timor did the media or public opinion demand that the 
United States intervene in East Timor.
PATTERNS IN FOREIGN POLICY ACROSS THE CASES
This section considers patterns in foreign policy across the three case studies. It 
examines specific patterns that were observed within each variable in this study.
The major pattern that emerged in the examination of U.S. allies was that a 
dominant regional actor greatly impacted the unfolding events. Across all three cases, 
there was a distinct U.S. policy favoring intervention by the regional hegemon, which is a 
step away from the idea that the United States would become a type o f globo-cop in post­
cold war era. France intervened in Rwanda as the regional hegemon to create a safe 
haven for Hutu. In Haiti, the United States was the regional superpower that led the UN 
intervention to put down the military regime and reinstate democracy. Australia was the 
regional power that led the UN mission in East Timor to stop the punitive violence after 
the referendum. In Rwanda and East Timor, the United States objected to intervention, 
until the regional hegemon decided to intervene and subsequently petitioned the UN for 
support. For example, the United States adamantly opposed the use o f military force to 
stop the civil violence in Rwanda up to the last hour, when France declared that it would 
unilaterally intervene and the UN half-heartedly agreed. Even in Haiti, where the United 
States functioned as the regional hegemon, the United States opposed military use of 
force for quite some time. In East Timor, the United States at no time wanted any part of 
military use o f force, and opposed UN actions that might commit it to do so. It was not 
until Australia decided to intervene and petitioned for assistance in the UN and approval
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from the United States, that the United States agreed as long as it was not involved except 
for minimal peacekeeping assignments. In Haiti, the United States also hesitated to use 
force, preferring to explore other alternatives before taking that step.
The major pattern found in the examination of the United Nations was the 
apparent unwillingness o f member states to interfere in civil violence within a single 
member state. Moreover, the position of the Security Council depended on the policies 
of its members. This most clearly occurred in the case of Rwanda for two reasons. First, 
Rwanda had a temporary seat on the Council at the time of the crisis, and used this 
opportunity to misinform and mislead the Council regarding the violence at home.
Second, the United States blocked UN action by delaying decisions and by refusing to 
participate in missions. Without U.S. participation, even humanitarian missions would 
suffer, because the United States had the most advanced technology and equipment 
available. As a result, missions without U.S. participation or support were more 
challenging. In addition, the UN waited to mandate the use o f force until after one 
country was willing to intervene unilaterally. For example, France intervened in 
Rwanda, the United States went into Haiti, and Australia led the mission into East Timor.
The U.S. Congress reflected a mixed pattern across the case studies. At no time 
did Congress support U.S. involvement in military intervention in Rwanda. Moreover, 
Congress did not support humanitarian assistance to Rwanda until after public opinion 
began to shift in favor o f it. In Haiti, Congress was deadlocked by debate regarding legal 
issues and therefore only came to support the military intervention after it had taken 
place. Congress responded to the crisis in East Timor in a similar way, as it had to the 
crisis in Rwanda. For example, Congress did not support military intervention in East
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Timor at any time, and was slow to support sending humanitarian assistance until mid- 
September and then only limited to support activities. Thus, Congress responded to each 
crisis differently, but remained generally reluctant to commit U.S. forces to participate in 
military missions.
Similarly, U.S. public opinion and the media did not support the use o f force in 
the cases of Rwanda and East Timor, but not in Haiti. This was because during the crisis 
in Haiti, the public was ambivalent until the presidential address to the nation on the eve 
of the intervention. Then, public support slightly increased as it “rallied around the flag.” 
Geographic distance and knowledge of the region also influenced the pattern of public 
opinion and the media with Haiti closer to the United States compared to Rwanda and 
East Timor. In addition, the polls indicated that fewer people in the United States knew 
as much about Rwanda and East Timor as they knew about Haiti.
The predominant pattern for U.S. interests found in all three case studies is that 
the issue of refugees caused political and social instability that ultimately required outside 
international intervention. As shown in Chapter II, refugees place considerable strain on 
international stability because they essentially “invade” the neighboring country, which 
has no recourse but to care for them. The burden of providing for large numbers of 
refugees is particularly difficult when violence is involved. In such cases, refugee camps 
can become hotbeds for resistance movements and may function as headquarters for raids 
into the country of origin. Understandably, such activity strains relations between 
neighboring countries, even if they have a history of friendly relations. Two of the cases 
in this study exhibit examples o f governmental collapse that degenerated into civil unrest, 
violence and brutal behavior, as was apparent in Rwanda and Haiti. The crisis in East
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Timor was the result o f outside oppression, which degenerated from brutal suppression of 
self-determination into punitive violence. All of these cases generated large numbers of 
refugees, which consequently merited some form of international action, regardless of 
whether the United States participated or not.
A related pattern was that each case became a crisis when regional stability was 
compromised. In Rwanda, the crisis began years before the double assassination of the 
President o f Burundi and the President o f Rwanda launched the genocide. This event 
placed neighboring countries into a highly precarious position, especially considering that 
neither country had institutionalized government to any great extent. Consequently, both 
countries were thrown into internal political turmoil. In the case o f Haiti, regional 
security was paramount in the OAS and UN decisions to take action against the military 
regime. A precedent had to be set to oust Cedras to show that military takeovers would 
not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere. Regional security in East Timor was at the 
root of the lack o f the U.S. commitment to resolving the crisis. The United States viewed 
Indonesia as the bulwark o f stability for the larger region, including the shipping lanes 
reaching into Southeast Asia. The United States worked to prevent the collapse of 
Indonesia after Suharto, damaging this relationship would have potentially meant the loss 
o f the largest Muslim U.S. ally in that part o f the world.
It appears that a shift has occurred in the level o f emphasis placed on peripheral 
interests such as international laws pertaining to human rights. Historically state security 
matters pertained to military or strategic concerns. During the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries however, vital economic interests grew in importance. Today peripheral 
interests such as international law, and especially human rights, have been thrust into the
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realm of high politics. While this does not make international law a vital interest, it has 
grown in importance, as it increasingly becomes the mechanism for regulating state 
behavior to minimize anarchy at the international level. Moreover, the evolution o f vital 
and peripheral interests over time continues to progress, as peripheral interests become 
more central.
The pattern that emerged in all cases was that the distance o f the crisis had an 
impact on the United States decision to intervene. The United States refrained from 
involvement in Rwanda partly because of operations in far away Africa are costly, for 
example, for air lifting supplies, equipment, and troops. The geographic location of 
Haiti, just next door, also aided the ability of the United States to quickly send ships with 
equipment and troops. The geographic location o f East Timor played a very large role in 
the decision for two main reasons. First, East Timor was located next to, and some 
would argue, within Indonesia, making military use o f force against Indonesia a 
possibility that was less than desirable for the United States. Second, East Timor is 
distant from the United States and would therefore make operations even more costly 
than in Africa. This pattern is revisited below in the hypothesis section.
Third party political actors were another pattern that emerged in Haiti and East 
Timor to a larger extent than in Rwanda. For example, the Clinton administration 
worked extensively to include Aristide in its plans for Haiti. Part o f the reason that 
Clinton did not use force earlier was that Aristide would not endorse such an alternative. 
As the democratically elected leader o f Haiti, this resistance from Aristide complicated 
policy decisions. Only after Aristide appealed to the UN to restore democracy in Haiti 
did the use of force become a viable alternative, even though he had not explicitly
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requested such action. Similarly, the administration worked extensively with Indonesia’s 
political and military leaders throughout the crisis in East Timor. It was not until the 
United States cut military aid to Indonesia in September, that the Indonesian government 
invited the UN to restore order in East Timor. Third party actors also complicated the 
crisis in Rwanda, but that involved France more than the United States. For example, the 
RPF quickly swept through Rwanda and took power from Hutu extremists. France 
however, maintained that the Hutu were the proper government o f Rwanda. This did not 
involve the United States directly, but did complicate the crisis for France a great deal.
THE HYPOTHESES REVISITED
H i: The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer United States is to the crisis,
the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more peripheral 
interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the crisis, the 
less the president will push for intervention.
The three case studies show that despite competing factors in making foreign 
policy decisions, President Clinton remained mindful o f overarching goals, such as 
protecting vital and peripheral interests. When faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests, 
such as posed by refugee migration from Haiti, Clinton recognized that he needed support 
for intervention from international and domestic constituencies to maintain regional 
stability. For example, Clinton went to the UN to ask for a mandate to intervene with 
force. After receiving a nod of approval from Aristide and the OAS, the UN mandated 
the use of force under U.S. leadership. In addition, Clinton made an address to the public 
on the eve of the intervention to announce and explain to the American public the
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intervention in Haiti. The public response was favorable, and even though the president 
did not ask for congressional approval ahead o f time, the Congress was kept abreast of 
events and did not attempt to stop the intervention.
Geographic distance from the United States did impact the U.S. response to crisis. 
Our case studies demonstrate that the farther the crisis is from the United States the less 
the United States is to intervene. Rwanda and East Timor, for example, are very far from 
the United States and the United States did not use military force in either instance. Haiti 
however, is very close to the United States and the United States was compelled to 
intervene to end the refugee flow. In addition, geographic distance played a role in the 
U.S. policy o f endorsing regional powers to settle the crisis. This was observed in both 
Rwanda and East Timor, most likely because the cost o f intervention would be lower and 
the benefits higher for regional powers than for a distant country, such as the United 
States. Besides, the United States was spared participating in intervention, since France 
and Australia intervened in Rwanda and East Timor respectively.
At times Clinton hesitated to use force because he had to balance interests with 
demands and pressures from other constituencies and actors. During the crisis in East 
Timor, vital interests such as military, strategic, and economic interests in the U.S.- 
Indonesia relationship far outweighed vital and peripheral interests in the U.S.-East 
Timor relationship. The United States was not ready to risk its long-term and ongoing 
military partnership with Indonesia, at least until the international momentum against 
certain aspects of this relationship forced the United States to reevaluate the way 
Indonesia used its military and equipment. Once Clinton made this reevaluation, he 
announced that there would be no more forthcoming military assistance to Indonesia as
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long as its military supported militia in East Timor. Even after this reevaluation, 
however, Clinton limited U.S. participation in the UN mission to East Timor to minimal 
humanitarian assistance, because relations with Jakarta still remained more important to 
the United States than relations with Dili. Thus, Clinton’s hesitation to use force in East 
Timor was a function o f U.S. interests in Indonesia that held far more importance to 
policy makers than interests in tiny East Timor.
Geographic proximity also played a part in East Timor, but here the importance 
fell on its proximity to Indonesia, a long-time and critical ally o f the United States. As a 
result, the United States viewed the violence in East Timor as a side effect of the 
modernization and democratization in Indonesia. Clinton therefore recognized that 
resolution o f the crisis in Indonesia was key to resolving threats to the larger region. In 
this respect, Clinton had to be very careful to walk a thin line between offending 
important allies such as Indonesia, China, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines on one 
hand, and offending a sense of injustice supported by East Timor, Portugal and the UN in 
general. Clinton worked with Indonesia through diplomatic and economic means to end 
the suffering not only in East Timor, but all throughout Indonesia.
Clinton not only hesitated, but also refused to use force to stop civil violence in 
Rwanda, because the United States had few if any interests in Rwanda. There were no 
military, or strategic, and few economic ties to the country. The only U.S. interests in 
Rwanda were peripheral, having to do with international law and norms regarding human 
rights. Unfortunately, the United States cannot build policy based on principles and 
norms alone. Without threats to vital interests, the cost of U.S. intervention in a  hot civil 
conflict in Africa would have been too high to justify. As a result, Clinton hampered UN
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aspirations for intervention in Rwanda, because the costs outweighed the benefits of 
intervention in a place that ranked low for the United States in terms of U.S. vital and 
peripheral interests, congressional approval, public opinion and the media. Even though 
the UN invited member countries to participate in missions around the world this did not 
automatically ensure intervention. This was an important part o f the UN intervention in 
Rwanda, because after Belgium withdrew, the UN mission was unable to uphold order 
because many of the contributing countries had sent inexperienced and ill-equipped 
forces.
The U.S. Congress was not likely to support the use of military force abroad in 
either the case of Rwanda or East Timor. This response was more associated with the 
recent events in Somalia than geographic location of the crisis in question.
It was not until the media informed the public about the conditions in the refugee 
camps that Clinton sent humanitarian aid to Rwanda. Despite the financial expense of 
providing humanitarian assistance in a distant location, the risk to life and limb for 
American troops was low and the political benefit to the president at home was great.
As shown in the case studies, Clinton was not willing to risk the lives of 
American soldiers to intervene with force to stop ethnic violence either in Rwanda, or 
East Timor. While it is true that ethnic cleansing can and often does generate 
international instability, it is also true that such instability is generally regional-specific. 
Therefore, as the cases in this study demonstrate, the geographic proximity o f the crises 
in question along with the long-standing historical and political ties to the United States 
have an important impact on the decision whether to intervene. The closer regional
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instability is to the United States the more likely it is that U.S. leaders will be compelled 
to intervene.
H 2 : The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene.
Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will 
intervene.
This hypothesis is confirmed by the case studies examined in this dissertation. 
When France intervened in Southwest Rwanda to provide a safe haven for Hutu, it 
relieved any pressure on the United States to take action. As a result, the United States 
was not compelled to use force in Rwanda to end the violence. Moreover, once it became 
clear that humanitarian assistance was necessary, the United States sent assistance for a 
short period of time within a multilateral framework.
In the examination o f the case of Haiti, no U.S. ally came to light that was willing 
to intervene with force in Haiti. On the contrary, the OAS objected to the use o f military 
force to reinstate Aristide, preferring to use other means o f persuasion, such as economic 
sanctions. The OAS position remained opposed to the use o f force, but the appointment 
o f a new Secretary General softened its position, and then the OAS neither openly 
supported nor opposed the use of force. Therefore, even though no U.S. ally wanted to 
intervene in Haiti, there was also little opposition to the U.S. use o f force. This enabled 
the United States to intervene with force in Haiti without fear o f condemnation from the 
OAS. Consequently, pressure on the United States was not relieved, and as a result the 
United States was compelled to intervene to restore democratic rule.
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In the case o f East Timor, Portugal initiated negotiations in the UN to end the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor. It was not until Australia developed domestic 
pressures that it began to push for intervention. Even though Australia and Portugal 
approached the United States to send forces, the U.S. relations with Indonesia proved 
more important until September. In the meantime however, Australia intervened in East 
Timor to end the post-referendum violence. By doing so, Australia relieved pressures on 
the United States to contribute to the mission to any great extent. Thus, this hypothesis 
proves to be correct as shown in the case studies o f Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor.
H3 : The more the UN is likely to call for intervention, the more the United States is to
support it.
This hypothesis is problematic because it has a circular element in it. This is 
because the United States is a member of the Security Council from which resolutions are 
declared. Moreover, with the United States as a member o f the Security Council, the 
United States is as likely to influence other members o f the Council as it is to be 
influenced by others. Thus, this hypothesis is problematic, because the United States 
cannot influence itself.
Now, looking at our three case studies, the United States did not want to intervene 
in Rwanda in any way. Thus, when it came to the UN mandating a mission to help end 
violence in this country, the United States actively blocked any such action. Thus, the 
United States exercised more influence over the UN Security Council decisions than the 
other way around. Indeed, it was not until France announced that it was willing to
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intervene unilaterally, that the UN Security Council approved the mission that did not 
require the United States to participate.
In the case o f Haiti, the United States wanted to restore democracy and needed 
UN support. Initially, the United States followed the OAS lead. At some point, however 
the OAS-sponsored sanctions clearly failed, and the United States began to assume a 
more forceful role in resolving the crisis. Consequently, the OAS, limited by its charter, 
acquiesced to the use of force by not objecting. The United States appealed to the UN 
without objection from either the OAS or Aristide. In this case, the United States again 
exerted a large amount of influence over the decisions made by the UN Security Council 
to involve the Chapter VII mandate to use force.
The case o f East Timor reveals similar influence o f the United States in the UN 
Security Council. For reasons explained above, the United States did not want to 
participate in any military action against Indonesia in East Timor. This had many 
consequences, but the U.S. position made it difficult for Australia to receive the Chapter 
VII mandate to use force. Australia had to apply pressure on the United States not to 
block such a mandate. U.S. approval ultimately came with the condition that the United 
States would not participate in the intervention to any great extent. In the case of East 
Timor, the United States was a key element o f the UN Security Council decision 
regarding the authorization to use force to end the violence. Thus, the case studies 
suggest that this hypothesis is conflicted because the United States is a critical factor in 
the decisions regarding UN Security Council mandates.
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H4 : The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the
president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to 
oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.
This hypothesis is confirmed by our case studies. In Rwanda, the U.S. Congress 
not only resisted committing troops and firnds, but it also delayed paying already existing 
dues at the UN for previous peacekeeping activities. The crisis in Rwanda came at a time 
when Congress had turned to domestic affairs after Somalia. Thus, Congress was more 
concerned with containing costs and mission creep, than it was about ending the violence 
in a far away country in Africa. It was not until the images o f suffering refugees hit the 
news that Congress became more pliable in sending humanitarian aid. Even then 
however, Congress stipulated that allocated funds should be strictly used for non-military 
humanitarian operations. In addition, Congress demanded a pull-out deadline, 
reinforcing its position.
Congress was ambivalent at the time of the crisis in Haiti, and it remained 
deadlocked in debate over such issues as the president’s legal rights to use force. As a 
result, Clinton received relatively broad freedom to forge policy without congressional 
interference. Thus, the inability of Congress to make a commitment o f support or 
opposition o f the use o f force in Haiti had little effect on Clinton’s foreign policy in Haiti.
The crisis in East Timor invoked resistance to the president’s policy toward 
Indonesia, thereby sending the message that Congress did not approve o f U.S. implied 
involvement in militia activities in East Timor. Congress had already cut military aid to 
Indonesia in 1992. By the time of the referendum and ensuing violence, Congress 
favored using U.S. influence on Indonesia to end the human rights violations. It was
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shortly after this that President Clinton shifted the U.S. policy to withhold military aid to 
Indonesia, due to its involvement in supporting the militia activities in East Timor. Thus, 
congressional pressure on the president did occur just prior to the announced shift in U.S. 
policy, as Congress took a position against supporting Indonesia and the President 
acquiesced. Congress did not, however, go so far as to demand that the United States 
participate in the UN mission to East Timor, but it was instrumental in pressuring Jakarta 
to invite the UN force in to restore order.
H5 : The more the media opposes the president’s policy, the more public opinion will
engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding 
intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president’s policy, the 
less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president 
will be regarding intervention.
Public opinion is a highly influential variable in the policy-making process. As 
shown in the cases o f East Timor and Rwanda, Clinton hesitated to use force to stop civil 
violence because public sentiment opposed such action. In each case, the crisis was far 
away and in a part o f the world that is less well known to the American public. With less 
knowledge about the country and region in question, the public has more difficulty 
supporting costly policy, especially if  the benefits o f that policy are vague or unknown. 
Thus, selling intervention to the public in far away and less known places is more 
difficult. Moreover, if  the president is not interested in intervening in that part o f the 
world anyway, the disinterested public facilitates inaction, because it goes relatively 
unnoticed.
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In Haiti, public opinion was mixed and hovered around the 50 percent mark 
throughout the crisis. In effect, a divided public opinion allows the president greater 
latitude to forge policy, because the president can directly appeal to the public to generate 
greater support in either direction. In this way, the president can pull the public along 
with him, as policy gains momentum. In a case such as Haiti, where the public is more 
interested in the region in question, the public more readily absorbs the information it is 
offered either by the president or by the media. Thus, when the president addressed the 
public prior to the intervention in Haiti, public approval jumped to above the half way 
mark.
O f the three cases in this study, the Haiti case presented the most evidence that the 
U.S. public came the close to engaging elite decision makers in Congress, as a 
consequence of issues surrounding Haitian refugees. The public had more at stake due to 
the crisis in Haiti than in the crises in Rwanda or East Timor. Consequently, there was 
potential for political implications—at least in Florida—if the Haitian refugee situation 
went on unfettered. The crisis in Rwanda produced a public reaction to the plight in the 
refugee camps. Here, the public engaged elite decision makers to the extent that it 
generated a shift in the congressional position regarding humanitarian assistance.
Initially in Rwanda, the media relayed information to the public that was in line 
with official policy, calling the violence renewed civil war, rather than genocide. Once 
the refugee camps were established however, the media played an important role, because 
it helped public opinion engage elite decision makers to send humanitarian assistance. 
Once this took place, Congress also began to shift its position, thereby dividing the elites. 
Thus, once Congress saw public opinion shift, it also shifted. The media was
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instrumental in shifting both public opinion and for dividing elites. Therefore, as long as 
the media followed official rhetoric on Rwanda, there was no division in public opinion 
or Congress. However, once the media began to counter official rhetoric, by publicizing 
the suffering in refugee camps, the public engaged and division began to emerge in 
Congress as public engagement took effect.
Throughout the three cases, public opinion was mixed regarding intervention in 
Haiti, only reaching a slight majority after President Clinton made his address to the 
nation to plead his case for intervention. The role o f the media was similarly mixed. 
While the president’s address improved the likelihood that the public would favor 
intervention, critical news reports about the intervention itself possibly tempered public 
opinion. Thus, the mixed nature o f media reports during the crisis in Haiti left public 
opinion mixed, and no shift formed in Congress, which remained deadlocked in debate.
The media closely reflected the official position of the U.S. government during 
the crisis in East Timor. This included minimizing evidence of U.S. involvement or 
implication in military affairs in Indonesia that fueled militia intimidation of East 
Timorese. For the most part, the American public neither followed the crisis in East 
Timor, nor supported the use of military intervention to resolve it. Thus, the hypothesis 
is true, because the media endorsed the message o f the president, and the public did not 
form a lobby in Congress.
Therefore, this study suggests that in cases where public opinion becomes strong 
enough to engage elites in Congress, then a reassessment o f policy becomes possible. It 
also suggests, that in cases where the public remains disinterested, the public will not 
engage elite decision makers and there is little chance for a reevaluation o f policy.
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THE CLINTON DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CLINTON
In the second half of its first term, the Clinton administration moved “toward the 
political center. ” 9  International and domestic political forces prompted this moderate 
foreign policy. In many respects, Clinton was influenced by the extent o f U.S. interests, 
the availability o f international allies and world support, the amount o f congressional 
support as well as domestic public approval. This dissertation began with a central 
question: to what extent did Clinton uphold the principle that the United States would 
intervene to stop ethnic cleansing. This dissertation concludes that Clinton did not 
consistently uphold this principle. However, whenever possible, Clinton attempted to 
follow through on what some described as the Clinton Doctrine.
The examination o f U.S. interests in these three case studies reveals a great deal 
about the conditions for, and types of, intervention that Clinton was willing to risk. The 
key was to bring change at the right price, according to the risks involved. An evaluation 
o f U.S. interests revealed layers o f interests that are either vital or peripheral. As it turns 
out, ending ethnic violence is a peripheral interest, and is therefore much more difficult to 
uphold because it is an intangible end product that requires the payment of tangible costs. 
As a rule, foreign policy cannot be determined by intangible principles. Tangible costs 
include the likely loss o f life or limb of troops that are inevitably placed in harms way to 
end violence, even though technological advancement since 1975 has made intervention 
less costly in terms of risks to inherent dangers of warfare. In addition, intervention 
abroad is financially costly. Under such conditions, the costs must not outweigh the 
benefits o f intervention. Therefore, if ethnic violence occurs in a country in which the
9. Kurtz, Spin Cycle, xiv.
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United States has few financial interests, such as Rwanda or East Timor, then the 
intervention could cost more than benefit—in economic terms. The political costs o f 
intervention must also be matched with benefits. For example, in Rwanda, France 
perceived that its sphere of influence was coming under threat by expanding U.S. 
influence. Along this line, France had more interests at stake in Rwanda than did the 
United States. Consequently, France was compelled to intervene before the United 
States.
The claim that Clinton would defend human rights is a principled stand and is 
therefore difficult to substantiate. For example, despite rhetoric to end ethnic violence, 
Clinton did not order an intervention in Rwanda because the costs were greater than the 
benefits o f doing so. The United States did intervene in Haiti, but it did so because the 
political and economic benefits o f reasserting regional stability—and ending refugee 
migration—outweighed the costs. The United States did not intervene in East Timor, 
regardless o f human rights violations, because the political, diplomatic, economic, and 
military costs o f intervening were higher than were the benefits o f coming to the aid o f 
this tiny fledgling nation. Thus, Clinton’s rhetoric supporting human rights was not in 
line with U.S. interests at all times. Clinton ultimately had to take U.S. vital, as well as 
peripheral interests into consideration as part o f the decision whether to intervene. The 
Clinton Doctrine therefore places Clinton under pressure to trade peripheral interests for 
vital interests, which is unreasonable.
The case studies demonstrate that U.S. allies play an important role in the 
formulation of foreign policy. Obviously, you cannot have a “foreign” policy without 
other countries, but consider the implications o f anarchy. International relations
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essentially encapsulate the actions of states to independently or collectively overcome the 
effects o f anarchy. The goal o f each state is to maximize its position within the 
international system. Consequently there is tremendous competition, but also 
cooperation. The cases in this study show that U.S. allies do impact U.S. foreign policy 
and the way the United States behaves in the international system. In both Rwanda and 
East Timor, U.S. allies were extremely influential on United States foreign policy 
because as the superpower, the United States was effectively relieved of the “sheriffs” 
obligation to respond, if  and when one of its allies did the job first. In Rwanda, France 
intervened to provide a safe haven for the Hutu. Australia filled this role in East Timor. 
This option was not available in the case of Haiti, because the regional hegemon is the 
United States, so there was no other country left to fill this role.
In addition, U.S.-French competition for expanding or maintaining a sphere of 
influence in Africa added an element of complication to the crisis. Here we can directly 
observe the competition to maximize position under anarchy, as mentioned above. 
Similarly, the fact that Australia is considered a “Western” power brought increased 
strain in relations around the larger region, because Indonesia demanded a higher level of 
Asian participation, yet Japan was reluctant to participate since it fell into trouble in 
Cambodia. This element o f competition was lacking in the case o f Haiti, because the 
United States dominates the region.
Clearly, U.S. relations with allies in each crisis are rooted in the concept of 
anarchy, because each one deals with actors out to maximize their position within the 
system. For the Hutu, it meant eliminating the Tutsi, but retaining a French alliance, 
while misleading the UN. For the Tutsi, it meant fighting for survival, and that also
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meant regaining leadership in the state of Rwanda. Cedras took the government away 
from the democratically elected leader and held it for four years. East Timor was a case 
in which this tiny half-island was buffeted between occupying forces and stood for the 
first time to attain independence, but needed outside support and assistance. In each case, 
U.S. allies played a large role in defining the events and policy over time.
Clinton embarked upon the presidency, endorsing a policy to uphold humanitarian 
rights, as a catalyst for engineering change. According to Michael Jackson, Clinton did 
well, while in office, to support international stability in the much less stable post-cold 
war era . 10 He supported “assertive multilateralism” to achieve this lofty goal. Under 
such conditions, the UN becomes an important forum for building international 
consensus and authority for legitimizing and administering intervention. When 
evaluating the Clinton Doctrine, we cannot forget that ending ethnic violence is 
potentially a very costly undertaking for any nation. The costs must remain within the 
capabilities o f the intervening nation. It is more cost effective to resolve ethnic crises 
within a multilateral framework. The UN provides a system for burden sharing, so that 
no single country must pay all costs. The UN ultimately mandated the intervention in 
each case study. Moreover, the costs of intervention were spread over the shoulders of 
several countries, even though one self-selected country chose to lead the mission and in 
fact, pushed for intervention.
That the international community in general, and the UN specifically, would 
institutionalize and uphold norms and laws against ethnic cleansing is unprecedented. It 
is clear that the UN fulfilled its function of creating consensus for international policy.
10. Jackson, “Something Must Be Done?,” 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
259
More importantly, the UN informed members about the crises and thereby enabled the 
world body to negotiate peacefully. In this case, information is very important, because 
if countries remained uninformed of the goals and intent o f the intervention exercise, then 
there would be an increased perceived threat to international and regional stability. For 
example, Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher explain that “there is a growing international 
awareness o f the linkage between human rights abuses, forcible displacement of civilian 
populations, and local, regional and international security . ” 11 Stemming regional 
instability due to refugee migration is in the interest o f any country. This plays out in all 
three o f the case studies in this dissertation, in which refugees generated tension within 
the region. In all three cases, the UN authorized military intervention to restore order in 
the afflicted country. In each case, the public mood in the specific country with the most 
interests in regional stability influenced that country’s decision to intervene. Because 
humanitarian intervention is based on principles, it can only be practiced when the 
benefits o f such action outweigh the costs. Thus, the UN played a vital role in resolving 
each of these crises by making the intervention activities transparent and more cost 
effective and consequently less threatening to regional actors and other allies.
Once situations o f ethnic violence hit the news media, they usually bring about a 
global outcry. Once this happens, world leaders come under pressure to do something to 
halt this type o f injustice. This public response is a relatively new phenomenon in 
history, and suggests that norms and principles supporting human rights have increased at 
domestic and international levels in recent years. Ethnic cleansing violates the most 
essential human right—the right to life. This issue touches deep American ideological
11. Dowty and Loescher, “Refugee Flows,” 43.
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sentiment, and encounters part o f the American identity. For this reason, presidential 
rhetoric favoring ending human rights violations, such as found in the Clinton Doctrine, 
invokes American beliefs in the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit o f happiness. 
Therefore, such rhetoric would naturally have powerful political appeal to the American 
public.
Despite this ideological appeal, the cases in this study did not show that the 
American public consistently supported or demanded that the U.S. government use force 
to end ethnic violence abroad. What they did show however, was that the American 
public more readily demands humanitarian assistance to be sent to refugees in need. This 
was substantiated in instances, when horrible images o f the Goma refugee camps brought 
about a U.S. public response. This suggests that even though the American public enjoys 
rhetoric such as the Clinton Doctrine, promising to end ethnic violence, when it comes 
right down to doing it, there is a tremendous disconnect. Therefore, while the American 
public wants to hear benevolent rhetoric, it does not have the stomach to actually send 
American troops into harms way.
We cannot be so foolish as to forget, however, that if  indeed the public mood 
were to become insistent, then it would not only serve the political interest of the 
president to stop such violence, but would place pressure on him to do so. This is seen in 
the case studies in this dissertation by the fact that Congress tends to remain extremely 
aware o f public sentiment and acts accordingly. This was exemplified in all three cases.
The case o f Rwanda shows that the American public had no real interest in 
intervening to end the violence and neither did Congress. Congress did not make great 
efforts to end the violence or to pay the UN dues for the peacekeeping effort. Indeed, it
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was not until after the formation of the deadly conditions in the refugee camps that the 
public began to show some shift in the direction o f sending assistance. Congress 
followed the same trajectory as the public and resisted the use o f force to put down the 
violence, however, readily sent assistance once it became more politically charged. In 
Haiti, the public was divided right up until the president’s address to the nation on the eve 
of the intervention, after which there was a small spike in public approval. Likewise, 
Congress was deadlocked in debate until just after the intervention, at which time it 
approved in a post mortem resolution.
The situation in East Timor revealed that the American public had little 
knowledge of, or interest in stopping the violence. Congress, for its part was less 
concerned with taking action to end the violence in East Timor, than it was over shutting 
off funding for military assistance that doggedly continued to flow to Indonesia and the 
militia in East Timor. This military aid implicated the United States in supporting the 
militia in its reign o f terror throughout East Timor. This was important because once the 
media began to spread this message, it made the United States appear to be an 
accomplice, and the American public does not tolerate this sort o f injustice for very long. 
Moreover, the risk of public disapproval or opposition increased. As explained in an 
earlier chapter, once the public catalyzes a response in opposition, then elites in Congress 
are more likely to take notice. Consequently, implications of U.S. involvement providing 
training and equipment to the militia via Indonesia could have led to a political scandal. 
Thus, continued military assistance to Indonesia inherently had deep political 
undercurrents and high risks. Thus, it was in the political self-interest o f politicians to
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avoid connection to scandals of this extreme nature, and Congress acted to reinforce 
earlier decisions to end military aid to Indonesia.
The Clinton Doctrine announced that eliminating ethnic cleansing was in the 
interest of the United States. It stood to reason that Clinton was committed and willing to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to achieve this goal. However, as much 
as he would have liked, he was not free to intervene everywhere, because of constraints 
placed on him, either by U.S. interests, the UN, allies, the U.S. Congress, or the public 
and the media. These considerations served to remind Clinton of political and other risks 
involved in trying to fulfill unreasonable goals. Foreign policy is very complicated and 
can change over time because of conflicting pressures on the president. The variables 
examined in this dissertation helped shape foreign policy under Clinton, as he searched 
for the best foreign policy alternative.
We have seen in the cases of Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor that alternative 
variables placed pressure on the president. They either pressured him to act, or 
constrained him. As a rational actor, the president must assess each alternative according 
to desired outcomes and weigh the costs and benefits o f his decision. This process was 
evident in the case o f Haiti, in which Clinton sought to resolve the crisis in democracy 
through progressively deepening commitment, beginning with sanctions, progressing to 
an embargo, reaching agreement, then military deterrence, to ultimate use of military 
force. In this instance, by the time Clinton ordered military use of force, he had 
exhausted his options in negotiations, sanctions, and incentives.
Policy outcomes did not necessarily include the use o f U.S. military force to end 
ethnic violence abroad. Clinton learned quickly in Somalia, for example, that the United
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States, despite its prowess, cannot successfully intervene everywhere without first 
assessing the costs and benefits involved. Either the United States must be willing to 
embrace the necessary costs, or the president must be willing to absorb the risked 
political price if  intervention does not succeed. Clinton delivered rhetoric with mastery, 
but as shown in our case studies, he was unable to end ethnic violence. The conclusion 
of this study suggests, surprisingly, that Clinton did in fact fulfill the Clinton Doctrine, 
because it was a qualified statement—that the United States would stop ethnic cleansing 
whenever possible. This conclusion unfortunately places greater emphasis on the 
qualification than the message.
The qualification encompasses the impact of the five variables in this dissertation 
on the foreign policy process. While all o f these variables— U.S. interests, allies, the UN, 
Congress, and public opinion and the media—do matter, U.S. interests are the primary 
contributing variable. Public opinion is expected to be the most influential variable, but it 
has relatively little influence on foreign policy, that is unless and until it catalyzes a lobby 
that reaches elite decision makers. Rather, the president has tools at his command to 
monitor public sentiment and to lead public opinion and the media. Congress is 
especially influential in areas where it can limit the budget, but also when it influences 
public opinion, informs the media, and demands reports from the president. In addition 
to these domestic factors, the president must consider international variables as well.
U.S. allies proved to be highly influential on U.S. foreign policy during the three crises 
examined in this study. Moreover, U.S. membership in the UN was shown to motivate 
other countries to take or not to take specific actions, as well as to pressure the United 
States to alter the direction of foreign policy. Thus, this study demonstrates that Clinton
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did fulfill the Clinton Doctrine, to the highest degree possible, according to the opposing 
winds o f influence from each o f the five variables examined. These opposing forces 
served to moderate, shape, and balance Clinton’s foreign policy by limiting the number 
o f acceptable alternatives.
The pitfalls of this holistic approach are that foreign policy is extremely complex 
and the variables can and often do interact with one another and therefore they have some 
feedback between them. This is seen most clearly in the case o f U.S.-UN interaction, in 
which U.S. foreign policy is influenced by UN Security Council decisions that are 
themselves heavily dependent on U.S. policies. Moreover, the holistic nature o f this 
framework intrinsically omits influences on foreign policy that could prove informative. 
For example, individual analysis could be included to address the impact o f personality, 
belief systems, analogical and imaging cognition, as well as group dynamics, and rational 
choice o f the president’s decisions at the personal level. This framework could also 
benefit from the inclusion o f analysis on interest groups and multinational corporations, 
as they continue to increase in importance.
This study is important to the field o f international relations, because it examines 
foreign policy within a framework of variables that impact foreign policy on a holistic 
level. The applicability o f this framework can be used evaluate other foreign policy 
decisions to help analysts predict and understand complex foreign policy outcomes. The 
framework in this dissertation is not time sensitive, and can be applied to other crises and 
events than those in this study. Additionally, this framework is not context dependent, 
because it can be applied across different administrations.
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To demonstrate the applicability o f the analysis in this dissertation, consider 
briefly the ongoing deliberations on a possible war against Iraq. Negotiations in the 
United Nations are delicate and there is contention that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could 
cause future regional complications. To find a way through difficult negotiations, the UN 
Security Council must focus on the necessity for inspections for weapons o f mass 
destruction. Negotiations are confounded because Russian government is reluctant to 
sign onto the intervention against Iraq, because of the U.S. position against a possible 
Russian intervention in Georgia. France hesitates to endorse a single UN resolution, 
preferring a double resolution instead. The first resolution might call for adherence to 
international inspection for weapons of mass destruction, with the second mandating 
enforcement to automatically come into force with violation o f the first. Interestingly, 
both France and Russia agree that inspectors should not enter Iraq without a resolution. 
China is hesitant, insisting that in the case a resolution can be passed, the U.S. must abide 
by it to the letter.
The U.S. allies are also sending mixed messages to the White House. France 
resists U.S. military use o f force in Iraq because o f larger unresolved regional issues. 
Considerable German opposition came to light in the summer 2002, when the Chancelor 
Schroeder built his campaign against any military intervention in Iraq. This opposition 
sparked significant diplomatic tensions between the two countries, as shown by President 
Bush’s failure to make the customary congratulatory phone call to Chancelor Schroeder 
upon his reelection. Despite such reluctance from two key partners in Europe, the United 
Kingdom remained firmly supportive of the U.S. policy, and has helped build the case for 
quick military action. Finally, Israel’s response to an Iraqi missile attack aimed at its
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territory remains unclear, and the impact o f such a response, should it occur, on regional 
stability continues to be a central U.S. concern.
After much deliberation, the U.S. Congress passed a bipartisan resolution 
approving the use o f military force in Iraq. The vote in the Senate was 77 to 23 in favor 
of the resolution, and the House passed the Resolution with a margin of 296 to 133.12 
The final resolution, however, also highlighted the importance o f diplomatic measures 
designed to achieve a multilateral approach to the issue. The majority in Congress 
reflects public opinion polls that showed a 62 to 67 percent majority of the American 
public in favor o f a military intervention in Iraq, but the figures dropped significantly 
when unilateral. Clearly the American public supports this pending intervention.
Our framework shows, therefore, that despite the fact that Europe is disinclined to 
support U.S. action in Iraq, it is faced with few choices. Congress and the American 
public support the action and the media facilitates the transmission of information 
without opposition. This leaves President Bush with “extraordinary flexibility” to
1 Q
intervene in Iraq. In addition, vital interests are at stake in the Middle East for Europe 
and the United States as well. Thus, the remaining piece in this framework is that it 
would be best for the UN Security Council would adopt a suitable resolution that would 
give a likely U.S. military action the multilateral legitimacy sought by the Bush 
administration.
In conclusion, this dissertation builds on the existing body of literature on foreign
12. See “Senate, in 77-33  Vote, passes Iraq Resolution,” New York Times, 11 October 2002 ,1; and 
“Congress Passes Iraq Resolution: Overwhelming Approval gives Bush Authority to Attack Unilaterally,” 
New York Times, 11 October 200 2 ,1 .
13. Glenn Kessler, “A  Muscular First Step: Bush Gains Freedom, Negotiating Power,” The 
Washington Post, 11 October 2002, 1.
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policy and intervention, and takes into account international relations theory, highlighting 
the importance of international and domestic forces that shape policy decisions to use 
military force abroad. This is an original study that approaches foreign policy and 
intervention in a holistic method, encompassing the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S. 
Congress, public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests. This study shows that these 
variables significantly shape the course of foreign policy decisions emanating from the 
White House by focusing on small scale, low intensity, and low risk crises, but the 
framework suggested in this study could also be useful for examining large scale, high 
intensity, and high risk crises.
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